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cs.CR updates on arXiv.org

On the Security of Research Artifacts SafeHarbor: Hierarchical Memory-Augmented Guardrail for LLM Agent Safety Agentic Vulnerability Reasoning on Windows COM Binaries From Beats to Breaches:How Offensive AI Infers Sensitive User Information from Playlists Undetectable Backdoors in Model Parameters: Hiding Sparse Secrets in High Dimensions When Embedding-Based Defenses Fail: Rethinking Safety in LLM-Based Multi-Agent Systems Token-Efficient Change Detection in LLM APIs Selfie-Capture Dynamics as an Auxiliary Signal Against Deepfakes and Injection Attacks for Mobile Identity Verification Trident: Improving Malware Detection with LLMs and Behavioral Features When Alignment Isn't Enough: Response-Path Attacks on LLM Agents RefusalGuard: Geometry-Preserving Fine-Tuning for Safety in LLMs Checkerboard: A Simple, Effective, Efficient and Learning-free Clean Label Backdoor Attack with Low Poisoning Budget Block-wise Codeword Embedding for Reliable Multi-bit Text Watermarking Secret Stealing Attacks on Local LLM Fine-Tuning through Supply-Chain Model Code Backdoors Enhancing Linux Privilege Escalation Attack Capabilities of Local LLM Agents Defusing the Trigger: Plug-and-Play Defense for Backdoored LLMs via Tail-Risk Intrinsic Geometric Smoothing Evaluating Jailbreaking Vulnerabilities in LLMs Deployed as Assistants for Smart Grid Operations: A Benchmark Against NERC Standards Behavioral Canaries: Auditing Private Retrieved Context Usage in RL Fine-Tuning FlexServe: A Fast and Secure LLM Serving System for Mobile Devices with Flexible Resource Isolation Breaking MCP with Function Hijacking Attacks: Novel Threats for Function Calling and Agentic Models Text Steganography with Dynamic Codebook and Multimodal Large Language Model TwoHamsters: Benchmarking Multi-Concept Compositional Unsafety in Text-to-Image Models Fundamental Limitations of Favorable Privacy-Utility Guarantees for DP-SGD Symbolic Guardrails for Domain-Specific Agents: Stronger Safety and Security Guarantees Without Sacrificing Utility Hardening x402: PII-Safe Agentic Payments via Pre-Execution Metadata Filtering QShield: Securing Neural Networks Against Adversarial Attacks using Quantum Circuits Hijacking Text Heritage: Hiding the Human Signature through Homoglyphic Substitution Like a Hammer, It Can Build, It Can Break: Large Language Model Uses, Perceptions, and Adoption in Cybersecurity Operations on Reddit Private Seeds, Public LLMs: Realistic and Privacy-Preserving Synthetic Data Generation One Word at a Time: Incremental Completion Decomposition Breaks LLM Safety
Better Late than Never; Scaling Computation in Blockchain...
Sourav Das, Nitin Awathare, Ling Ren, Vinay Joseph Ribeiro, Umes · 2020-05-25 · via cs.CR updates on arXiv.org

Proof-of-Work~(PoW) based blockchains typically allocate only a tiny fraction (e.g., less than 1% for Ethereum) of the average interarrival time~($\mathbb{I}$) between blocks for validating transactions. A trivial increase in validation time~($τ$) introduces the popularly known Verifier's Dilemma, and as we demonstrate, causes more forking and increases unfairness. Large $τ$ also reduces the tolerance for safety against a Byzantine adversary. Solutions that offload validation to a set of non-chain nodes (a.k.a. off-chain approaches) suffer from trust issues that are non-trivial to resolve. In this paper, we present Tuxedo, the first on-chain protocol to theoretically scale $τ/\mathbb{I} \approx 1$ in PoW blockchains. The key innovation in Tuxedo is to separate the consensus on the ordering of transactions from their execution. We achieve this by allowing miners to delay validation of transactions in a block by up to $ζ$ blocks, where $ζ$ is a system parameter. We perform security analysis of Tuxedo considering all possible adversarial strategies in a synchronous network with end-to-end delay $Δ$ and demonstrate that Tuxedo achieves security equivalent to known results for longest chain PoW Nakamoto consensus. Additionally, we also suggest a principled approach for practical choices of parameter $ζ$ as per the application requirement. Our prototype implementation of Tuxedo atop Ethereum demonstrates that it can scale $τ$ without suffering the harmful effects of naive scaling in existing blockchains.