惯性聚合 高效追踪和阅读你感兴趣的博客、新闻、科技资讯
阅读原文 在惯性聚合中打开

推荐订阅源

N
Netflix TechBlog - Medium
G
Google Developers Blog
H
Hackread – Cybersecurity News, Data Breaches, AI and More
T
The Blog of Author Tim Ferriss
Microsoft Azure Blog
Microsoft Azure Blog
GbyAI
GbyAI
L
LangChain Blog
云风的 BLOG
云风的 BLOG
OSCHINA 社区最新新闻
OSCHINA 社区最新新闻
aimingoo的专栏
aimingoo的专栏
P
Proofpoint News Feed
Cyber Security Advisories - MS-ISAC
Cyber Security Advisories - MS-ISAC
小众软件
小众软件
WordPress大学
WordPress大学
A
About on SuperTechFans
大猫的无限游戏
大猫的无限游戏
C
Check Point Blog
月光博客
月光博客
Stack Overflow Blog
Stack Overflow Blog
美团技术团队
Jina AI
Jina AI
T
Tailwind CSS Blog
Google DeepMind News
Google DeepMind News
D
Docker

cs.CR updates on arXiv.org

Agentic Vulnerability Reasoning on Windows COM Binaries From Beats to Breaches:How Offensive AI Infers Sensitive User Information from Playlists Undetectable Backdoors in Model Parameters: Hiding Sparse Secrets in High Dimensions When Embedding-Based Defenses Fail: Rethinking Safety in LLM-Based Multi-Agent Systems Token-Efficient Change Detection in LLM APIs Selfie-Capture Dynamics as an Auxiliary Signal Against Deepfakes and Injection Attacks for Mobile Identity Verification Trident: Improving Malware Detection with LLMs and Behavioral Features When Alignment Isn't Enough: Response-Path Attacks on LLM Agents RefusalGuard: Geometry-Preserving Fine-Tuning for Safety in LLMs Checkerboard: A Simple, Effective, Efficient and Learning-free Clean Label Backdoor Attack with Low Poisoning Budget Block-wise Codeword Embedding for Reliable Multi-bit Text Watermarking Secret Stealing Attacks on Local LLM Fine-Tuning through Supply-Chain Model Code Backdoors Enhancing Linux Privilege Escalation Attack Capabilities of Local LLM Agents Defusing the Trigger: Plug-and-Play Defense for Backdoored LLMs via Tail-Risk Intrinsic Geometric Smoothing Evaluating Jailbreaking Vulnerabilities in LLMs Deployed as Assistants for Smart Grid Operations: A Benchmark Against NERC Standards Behavioral Canaries: Auditing Private Retrieved Context Usage in RL Fine-Tuning FlexServe: A Fast and Secure LLM Serving System for Mobile Devices with Flexible Resource Isolation Breaking MCP with Function Hijacking Attacks: Novel Threats for Function Calling and Agentic Models Text Steganography with Dynamic Codebook and Multimodal Large Language Model An AI Agent Execution Environment to Safeguard User Data TwoHamsters: Benchmarking Multi-Concept Compositional Unsafety in Text-to-Image Models Fundamental Limitations of Favorable Privacy-Utility Guarantees for DP-SGD Symbolic Guardrails for Domain-Specific Agents: Stronger Safety and Security Guarantees Without Sacrificing Utility Hardening x402: PII-Safe Agentic Payments via Pre-Execution Metadata Filtering QShield: Securing Neural Networks Against Adversarial Attacks using Quantum Circuits Hijacking Text Heritage: Hiding the Human Signature through Homoglyphic Substitution Like a Hammer, It Can Build, It Can Break: Large Language Model Uses, Perceptions, and Adoption in Cybersecurity Operations on Reddit Private Seeds, Public LLMs: Realistic and Privacy-Preserving Synthetic Data Generation One Word at a Time: Incremental Completion Decomposition Breaks LLM Safety Measuring and Exploiting Contextual Bias in LLM-Assisted Security Code Review
Mitigating Malicious Attacks in Federated Learning via Co...
Qilei Li, Ahmed M. Abdelmoniem · 2024-08-06 · via cs.CR updates on arXiv.org

Federated Learning (FL) is a distributed machine learning diagram that enables multiple clients to collaboratively train a global model without sharing their private local data. However, FL systems are vulnerable to attacks that are happening in malicious clients through data poisoning and model poisoning, which can deteriorate the performance of aggregated global model. Existing defense methods typically focus on mitigating specific types of poisoning and are often ineffective against unseen types of attack. These methods also assume an attack happened moderately while is not always holds true in real. Consequently, these methods can significantly fail in terms of accuracy and robustness when detecting and addressing updates from attacked malicious clients. To overcome these challenges, in this work, we propose a simple yet effective framework to detect malicious clients, namely Confidence-Aware Defense (CAD), that utilizes the confidence scores of local models as criteria to evaluate the reliability of local updates. Our key insight is that malicious attacks, regardless of attack type, will cause the model to deviate from its previous state, thus leading to increased uncertainty when making predictions. Therefore, CAD is comprehensively effective for both model poisoning and data poisoning attacks by accurately identifying and mitigating potential malicious updates, even under varying degrees of attacks and data heterogeneity. Experimental results demonstrate that our method significantly enhances the robustness of FL systems against various types of attacks across various scenarios by achieving higher model accuracy and stability.