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cs.CR updates on arXiv.org

Agentic Vulnerability Reasoning on Windows COM Binaries From Beats to Breaches:How Offensive AI Infers Sensitive User Information from Playlists Undetectable Backdoors in Model Parameters: Hiding Sparse Secrets in High Dimensions When Embedding-Based Defenses Fail: Rethinking Safety in LLM-Based Multi-Agent Systems Token-Efficient Change Detection in LLM APIs Selfie-Capture Dynamics as an Auxiliary Signal Against Deepfakes and Injection Attacks for Mobile Identity Verification Trident: Improving Malware Detection with LLMs and Behavioral Features When Alignment Isn't Enough: Response-Path Attacks on LLM Agents RefusalGuard: Geometry-Preserving Fine-Tuning for Safety in LLMs Checkerboard: A Simple, Effective, Efficient and Learning-free Clean Label Backdoor Attack with Low Poisoning Budget Block-wise Codeword Embedding for Reliable Multi-bit Text Watermarking Secret Stealing Attacks on Local LLM Fine-Tuning through Supply-Chain Model Code Backdoors Enhancing Linux Privilege Escalation Attack Capabilities of Local LLM Agents Defusing the Trigger: Plug-and-Play Defense for Backdoored LLMs via Tail-Risk Intrinsic Geometric Smoothing Evaluating Jailbreaking Vulnerabilities in LLMs Deployed as Assistants for Smart Grid Operations: A Benchmark Against NERC Standards Behavioral Canaries: Auditing Private Retrieved Context Usage in RL Fine-Tuning FlexServe: A Fast and Secure LLM Serving System for Mobile Devices with Flexible Resource Isolation Breaking MCP with Function Hijacking Attacks: Novel Threats for Function Calling and Agentic Models Text Steganography with Dynamic Codebook and Multimodal Large Language Model An AI Agent Execution Environment to Safeguard User Data TwoHamsters: Benchmarking Multi-Concept Compositional Unsafety in Text-to-Image Models Fundamental Limitations of Favorable Privacy-Utility Guarantees for DP-SGD Symbolic Guardrails for Domain-Specific Agents: Stronger Safety and Security Guarantees Without Sacrificing Utility Hardening x402: PII-Safe Agentic Payments via Pre-Execution Metadata Filtering QShield: Securing Neural Networks Against Adversarial Attacks using Quantum Circuits Hijacking Text Heritage: Hiding the Human Signature through Homoglyphic Substitution Like a Hammer, It Can Build, It Can Break: Large Language Model Uses, Perceptions, and Adoption in Cybersecurity Operations on Reddit Private Seeds, Public LLMs: Realistic and Privacy-Preserving Synthetic Data Generation One Word at a Time: Incremental Completion Decomposition Breaks LLM Safety Measuring and Exploiting Contextual Bias in LLM-Assisted Security Code Review
Privacy preserving layer partitioning for Deep Neural Net...
Kishore Rajasekar, Randolph Loh, Kar Wai Fok, Vrizlynn L. L. Thi · 2024-04-11 · via cs.CR updates on arXiv.org

MLaaS (Machine Learning as a Service) has become popular in the cloud computing domain, allowing users to leverage cloud resources for running private inference of ML models on their data. However, ensuring user input privacy and secure inference execution is essential. One of the approaches to protect data privacy and integrity is to use Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) by enabling execution of programs in secure hardware enclave. Using TEEs can introduce significant performance overhead due to the additional layers of encryption, decryption, security and integrity checks. This can lead to slower inference times compared to running on unprotected hardware. In our work, we enhance the runtime performance of ML models by introducing layer partitioning technique and offloading computations to GPU. The technique comprises two distinct partitions: one executed within the TEE, and the other carried out using a GPU accelerator. Layer partitioning exposes intermediate feature maps in the clear which can lead to reconstruction attacks to recover the input. We conduct experiments to demonstrate the effectiveness of our approach in protecting against input reconstruction attacks developed using trained conditional Generative Adversarial Network(c-GAN). The evaluation is performed on widely used models such as VGG-16, ResNet-50, and EfficientNetB0, using two datasets: ImageNet for Image classification and TON IoT dataset for cybersecurity attack detection.