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cs.CR updates on arXiv.org

On the Security of Research Artifacts SafeHarbor: Hierarchical Memory-Augmented Guardrail for LLM Agent Safety Agentic Vulnerability Reasoning on Windows COM Binaries From Beats to Breaches:How Offensive AI Infers Sensitive User Information from Playlists Undetectable Backdoors in Model Parameters: Hiding Sparse Secrets in High Dimensions When Embedding-Based Defenses Fail: Rethinking Safety in LLM-Based Multi-Agent Systems Token-Efficient Change Detection in LLM APIs Selfie-Capture Dynamics as an Auxiliary Signal Against Deepfakes and Injection Attacks for Mobile Identity Verification Trident: Improving Malware Detection with LLMs and Behavioral Features When Alignment Isn't Enough: Response-Path Attacks on LLM Agents RefusalGuard: Geometry-Preserving Fine-Tuning for Safety in LLMs Checkerboard: A Simple, Effective, Efficient and Learning-free Clean Label Backdoor Attack with Low Poisoning Budget Block-wise Codeword Embedding for Reliable Multi-bit Text Watermarking Secret Stealing Attacks on Local LLM Fine-Tuning through Supply-Chain Model Code Backdoors Enhancing Linux Privilege Escalation Attack Capabilities of Local LLM Agents Defusing the Trigger: Plug-and-Play Defense for Backdoored LLMs via Tail-Risk Intrinsic Geometric Smoothing Evaluating Jailbreaking Vulnerabilities in LLMs Deployed as Assistants for Smart Grid Operations: A Benchmark Against NERC Standards Behavioral Canaries: Auditing Private Retrieved Context Usage in RL Fine-Tuning FlexServe: A Fast and Secure LLM Serving System for Mobile Devices with Flexible Resource Isolation Breaking MCP with Function Hijacking Attacks: Novel Threats for Function Calling and Agentic Models Text Steganography with Dynamic Codebook and Multimodal Large Language Model TwoHamsters: Benchmarking Multi-Concept Compositional Unsafety in Text-to-Image Models Fundamental Limitations of Favorable Privacy-Utility Guarantees for DP-SGD Symbolic Guardrails for Domain-Specific Agents: Stronger Safety and Security Guarantees Without Sacrificing Utility Hardening x402: PII-Safe Agentic Payments via Pre-Execution Metadata Filtering QShield: Securing Neural Networks Against Adversarial Attacks using Quantum Circuits Hijacking Text Heritage: Hiding the Human Signature through Homoglyphic Substitution Like a Hammer, It Can Build, It Can Break: Large Language Model Uses, Perceptions, and Adoption in Cybersecurity Operations on Reddit Private Seeds, Public LLMs: Realistic and Privacy-Preserving Synthetic Data Generation One Word at a Time: Incremental Completion Decomposition Breaks LLM Safety
Holmes: An Efficient and Lightweight Semantic Based Anoma...
Peilun Wu, Hui Guo · 2021-04-16 · via cs.CR updates on arXiv.org

Email threat is a serious issue for enterprise security. The threat can be in various malicious forms, such as phishing, fraud, blackmail and malvertisement. The traditional anti-spam gateway often maintains a greylist to filter out unexpected emails based on suspicious vocabularies present in the email's subject and contents. However, this type of signature-based approach cannot effectively discover novel and unknown suspicious emails that utilize various evolving malicious payloads. To address the problem, in this paper, we present Holmes, an efficient and lightweight semantic based engine for anomalous email detection. Holmes can convert each email event log into a sentence through word embedding and then identify abnormalities that deviate from a historical baseline based on those translated sentences. We have evaluated the performance of Holmes in a real-world enterprise environment, where around 5,000 emails are sent/received each day. In our experiments, Holmes shows a high capability to detect email threats, especially those that cannot be handled by the enterprise anti-spam gateway. It is also demonstrated through our experiment that Holmes can discover more concealed malicious emails that are immune from several commercial detection tools.