Iran’s corrupt economy is still bleeding; Washington has a narrow, perishable window to bring the regime to its knees.

President Donald Trump has shown admirable resolve.

His instinct — that America does not need a weak deal with a weakened Iran — is right.

The pressure applied over the last three months has produced more coercive leverage over the Islamic Republic than at any point in its 47-year history.

Operation Economic Fury grounded Iran’s commercial aviation for 56 days.

The US naval blockade is costing the regime an estimated $450 million a day.

Iran’s nuclear infrastructure has been severely degraded. Its air defenses are in ruins. Its ballistic-missile program has collapsed from production of 100 missiles a month to zero.

Increasingly desperate and eager to take advantage of the cease-fire, Tehran is moving fast to reopen one artery Washington has not yet closed: the sky.

Iran’s airlines are flying again. Mahan Air, which the regime used to send child soldiers to Syria and weapons to Hezbollah, has relaunched routes to Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, Bangkok, Moscow and Islamabad.

Iran Air is flying again to Istanbul, Muscat, Doha, Baghdad, Najaf and Baku.

At least 15 international routes from Tehran’s Imam Khomeini Airport have been restored since April 25, days after the cease-fire took hold.

The regime wants the world to see this as a humanitarian lifeline. Families reunited. Trade restored. Normalcy returning.

Don’t believe it.

These are not ordinary airlines. They are instruments of the Islamic regime and its Revolutionary Guard Corps.

Every flight that takes off is an operational asset for a regime that is not done fighting.

Iran Air is wholly owned by the government of Iran and is sanctioned under authorities covering Weapons of Mass Destruction nonproliferation and Russian sanctions for facilitating Iran’s drone transfers to Moscow.

Mahan Air is owned through the IRGC-controlled charity institute Mol-Al-Movahedin.

The Treasury’s own documents show Mahan Air providing transportation, financial transfers and personnel travel services to the IRGC-Quds Force.

Together these carriers generate hundreds of millions of dollars a year in hard currency that flows directly to the IRGC’s budget.

Here is what those flights actually carry.

First, cash. Routes to Istanbul and Dubai have been documented by the Treasury as bulk-cash corridors for the IRGC-Quds Force.

The mechanics are simple: IRGC financial facilitators procure US dollars at exchange houses in destination cities, then carry the cash back to Tehran on commercial flights as ordinary passengers.

Then there are the much-needed technical components.

Mahan Air’s network of front companies in the UAE, Turkey, China, Thailand, Pakistan and India has been used to acquire American-made flight computers, actuators, collision-avoidance processors and servomotors with drone applications, all subject to US export controls.

Additionally, there is the movement of fighters.

Mahan Air has flown militants to Syria and Iraq with their names missing from flight manifests.

It has shipped Hezbollah weapons under false cargo declarations.

As recently as 2025, its subsidiary airline moved Iranian drones to Caracas.

The resumed routes to Baghdad, Najaf, Erbil, and Mashhad serve a dual purpose: moving pilgrims to holy cities, and IRGC operatives across borders.

And here is the most urgent concern of all: It is highly likely the regime is counting on those same routes to bring Iraqi militia fighters and Hezbollah operatives back into Iran — to crackdown on the domestic unrest the regime fears most.

The United States doesn’t have to pass new legislation to take meaningful action. All of these airlines are already on the US sanctions list.

Secondary sanctions on anyone who fuels them, handles them on the ground or maintains their aircraft have been on the books for years.

Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent made this explicit on April 27: “Doing business with sanctioned Iranian airlines risks exposure to US sanctions.”

The legal tools are there but what is missing is enforcement posture.

Every dollar of oil revenue blocked at sea creates pressure to replace it through airborne channels.

Every smuggling network that has grown around the maritime ring depends on airborne financial flows to settle its accounts.

Close the air side, and the maritime leakage shrinks, without firing a single additional shot at sea.

But that leverage has a shelf life.

The cease-fire provides the window to maximize pressure, not a reason to pause it.

Iran’s airlines are renegotiating ground handling and fueling contracts right now.

Once those contracts are signed and the routes are normalized, dismantling them becomes far harder.

Iran’s airlines are not just flying passengers.

They are flying cash, weapon components and foreign fighters. They are the second front of Iran’s economy, and right now, that front is open.

Mark Dubowitz is chief executive of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, where Miad Maleki is a senior fellow.