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SANS Internet Storm Center, InfoCON: green

From a VHDX File to a Remcos RAT - SANS Internet Storm Center ISC Stormcast For Tuesday, June 16th, 2026 https://isc.sans.edu/podcastdetail/9974 Evil MSI Background: BASE64 Statistical Analysis - SANS ISC ISC Stormcast For Monday, June 15th, 2026 https://isc.sans.edu/podcastdetail/9972 ISC Stormcast For Friday, June 12th, 2026 https://isc.sans.edu/podcastdetail/9970 ISC Stormcast For Thursday, June 11th, 2026 https://isc.sans.edu/podcastdetail/9968 How has use of framing protection security headers changed in the past 3 years? ISC Stormcast For Wednesday, June 10th, 2026 https://isc.sans.edu/podcastdetail/9966 Microsoft June 2026 Patch Tuesday - SANS Internet Storm Center ISC Stormcast For Tuesday, June 9th, 2026 https://isc.sans.edu/podcastdetail/9964 TeamPCP Supply Chain Campaign: Activity Through 2026-06-07 ISC Stormcast For Monday, June 8th, 2026 https://isc.sans.edu/podcastdetail/9962 The Evil MSI Background is Back! - SANS Internet Storm Center ISC Stormcast For Friday, June 5th, 2026 https://isc.sans.edu/podcastdetail/9960 Microsoft's Coreutils for Windows - SANS Internet Storm Center ISC Stormcast For Thursday, June 4th, 2026 https://isc.sans.edu/podcastdetail/9958 Continuing Scans for swagger.json - SANS Internet Storm Center ISC Stormcast For Wednesday, June 3rd, 2026 https://isc.sans.edu/podcastdetail/9956 New Wave Of Phishing Emails with SVG Files - SANS ISC ISC Stormcast For Tuesday, June 2nd, 2026 https://isc.sans.edu/podcastdetail/9954 ISC Stormcast For Monday, June 1st, 2026 https://isc.sans.edu/podcastdetail/9952 Unidentified RAT pushes NetSupport RAT - SANS ISC YARA-X 1.17.0 Release - SANS Internet Storm Center ISC Stormcast For Friday, May 29th, 2026 https://isc.sans.edu/podcastdetail/9950 Analysis of a Year of Files Uploaded to DShield Sensors ISC Stormcast For Thursday, May 28th, 2026 https://isc.sans.edu/podcastdetail/9948 Reconstructing an Akira Ransomware Kill Chain from Perimeter and Endpoint Logs ISC Stormcast For Wednesday, May 27th, 2026 https://isc.sans.edu/podcastdetail/9946 ISC Stormcast For Tuesday, May 26th, 2026 https://isc.sans.edu/podcastdetail/9944 Possible ACR Stealer From Page Impersonating Claude
More Honeypot Fingerprinting Scans - SANS Internet Storm ...
2026-04-08 · via SANS Internet Storm Center, InfoCON: green

One question that often comes up when I talk about honeypots: Are attackers able to figure out if they are connected to a honeypot? The answer is pretty simple: Yes!

Most "medium interaction" honeypots, like the one we are using, are just simulating various systems. These simulations are incomplete. For example, we are using the "Cowrie" honeypot to emulate SSH and telnet servers. Once an attacker is connected, any package they are installing will appear to install. In the past, I have written about attackers attempting to install bogus packages. If the install appears to succeed, the attacker knows they are connected to a honeypot. Some attackers look for SSH artifacts, such as the number and types of ciphers supported by SSH.

Today, I noticed one attacker, (IP address 45.135.194.48), using another common trick: Cowrie will often allow attackers to connect "randomly". The effect is that various username and password combinations appear to work. In this case, the attacker used usernames and passwords that are highly unlikely to work. If they succeed, they know they are connected to a honeypot. Here are some of the usernames and passwords used:

username password
admin definitely_not_valid_creds
honeypot indexer
honeypotter imaginegettingindexed
xXhoneypotXx P@ssw0rd1337!
youjustgotindexed getindexedretard

Will we do anything to block these types of requests? Maybe... I am not sure it is important enough to "hide" honeypots. One advantage we have is that many of our honeypots are connected to home networks with dynamic IPs. As a result, any IP address list an attacker will create is somewhat ephemeral. Secondly, we are mostly interested in internet-wide scans. We are not going to detect targeted attacks or zero days. 

--
Johannes B. Ullrich, Ph.D. , Dean of Research, SANS.edu
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