惯性聚合 高效追踪和阅读你感兴趣的博客、新闻、科技资讯
阅读原文 在惯性聚合中打开

推荐订阅源

G
Google Developers Blog
人人都是产品经理
人人都是产品经理
腾讯CDC
OSCHINA 社区最新新闻
OSCHINA 社区最新新闻
WordPress大学
WordPress大学
S
SegmentFault 最新的问题
小众软件
小众软件
B
Blog
博客园 - 叶小钗
Microsoft Azure Blog
Microsoft Azure Blog
Apple Machine Learning Research
Apple Machine Learning Research
A
About on SuperTechFans
J
Java Code Geeks
Blog — PlanetScale
Blog — PlanetScale
博客园 - 司徒正美
博客园 - 【当耐特】
让小产品的独立变现更简单 - ezindie.com
让小产品的独立变现更简单 - ezindie.com
Recent Announcements
Recent Announcements
宝玉的分享
宝玉的分享
Martin Fowler
Martin Fowler
Hugging Face - Blog
Hugging Face - Blog
奇客Solidot–传递最新科技情报
奇客Solidot–传递最新科技情报
Last Week in AI
Last Week in AI
V
V2EX

Resend RSS Feed

6 Tips for Accessible Emails Welcoming Manoel do Amaral, our new Brand Designer Welcoming Michael Vaz, our new Customer Success Engineer Six Steps to Improve Your Sender Reputation Welcoming Tatira Andrade, our new Executive Assistant Welcoming Pedro Ivo Hudson, our new Design Engineer Welcoming Diel Duarte, our new Open source Engineer Welcoming Areia Spinner, our new Recruiter Resend Forward: A Conference about Craft React Email 6.0 Custom Tracking Domains AI Email Editor Introducing Automations Welcoming Ahmed Tolba, our new SRE Engineer Welcoming Aneil Singh, our new Founding Account Executive Welcoming Lucas Motta, our new Software Engineer Welcoming Trey Knowles, our new Founding Account Executive Welcoming Anxhela Carciu, our new SRE Engineer Introducing DMARC Analyzer Welcoming Evan Thibodeau, our new Customer Success Engineer Welcoming Derich Pacheco, our new Software Engineer Welcoming Alec Ventura, our new Data Engineer Welcoming Felipe Freitag, our new Software Engineer Welcoming Mateusz Wos, our new Software Engineer Incident report for February 15, 2026 Email automation for OpenClaw How to Create a DevTools Agent Skill Introducing Email Skills Why You Should Embrace the Promotions Tab Slater Smith, our new Customer Success Engineer
Incident report for January 10, 2024
Zeno Rocha · 2024-01-10 · via Resend RSS Feed

Security update January 11th, 7:49 pm UTC — We have completed reporting the incident to the following law enforcement authorities:

GDPR reports filed with:

Summary (TL;DR)

On January 7th, attackers used a leaked environment variable of the Resend database API to access customer data including Emails Sent, Domains, API Keys (encrypted), Logs, and Contacts, affecting all users.

The actual content of the emails was not accessed, nor were any unencrypted private keys for the Resend API or DKIM. No user action is required to continue safely sending.

We have since closed the access and rotated all database keys. Additionally, we are partnering with third-party cybersecurity company, Oneleet, to conduct an exhaustive investigation and help us ensure this attack cannot occur again.

We are deeply sorry for the impact this had on our users. We remain committed to transparency and prevention. The following is a summary of what went wrong, how the incident was resolved, and the work we are doing to ensure it does not happen again.

Incident timeline

All timestamps referenced are in Coordinated Universal Time (UTC).

  • On December 30th, at 11:20 pm, the attackers first gained access to our system by discovering an exposed database API key as an environment variable on the client-side of the Resend Dashboard.
  • On December 31st, at 12:28 pm, a Resend team member discovered that multiple users were sharing the same billing information. This appeared to be a strange bug and did not raise enough of a red flag during the holiday weekend for further investigation. An alarm was put in place to make sure this didn't happen to other users.
  • On January 7th, at 7:28 pm, the attacker started accessing data.
  • On January 9th, at 4:47 am, a user was discovered to have unblocked email sending on their account. During normal operations, senders are blocked for not complying with our Acceptable Use Policy. One of these users was able to update fields normally not accessible to users in order to unblock their sending. With further investigation, it appears they had already done this three times.
  • On January 9th, at 4:59 am, this incident was promoted to SEV-0 internally. We understood this attack to be a form of hijacking of an existing API request, not accessing the database.
  • On January 9th, at 5:21 pm, logs were discovered showing GET, PATCH, and DELETE requests to the database, making it clear that the database API layer had been accessed, but not clear the full exposure.
  • On January 9th, at 11:01 pm, logs were discovered showing programmatic access of database tables, which allowed us to establish the method, extent, and severity of the access. Our audit of the entire database leads us to be confident that we know the impact of the incident and have comprehensive knowledge of what happened and what steps we need to take to remediate this.
  • On January 10, at 2:32 am, the remediation was deployed to production.
  • On January 10, at 3:21 am, the database credentials were rotated, causing a 25 minute downtime.

How this affects you

No user action is required to continue safely sending. You may consider consulting an attorney regarding data privacy implications in your jurisdiction.

If you need an export of your data, please contact us at security@resend.com.

Here is a comprehensive list of what data was impacted. Only data after November 1st, 2023 was accessed.

Emails Sent

  • Accessed: Recipient address, sender address, sent date, subject, bcc, cc, reply to, and last event.
  • Not Accessed: No email content body which includes the HTML/plain text, and attachments.

Domains

  • Accessed: Domain names, verification status, region, and DKIM public keys.
  • Not Accessed: No unencrypted DKIM private keys.

API Keys

  • Accessed: Names, permission roles, and encrypted tokens.
  • Not Accessed: No unencrypted tokens.

Logs

  • Accessed: HTTP Response data such as status code, and HTTP Request data such as method, and endpoint.
  • Not Accessed: No HTTP Response JSON body, and Request JSON body, or headers.

Contacts

  • Accessed: Email addresses and names.

Users

  • Accessed: Resend user email addresses.
  • Not Accessed: No Resend user names or passwords.

These are the preventative measures that we have already taken:

  1. Removed database API environment variable from the client-side of the Resend Dashboard.
  2. Rotated database API access keys.
  3. Enforced MFA across all systems touching the database.
  4. Conducted org-wide password reset across all systems touching the database.

These are the preventative measures that we will be taking immediately:

  1. Improving monitoring and alerting for database API access.
  2. Partnering with a third-party cybersecurity company, Oneleet, to conduct an exhaustive investigation.

Please reach out to us at security@resend.com if you have any questions.

Conclusion

We sincerely apologize to everyone affected by this incident, and we appreciate your understanding as we learn to navigate this challenging period.

This has been an unfortunate and trying moment for us, but solidified the determination and commitment of each and every team member at Resend.

Your trust is what has built us, and we remain deeply committed to ensuring your sending is safe.