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cs.CR updates on arXiv.org

Agentic Vulnerability Reasoning on Windows COM Binaries From Beats to Breaches:How Offensive AI Infers Sensitive User Information from Playlists Undetectable Backdoors in Model Parameters: Hiding Sparse Secrets in High Dimensions When Embedding-Based Defenses Fail: Rethinking Safety in LLM-Based Multi-Agent Systems Token-Efficient Change Detection in LLM APIs Selfie-Capture Dynamics as an Auxiliary Signal Against Deepfakes and Injection Attacks for Mobile Identity Verification Trident: Improving Malware Detection with LLMs and Behavioral Features When Alignment Isn't Enough: Response-Path Attacks on LLM Agents RefusalGuard: Geometry-Preserving Fine-Tuning for Safety in LLMs Checkerboard: A Simple, Effective, Efficient and Learning-free Clean Label Backdoor Attack with Low Poisoning Budget Block-wise Codeword Embedding for Reliable Multi-bit Text Watermarking Secret Stealing Attacks on Local LLM Fine-Tuning through Supply-Chain Model Code Backdoors Enhancing Linux Privilege Escalation Attack Capabilities of Local LLM Agents Defusing the Trigger: Plug-and-Play Defense for Backdoored LLMs via Tail-Risk Intrinsic Geometric Smoothing Evaluating Jailbreaking Vulnerabilities in LLMs Deployed as Assistants for Smart Grid Operations: A Benchmark Against NERC Standards Behavioral Canaries: Auditing Private Retrieved Context Usage in RL Fine-Tuning FlexServe: A Fast and Secure LLM Serving System for Mobile Devices with Flexible Resource Isolation Breaking MCP with Function Hijacking Attacks: Novel Threats for Function Calling and Agentic Models Text Steganography with Dynamic Codebook and Multimodal Large Language Model An AI Agent Execution Environment to Safeguard User Data TwoHamsters: Benchmarking Multi-Concept Compositional Unsafety in Text-to-Image Models Fundamental Limitations of Favorable Privacy-Utility Guarantees for DP-SGD Symbolic Guardrails for Domain-Specific Agents: Stronger Safety and Security Guarantees Without Sacrificing Utility Hardening x402: PII-Safe Agentic Payments via Pre-Execution Metadata Filtering QShield: Securing Neural Networks Against Adversarial Attacks using Quantum Circuits Hijacking Text Heritage: Hiding the Human Signature through Homoglyphic Substitution Like a Hammer, It Can Build, It Can Break: Large Language Model Uses, Perceptions, and Adoption in Cybersecurity Operations on Reddit Private Seeds, Public LLMs: Realistic and Privacy-Preserving Synthetic Data Generation One Word at a Time: Incremental Completion Decomposition Breaks LLM Safety Measuring and Exploiting Contextual Bias in LLM-Assisted Security Code Review
AbuseGPT: Abuse of Generative AI ChatBots to Create Smish...
Ashfak Md Shibli, Mir Mehedi A. Pritom, Maanak Gupta · 2024-02-15 · via cs.CR updates on arXiv.org

SMS phishing, also known as "smishing", is a growing threat that tricks users into disclosing private information or clicking into URLs with malicious content through fraudulent mobile text messages. In recent past, we have also observed a rapid advancement of conversational generative AI chatbot services (e.g., OpenAI's ChatGPT, Google's BARD), which are powered by pre-trained large language models (LLMs). These AI chatbots certainly have a lot of utilities but it is not systematically understood how they can play a role in creating threats and attacks. In this paper, we propose AbuseGPT method to show how the existing generative AI-based chatbot services can be exploited by attackers in real world to create smishing texts and eventually lead to craftier smishing campaigns. To the best of our knowledge, there is no pre-existing work that evidently shows the impacts of these generative text-based models on creating SMS phishing. Thus, we believe this study is the first of its kind to shed light on this emerging cybersecurity threat. We have found strong empirical evidences to show that attackers can exploit ethical standards in the existing generative AI-based chatbot services by crafting prompt injection attacks to create newer smishing campaigns. We also discuss some future research directions and guidelines to protect the abuse of generative AI-based services and safeguard users from smishing attacks.