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cs.CR updates on arXiv.org

Agentic Vulnerability Reasoning on Windows COM Binaries From Beats to Breaches:How Offensive AI Infers Sensitive User Information from Playlists Undetectable Backdoors in Model Parameters: Hiding Sparse Secrets in High Dimensions When Embedding-Based Defenses Fail: Rethinking Safety in LLM-Based Multi-Agent Systems Token-Efficient Change Detection in LLM APIs Selfie-Capture Dynamics as an Auxiliary Signal Against Deepfakes and Injection Attacks for Mobile Identity Verification Trident: Improving Malware Detection with LLMs and Behavioral Features When Alignment Isn't Enough: Response-Path Attacks on LLM Agents RefusalGuard: Geometry-Preserving Fine-Tuning for Safety in LLMs Checkerboard: A Simple, Effective, Efficient and Learning-free Clean Label Backdoor Attack with Low Poisoning Budget Block-wise Codeword Embedding for Reliable Multi-bit Text Watermarking Secret Stealing Attacks on Local LLM Fine-Tuning through Supply-Chain Model Code Backdoors Enhancing Linux Privilege Escalation Attack Capabilities of Local LLM Agents Defusing the Trigger: Plug-and-Play Defense for Backdoored LLMs via Tail-Risk Intrinsic Geometric Smoothing Evaluating Jailbreaking Vulnerabilities in LLMs Deployed as Assistants for Smart Grid Operations: A Benchmark Against NERC Standards Behavioral Canaries: Auditing Private Retrieved Context Usage in RL Fine-Tuning FlexServe: A Fast and Secure LLM Serving System for Mobile Devices with Flexible Resource Isolation Breaking MCP with Function Hijacking Attacks: Novel Threats for Function Calling and Agentic Models Text Steganography with Dynamic Codebook and Multimodal Large Language Model An AI Agent Execution Environment to Safeguard User Data TwoHamsters: Benchmarking Multi-Concept Compositional Unsafety in Text-to-Image Models Fundamental Limitations of Favorable Privacy-Utility Guarantees for DP-SGD Symbolic Guardrails for Domain-Specific Agents: Stronger Safety and Security Guarantees Without Sacrificing Utility Hardening x402: PII-Safe Agentic Payments via Pre-Execution Metadata Filtering QShield: Securing Neural Networks Against Adversarial Attacks using Quantum Circuits Hijacking Text Heritage: Hiding the Human Signature through Homoglyphic Substitution Like a Hammer, It Can Build, It Can Break: Large Language Model Uses, Perceptions, and Adoption in Cybersecurity Operations on Reddit Private Seeds, Public LLMs: Realistic and Privacy-Preserving Synthetic Data Generation One Word at a Time: Incremental Completion Decomposition Breaks LLM Safety Measuring and Exploiting Contextual Bias in LLM-Assisted Security Code Review
FERRET: Private Deep Learning Faster And Better Than DPSGD
David Zagardo · 2025-06-05 · via cs.CR updates on arXiv.org

We revisit 1-bit gradient compression through the lens of mutual-information differential privacy (MI-DP). Building on signSGD, we propose FERRET--Fast and Effective Restricted Release for Ethical Training--which transmits at most one sign bit per parameter group with Bernoulli masking. Theory: We prove each fired group leaks at most ln 2 nats; after subsampling with rate s, the total privacy loss of G groups trained for T steps with firing probability p is epsilon = G * T * s * p * ln 2. Thus FERRET achieves MI-DP for epsilon in [0.1, 2] without additive noise. Practice: We evaluate three granularities--FERRET-MAX (finest), FERRET-EIGHTH (medium), and FERRET-2 (coarsest)--on five LLMs (137M-1.8B parameters) against DPSGD and Non-DP baselines. All methods trained for 1, 3, and 5 epochs. Utility: Across all settings, FERRET-MAX/EIGHTH beat DPSGD's perplexity. At epsilon=0.5, 5 epochs: FERRET-EIGHTH achieves 3.98 perplexity vs DPSGD's 11.61 (2.9x better), within 23% of Non-DP (3.25). Privacy: MI-AUC stays at chance for FERRET-MAX/EIGHTH (~0.51), matching DPSGD vs Non-DP's 0.76-0.99. FERRET-2 shows higher leakage (~0.55) due to lower headroom. Efficiency: Stricter budgets fire fewer signs, so FERRET uses 19-33% of DPSGD's training time and only 34-36% of Non-DP training time. Take-away: Sign-based MI-DP gets closer to achieving all three qualities of the privacy, utility, performance trilemma: FERRET trains up to 5x faster, achieves 3x lower perplexity compared to DPSGD and 1.2x greater than Non-DP, all while providing formal, mathematically provable privacy guarantees using zero additive noise. The results also show that, in certain instances, masked 1-bit updates can match non-private training utility while safeguarding data.