惯性聚合 高效追踪和阅读你感兴趣的博客、新闻、科技资讯
阅读原文 在惯性聚合中打开

推荐订阅源

N
Netflix TechBlog - Medium
罗磊的独立博客
云风的 BLOG
云风的 BLOG
Last Week in AI
Last Week in AI
Y
Y Combinator Blog
小众软件
小众软件
Blog — PlanetScale
Blog — PlanetScale
T
The Blog of Author Tim Ferriss
freeCodeCamp Programming Tutorials: Python, JavaScript, Git & More
月光博客
月光博客
博客园 - Franky
F
Fortinet All Blogs
D
Docker
博客园 - 司徒正美
腾讯CDC
Recent Announcements
Recent Announcements
The Cloudflare Blog
B
Blog RSS Feed
GbyAI
GbyAI
T
Tailwind CSS Blog
雷峰网
雷峰网
Cyber Security Advisories - MS-ISAC
Cyber Security Advisories - MS-ISAC
博客园 - 三生石上(FineUI控件)
阮一峰的网络日志
阮一峰的网络日志

cs.CR updates on arXiv.org

Agentic Vulnerability Reasoning on Windows COM Binaries From Beats to Breaches:How Offensive AI Infers Sensitive User Information from Playlists Undetectable Backdoors in Model Parameters: Hiding Sparse Secrets in High Dimensions When Embedding-Based Defenses Fail: Rethinking Safety in LLM-Based Multi-Agent Systems Token-Efficient Change Detection in LLM APIs Selfie-Capture Dynamics as an Auxiliary Signal Against Deepfakes and Injection Attacks for Mobile Identity Verification Trident: Improving Malware Detection with LLMs and Behavioral Features When Alignment Isn't Enough: Response-Path Attacks on LLM Agents RefusalGuard: Geometry-Preserving Fine-Tuning for Safety in LLMs Checkerboard: A Simple, Effective, Efficient and Learning-free Clean Label Backdoor Attack with Low Poisoning Budget Block-wise Codeword Embedding for Reliable Multi-bit Text Watermarking Secret Stealing Attacks on Local LLM Fine-Tuning through Supply-Chain Model Code Backdoors Enhancing Linux Privilege Escalation Attack Capabilities of Local LLM Agents Defusing the Trigger: Plug-and-Play Defense for Backdoored LLMs via Tail-Risk Intrinsic Geometric Smoothing Evaluating Jailbreaking Vulnerabilities in LLMs Deployed as Assistants for Smart Grid Operations: A Benchmark Against NERC Standards Behavioral Canaries: Auditing Private Retrieved Context Usage in RL Fine-Tuning FlexServe: A Fast and Secure LLM Serving System for Mobile Devices with Flexible Resource Isolation Breaking MCP with Function Hijacking Attacks: Novel Threats for Function Calling and Agentic Models Text Steganography with Dynamic Codebook and Multimodal Large Language Model An AI Agent Execution Environment to Safeguard User Data TwoHamsters: Benchmarking Multi-Concept Compositional Unsafety in Text-to-Image Models Fundamental Limitations of Favorable Privacy-Utility Guarantees for DP-SGD Symbolic Guardrails for Domain-Specific Agents: Stronger Safety and Security Guarantees Without Sacrificing Utility Hardening x402: PII-Safe Agentic Payments via Pre-Execution Metadata Filtering QShield: Securing Neural Networks Against Adversarial Attacks using Quantum Circuits Hijacking Text Heritage: Hiding the Human Signature through Homoglyphic Substitution Like a Hammer, It Can Build, It Can Break: Large Language Model Uses, Perceptions, and Adoption in Cybersecurity Operations on Reddit Private Seeds, Public LLMs: Realistic and Privacy-Preserving Synthetic Data Generation One Word at a Time: Incremental Completion Decomposition Breaks LLM Safety Measuring and Exploiting Contextual Bias in LLM-Assisted Security Code Review
RouteMark: A Fingerprint for Intellectual Property Attrib...
Xin He, Junxi Shen, Zhenheng Tang, Xiaowen Chu, Bo Li, Ivor W. T · 2025-08-03 · via cs.CR updates on arXiv.org

Model merging via Mixture-of-Experts (MoE) has emerged as a scalable solution for consolidating multiple task-specific models into a unified sparse architecture, where each expert is derived from a model fine-tuned on a distinct task. While effective for multi-task integration, this paradigm introduces a critical yet underexplored challenge: how to attribute and protect the intellectual property (IP) of individual experts after merging. We propose RouteMark, a framework for IP protection in merged MoE models through the design of expert routing fingerprints. Our key insight is that task-specific experts exhibit stable and distinctive routing behaviors under probing inputs. To capture these patterns, we construct expert-level fingerprints using two complementary statistics: the Routing Score Fingerprint (RSF), quantifying the intensity of expert activation, and the Routing Preference Fingerprint (RPF), characterizing the input distribution that preferentially activates each expert. These fingerprints are reproducible, task-discriminative, and lightweight to construct. For attribution and tampering detection, we introduce a similarity-based matching algorithm that compares expert fingerprints between a suspect and a reference (victim) model. Extensive experiments across diverse tasks and CLIP-based MoE architectures show that RouteMark consistently yields high similarity for reused experts and clear separation from unrelated ones. Moreover, it remains robust against both structural tampering (expert replacement, addition, deletion) and parametric tampering (fine-tuning, pruning, permutation), outperforming weight- and activation-based baseliness. Our work lays the foundation for RouteMark as a practical and broadly applicable framework for IP verification in MoE-based model merging.