Geoff Bennett:

For additional perspective now on President Trump's trip to China and the broader U.S.-China relationship, we get two views.

Myron Brilliant is a senior counselor at the DGA Group, an international consulting firm, and former executive vice president of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce. And Liza Tobin is a former intelligence officer and was the China director at the National Security Council during the Trump and Biden administrations. She's now managing director at Garnaut Global. That's a geopolitical risk advisory firm.

Thank you both for joining us this evening.

As Nick Schifrin reported, both President Trump and Xi seem to want stability in this relationship. President Xi said that China and the U.S. should be partners, instead of rivals, helping each other succeed and prosper together.

China -- or -- excuse me -- Liza, is China's stated vision for the U.S.-China relationship, is that in the U.S. interest?

Liza Tobin, Former National Security Council Staff:

Hey. Good to be on with you. Thanks for the question.

Yes, the word stability is really interesting in the context of the summit. Moving up to the summit, the U.S. has been messaging, hey, we just want a stable, calm relationship with China. But there's been this interesting new catchphrase, this new Chinese Communist Party term of art that's come out in the last couple of days to describe their relationship with the United States in terms of what they call constructive strategic stability (speaking in foreign language).

It's -- it sounds like a bunch of CCP garble, but it actually has deep strategic meaning. And what they're saying is, we hear the U.S. just wants stability. They just want to have a calm -- they just don't want China to be a problem. And we're going to stick our foot in the door and try to get the U.S. to agree to framing the relationship in terms of constructive strategic stability.

This has a long history in how the CCP approaches the U.S. They have tried this before in the Hu Jintao era and after that, saying, we'd like to describe our relationship with the U.S. in terms of new type major power relations.

So it's a very weighted term that basically signals, hey, we are on par with you guys. You're no longer the sole superpower. We're your equals or your betters. And we're going to use rhetoric to sort of try to trap you with words.

It's a little bit as if you're in a business relationship with someone and they start pressuring you to sign an MOU, and it's vaguely worded, but they kind of get you to sign and there's a poison pill in there. And then later, when you start doing things they don't like, they start coming after you with this thing.

So the optics of the summit were extremely positive. Xi Jinping was happy. President Trump was happy. But what's very interesting is that the Chinese are playing a longer game and trying to lock the United States into this sort of relationship within narrow guardrails, where China can have a vote and a veto power over U.S. national security decisions.

Geoff Bennett:

Myron, how do you see it?

Myron Brilliant, Senior Counselor, DGA Group:

Well, first of all, it's great to be back on.

I would say that this relationship is defined by high competition, high distrust, and low cooperation. And I think both sides want stability, but I agree with Liza. I think the United States is playing short-term game here with trying to get concrete deliverables, more selling of American beef and more airplanes and energy.

And China's playing the long term, which is to try to gain global influence by being on par with the United States. And so we're going to have to see not just the pageantry and the symbolism of this visit, which I think has been very positive.

And it's important. Two most consequential leaders, two most consequential countries getting to talk about a wide range of issues is important and should continue throughout the year. But we're not going to measure the success of this summit just simply by these two days.

We have to see what happens the day after, 100 days from now, six months from now, next year. We will see whether we make progress and whether we can really get to some of the underlying tensions in this relationship.

Let's remember, we're going to compete on areas like A.I. and technology. We're going to compete for global influence. And can we find in some areas limited cooperation? I think we can. I think the two leaders have personal chemistry, but we're going to have to see really much more than just a high-level visit to really unlock some of the distrust that's been building over a long period in this relationship.

Geoff Bennett:

Let's shift our focus to Taiwan, because that's one of the things that really stands out in the Chinese readout or official summary of the diplomatic conversation. Beijing emphasized it heavily. The White House barely mentioned it.

Liza, what does that suggest to you?

Liza Tobin:

Yes, this was -- it was clearly the number one priority that the CCP brought to this summit.

And there was a lot of concern, a lot of curiosity, a lot of rumors ahead of the summit that maybe the United States would offer some kind of grand bargain, trading away its support for Taiwan in exchange for maybe some help on Iran or something else. As

far as we can tell, the United States did not walk into that trap. President Trump got a question from reporters in Beijing, and he kind of brushed it aside. He didn't answer it. So it looks like the president was listening to his advisers, who would be warning him to say, hey, Mr. President, we don't want to walk into this trap where we inadvertently say something about Taiwan that Xi Jinping then takes as a concession and uses later to demoralize Taiwan.

I think what's key is that the United States runs its own foreign policy and we have our own relationships with allies and partners like Japan, Korea, Europe, and including Taiwan, and that we don't make that an issue that we negotiate on with China.

As far as I can tell, that didn't happen at this summit.

Geoff Bennett:

And, Myron, as you know, these readouts, they're carefully worded. They're strategic. The Trump administration in the past has used them as messaging documents.

What stands out to you about that on the Taiwan issue in particular?

Myron Brilliant:

Well, I have been following U.S.-China relations for over 30 years. So, certainly, you expect differences in the readout from the government officials. And that's what we're seeing, right?

The United States had emphasized that China has made certain commitments on Iran that are important to opening up the straits, to getting Iran to back down from having nuclear weapons, and, even further, to get Iran to agree -- or China to agree not to sell defense equipment to Iran.

We haven't seen that yet from China. China has pushed, certainly leaned in on the Taiwan issue, essential component always in U.S.-China talks, but we have not seen the administration or President Trump signal that he's made any commitments there. I would not expect it.

We have five decades of longstanding policy on Taiwan. It would be a huge mistake to change course now. The big question will be, after this summit, what happens with the arms sales deal that is pending? Will we see a delay? Will we see a different number? What will we be selling to Taiwan?

That would be a signal that there has been quietly an agreement between China and the United States. I think that would be the wrong signal. So let's wait a little bit to really get the readout after the summit. It's always a mistake to just judge it from the symbolism and the pageantry of the summit.

We have got to give ourselves a little time to see how things develop over the next 60 days to 100 days.

Geoff Bennett:

Myron Brilliant and Liza Tobin, thank you both for your insights. We appreciate it.

Myron Brilliant:

Thank you.