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On the Security of Research Artifacts SafeHarbor: Hierarchical Memory-Augmented Guardrail for LLM Agent Safety Agentic Vulnerability Reasoning on Windows COM Binaries From Beats to Breaches:How Offensive AI Infers Sensitive User Information from Playlists Undetectable Backdoors in Model Parameters: Hiding Sparse Secrets in High Dimensions When Embedding-Based Defenses Fail: Rethinking Safety in LLM-Based Multi-Agent Systems Token-Efficient Change Detection in LLM APIs Selfie-Capture Dynamics as an Auxiliary Signal Against Deepfakes and Injection Attacks for Mobile Identity Verification Trident: Improving Malware Detection with LLMs and Behavioral Features When Alignment Isn't Enough: Response-Path Attacks on LLM Agents RefusalGuard: Geometry-Preserving Fine-Tuning for Safety in LLMs Checkerboard: A Simple, Effective, Efficient and Learning-free Clean Label Backdoor Attack with Low Poisoning Budget Block-wise Codeword Embedding for Reliable Multi-bit Text Watermarking Secret Stealing Attacks on Local LLM Fine-Tuning through Supply-Chain Model Code Backdoors Enhancing Linux Privilege Escalation Attack Capabilities of Local LLM Agents Defusing the Trigger: Plug-and-Play Defense for Backdoored LLMs via Tail-Risk Intrinsic Geometric Smoothing Evaluating Jailbreaking Vulnerabilities in LLMs Deployed as Assistants for Smart Grid Operations: A Benchmark Against NERC Standards Behavioral Canaries: Auditing Private Retrieved Context Usage in RL Fine-Tuning FlexServe: A Fast and Secure LLM Serving System for Mobile Devices with Flexible Resource Isolation Breaking MCP with Function Hijacking Attacks: Novel Threats for Function Calling and Agentic Models Text Steganography with Dynamic Codebook and Multimodal Large Language Model TwoHamsters: Benchmarking Multi-Concept Compositional Unsafety in Text-to-Image Models Fundamental Limitations of Favorable Privacy-Utility Guarantees for DP-SGD Symbolic Guardrails for Domain-Specific Agents: Stronger Safety and Security Guarantees Without Sacrificing Utility Hardening x402: PII-Safe Agentic Payments via Pre-Execution Metadata Filtering QShield: Securing Neural Networks Against Adversarial Attacks using Quantum Circuits Hijacking Text Heritage: Hiding the Human Signature through Homoglyphic Substitution Like a Hammer, It Can Build, It Can Break: Large Language Model Uses, Perceptions, and Adoption in Cybersecurity Operations on Reddit Private Seeds, Public LLMs: Realistic and Privacy-Preserving Synthetic Data Generation One Word at a Time: Incremental Completion Decomposition Breaks LLM Safety
Don't sweat the small stuff, classify the rest: Sample Sh...
Jonathan Rusert, Padmini Srinivasan · 2022-05-04 · via cs.CR updates on arXiv.org

Deep learning (DL) is being used extensively for text classification. However, researchers have demonstrated the vulnerability of such classifiers to adversarial attacks. Attackers modify the text in a way which misleads the classifier while keeping the original meaning close to intact. State-of-the-art (SOTA) attack algorithms follow the general principle of making minimal changes to the text so as to not jeopardize semantics. Taking advantage of this we propose a novel and intuitive defense strategy called Sample Shielding. It is attacker and classifier agnostic, does not require any reconfiguration of the classifier or external resources and is simple to implement. Essentially, we sample subsets of the input text, classify them and summarize these into a final decision. We shield three popular DL text classifiers with Sample Shielding, test their resilience against four SOTA attackers across three datasets in a realistic threat setting. Even when given the advantage of knowing about our shielding strategy the adversary's attack success rate is <=10% with only one exception and often < 5%. Additionally, Sample Shielding maintains near original accuracy when applied to original texts. Crucially, we show that the `make minimal changes' approach of SOTA attackers leads to critical vulnerabilities that can be defended against with an intuitive sampling strategy.