It's 2 AM. Your coding agent is refactoring a microservice. It decides the best path forward is to "clean up" the staging environment — deletes three S3 buckets, tears down a CloudFormation stack, and spins up eight m5.4xlarge instances to "run integration tests faster." By morning, the bill is north of $10,000. The agent wasn't malicious. It was helpful. That's what makes it dangerous.

The AWS MCP server from AWS Labs gives agents direct access to 55 tools spanning EC2, S3, Lambda, DynamoDB, EKS, CloudFormation, and Terraform. Read access, write access, and — crucially — delete access. All through a single MCP connection. No confirmation dialogs. No spending caps. Just tool calls.

55 Tools, Including Delete and Destroy

The awslabs/mcp server exposes tools that fall into four categories:

• Read tools (25+): list_resources, get_resource, describe_log_groups, search_documentation — harmless, let them run
• Create tools: create_resource, create_table_from_csv — each one potentially spinning up billable infrastructure
• Execute tools: call_aws, invoke_lambda, tf_apply, manage_eks_stacks — arbitrary API calls and infrastructure changes
• Destructive tools: delete_resource, tf_destroy — the ones that keep you up at night

The problem isn't that these tools exist. They're genuinely useful. The problem is that nothing stops an agent from calling delete_resource on your production S3 bucket or create_resource in a loop until you've provisioned a hundred EC2 instances. System prompts don't enforce anything — they're suggestions the model can ignore, misinterpret, or override when it thinks it knows better.

Block Destructive Ops, Rate Limit Creation

Intercept sits between your agent and the AWS MCP server as a transparent proxy. Every tools/call passes through it and gets evaluated against a YAML policy before reaching upstream. Here's what the key sections of the AWS policy look like:

Hard-block deletions:

delete_resource:
    rules:
      - name: "block-delete"
        action: deny
        on_deny: "Resource deletion blocked by policy"

tf_destroy:
    rules:
      - name: "block-destroy"
        action: deny
        on_deny: "Infrastructure destruction blocked by policy"

No conditions, no exceptions. delete_resource and tf_destroy are denied unconditionally. The agent gets back a clear error message explaining why. It can carry on with its work using every other tool — it just can't delete anything.

Rate limit resource creation:

create_resource:
    rules:
      - name: "rate-limit-create"
        rate_limit: "10/hour"
        on_deny: "Rate limit: max 10 resource creations per hour"

The agent can still create resources, but no more than 10 per hour. Intercept tracks this with a stateful counter (SQLite by default, Redis for multi-instance setups). The counter persists across restarts, so killing and restarting the proxy doesn't reset the budget.

Rate limit write operations:

call_aws:
    rules:
      - name: "rate-limit-writes"
        rate_limit: "30/hour"
        on_deny: "Rate limit: max 30 write operations per hour"

The same pattern applies to call_aws, invoke_lambda, tf_apply, manage_eks_stacks, and update_resource — anything that mutates state gets capped at 30 operations per hour.

Global safety net:

"*":
    rules:
      - name: "global-rate-limit"
        rate_limit: "120/minute"
        on_deny: "Global rate limit: max 120 calls per minute"

The wildcard rule catches everything, including read operations. Even if the agent goes into a tight loop calling list_resources, it'll get throttled before it hammers the AWS API hard enough to trigger their own rate limits (and the associated costs of retries and backoff).

Read tools like describe_log_groups, search_documentation, and get_resource have no rules at all — they pass straight through. No point adding friction to operations that cost nothing and change nothing.

Getting Started

Install Intercept and scan the AWS MCP server to generate a policy scaffold:

npm install -g @policylayer/intercept

intercept scan -o aws-policy.yaml -- npx -y @aws/mcp

The generated policy already includes sensible defaults — the same deny rules and rate limits shown above. Edit it to match your use case: tighten the rate limits, loosen them, add argument-level conditions, or flip default: "allow" to default: "deny" for a strict allowlist approach.

Then run Intercept as your MCP server instead of the upstream directly:

intercept -c aws-policy.yaml -- npx -y @aws/mcp

Your agent connects to Intercept like it would connect to any MCP server. Same tools, same schemas, same interface. The difference is that every call now passes through your policy before reaching AWS. Spending controls that actually enforce, not suggest.

The full AWS policy covers all 55 tools with categorised rules, comments explaining each tool's purpose, and tuneable rate limits. Use it as-is or as a starting point.

Full AWS policy →