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cs.CR updates on arXiv.org

Agentic Vulnerability Reasoning on Windows COM Binaries From Beats to Breaches:How Offensive AI Infers Sensitive User Information from Playlists Undetectable Backdoors in Model Parameters: Hiding Sparse Secrets in High Dimensions When Embedding-Based Defenses Fail: Rethinking Safety in LLM-Based Multi-Agent Systems Token-Efficient Change Detection in LLM APIs Selfie-Capture Dynamics as an Auxiliary Signal Against Deepfakes and Injection Attacks for Mobile Identity Verification Trident: Improving Malware Detection with LLMs and Behavioral Features When Alignment Isn't Enough: Response-Path Attacks on LLM Agents RefusalGuard: Geometry-Preserving Fine-Tuning for Safety in LLMs Checkerboard: A Simple, Effective, Efficient and Learning-free Clean Label Backdoor Attack with Low Poisoning Budget Block-wise Codeword Embedding for Reliable Multi-bit Text Watermarking Secret Stealing Attacks on Local LLM Fine-Tuning through Supply-Chain Model Code Backdoors Enhancing Linux Privilege Escalation Attack Capabilities of Local LLM Agents Defusing the Trigger: Plug-and-Play Defense for Backdoored LLMs via Tail-Risk Intrinsic Geometric Smoothing Evaluating Jailbreaking Vulnerabilities in LLMs Deployed as Assistants for Smart Grid Operations: A Benchmark Against NERC Standards Behavioral Canaries: Auditing Private Retrieved Context Usage in RL Fine-Tuning FlexServe: A Fast and Secure LLM Serving System for Mobile Devices with Flexible Resource Isolation Breaking MCP with Function Hijacking Attacks: Novel Threats for Function Calling and Agentic Models Text Steganography with Dynamic Codebook and Multimodal Large Language Model An AI Agent Execution Environment to Safeguard User Data TwoHamsters: Benchmarking Multi-Concept Compositional Unsafety in Text-to-Image Models Fundamental Limitations of Favorable Privacy-Utility Guarantees for DP-SGD Symbolic Guardrails for Domain-Specific Agents: Stronger Safety and Security Guarantees Without Sacrificing Utility Hardening x402: PII-Safe Agentic Payments via Pre-Execution Metadata Filtering QShield: Securing Neural Networks Against Adversarial Attacks using Quantum Circuits Hijacking Text Heritage: Hiding the Human Signature through Homoglyphic Substitution Like a Hammer, It Can Build, It Can Break: Large Language Model Uses, Perceptions, and Adoption in Cybersecurity Operations on Reddit Private Seeds, Public LLMs: Realistic and Privacy-Preserving Synthetic Data Generation One Word at a Time: Incremental Completion Decomposition Breaks LLM Safety Measuring and Exploiting Contextual Bias in LLM-Assisted Security Code Review
Towards Demystifying and Repairing LLM-in-the-Loop Vulner...
[Submitted on 27 May 2026 (v1), last revised 3 Jul 2026 (this ve · 2026-05-27 · via cs.CR updates on arXiv.org

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Abstract:Large Language Models (LLMs) have been actively integrated into modern software systems as critical components, introducing a new type of software vulnerability, LLM-in-the-Loop (LiL) vulnerability, in which threats are caused by LLMs. Although some studies have attempted to investigate the impact of LiL vulnerabilities, they have unfortunately failed to clearly distinguish LiL vulnerabilities from conventional ones, leaving the understanding of real-world LiL vulnerabilities an open problem. To address this gap, we first clearly define the scope of LiL vulnerability, and discuss the differences between LiL vulnerabilities and vulnerabilities that exist in LLM systems but are not really caused by LLMs (i.e., LLM-ecosystem vulnerabilities). Then, we construct the first LiL vulnerability dataset, LiLCVE, covering 41 LiL vulnerabilities and 75 LLM-ecosystem vulnerabilities, to facilitate the risk analysis of LLM-integrated software. The analysis of LiLCVE reveals that LiL vulnerabilities have higher severity than LLM-ecosystem vulnerabilities and conventional software vulnerabilities, with 15.5% and 30.3% more critical vulnerabilities, respectively. Furthermore, given the high severity of LiL vulnerabilities and the potential of LLM-based vulnerability repair methods in patching conventional software vulnerabilities. We explore the capabilities of existing widely-used LLM-based methods in repairing vulnerabilities in LiLCVE. Experimental results on 20 agent-model configuration demonstrate that LiL vulnerabilities are far more challenging to fix, with an average decrease of 10.8% Pass@1 rate compared to other types of vulnerabilities. More critically, three categories, Generated Query Execution, Agent Action, and Model Output Rendering, frequently receive 0% repair success rates.

Submission history

From: Qiang Hu [view email]
[v1] Wed, 27 May 2026 08:11:37 UTC (1,957 KB)
[v2] Fri, 3 Jul 2026 07:41:40 UTC (792 KB)