The proof of work is the wrong analogy: finding hash collisions, while exponentially harder with N, is guaranteed to find, with enough work, some S so that H(S) satisfies N, so an asymmetry of resources used will see the side with more "work ability" eventually winning.

But bugs are different:

1. Different LLMs executions take different branches, but eventually the possible branches based on the code possible states are saturated.

2. If we imagine sampling the model for a bug in a given code M times, with M large, eventually the cap becomes not "M" (because of saturated state of the code AND the LLM sampler meaningful paths), but "I", the model intelligence level.

The OpenBSD SACK bug easily shows that: you can run an inferior model for an infinite number of tokens, and it will never realize(*) that the lack of validation of the start window, if put together with the integer overflow, then put together with the fact the branch where the node should never be NULL is entered regardless, will produce the bug.

So, cyber security of tomorrow will not be like proof of work in the sense of "more GPU wins"; instead, better models, and faster access to such models, will win.

* Don't trust who says that weak models can find the OpenBSD SACK bug. I tried it myself. What happens is that weak models hallucinate (sometimes causally hitting a real problem) that there is a lack of validation of the start of the window (which is in theory harmless because of the start < end validation) and the integer overflow problem without understanding why they, if put together, create an issue. It's just pattern matching of bug classes on code that looks may have a problem, totally lacking the true ability to understand the issue and write an exploit. Test it yourself, GPT 120B OSS is cheap and available.

BTW, this is why with this bug, the stronger the model you pick (but not enough to discover the true bug), the less likely it is it will claim there is a bug. Stronger models hallucinate less, so they can't see the problem in any side of the spectrum: the hallucination side of small models, and the real understanding side of Mythos.