View PDF HTML (experimental)

Abstract:Recent work (2024 to 2026) has converged on a strategy for defending tool-using LLM agents against indirect prompt injection: rather than training the model to refuse malicious instructions, enforce security outside the model with a deterministic policy that mediates the agent's actions. Systems such as CaMeL, FIDES, Progent, RTBAS, and FORGE realize this with capabilities, information-flow labels, and reference monitors, and several report near-elimination of attacks on the AgentDojo benchmark. We make two contributions. First, we organize these out-of-band defenses as instances of classical integrity protection (Biba), reference monitoring, and least privilege, yielding a structured comparison of what they do and do not cover. Second, we warn that every one of them is validated only on static benchmarks (a fixed set of injection attempts), the same methodology that made in-band defenses look strong until adaptive, defense-aware attacks broke twelve of them at over 90% success; we specify the threat model and protocol an adaptive evaluation requires. We then run that protocol as an independent reproduction and extension of Progent's own adaptive-attack analysis, on AgentDojo, with an open-weight agent (Qwen2.5-7B) self-hosted on a single H200, a setting its authors did not test. Averaged over three runs, the defense held: Progent cut mean attack success roughly sixfold (25.8% to 4.2%), and a hand-crafted adaptive attack did not raise it (2.6%). This is one small-scale data point on a weak model with a single black-box attack template; a stronger optimized (white-box GCG) attack remains open. The result is consistent with, but does not establish, the hypothesis that deterministic out-of-band enforcement is a harder target for an adaptive attacker than in-band detection.

Submission history

From: Praneeth Narisetty [view email]
[v1] Thu, 25 Jun 2026 00:35:23 UTC (145 KB)