Many just shrug their shoulders, and say, so what, who cares? The federal government has been insolvent for many years, and budget deficits and debt are nothing new.

Well, taxpayers should care. At present, 22.2% of their taxes are siphoned off to pay for interest on government debt—interest payments year-to-date are $628 billion, nearly $3 billion per day. If that’s not bad enough, the CBO projects that a whopping 29.2% of Americans’ taxes will be used to service the government’s debt load in 2036.

That means that in 10 years, almost a third of all taxes paid by Americans will not be used to finance current government services or transfer payments. Taxpayers will be shelling out a big slice of their taxes to service debt taken on in the past to finance government spending in years gone by.

As it turns out, Washington knows that voters, as well as the bond vigilantes that extend credit to the government, care about government deficit finance. The federal budgeting process has been continually under repair as a result. Prior to 1968, the federal government had three budgets. To inject greater rationality into the system, a unified budget took effect in 1969. But the unified budget did nothing to eliminate deficits and the concerns about the budgeting process. So, the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 was passed. But it had no capacity to control deficits. Then, in 1978, Senator Byrd proposed an amendment to prohibit deficit spending starting in 1981. It was adopted by the Senate, but instantly ignored.

Facing the continued burden of deficits and voter angst, the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act was enacted in 1985. It promised to gradually reduce federal deficits until 1991, when a budget balance would be achieved. However, in 1987, Congress postponed the implementation of Gramm-Rudman-Hollings for two years and in 1990 abandoned it entirely. It was followed by another attempt at deficit control, the Budget Enforcement Act of 1990, which quickly went down the fiscal memory hole.

In addition to statutes, there have been bodies composed of wise men and women who have made recommendations about how to repair the broken federal budget. President Obama established the Commission on Fiscal Responsibility and Reform in 2010 — ironically, at the same time he supported massive increases in the federal deficit. Not surprisingly, the Commission’s recommendations were never acted on by Congress.

That said, Congress has most recently focused attention on a pair of companion resolutions, H. Res. 981 and S. Res. 654, commonly referred to as the “3% Resolutions.” Together, the resolutions express the “sense of” the House and Senate that Congress should reduce future annual federal budget deficits to 3 percent of GDP or less by the end of fiscal year 2030, and pursue a balanced budget thereafter. This is the same format as that contained in the recommendations of Obama’s 2010 Fiscal Commission. However, these “3% Resolutions,” like most Congressional resolutions, are hardly worth the paper they are written on. Indeed, they create no obligation, carry no penalty, and can be ignored.

It is clear that constitutional strictures are needed to eliminate the federal government’s addiction to fiscal irresponsibility. As history has shown, nothing short of a constitutional constraint will firmly bind the hands of a Congress that has for half a century demonstrated that it cannot bind its own.

Under Article V, the Congress “shall call” a convention to consider one or more amendments if two-thirds (34) of the states file applications. As it turns out, thirty-nine states had active applications on file for a constitutional convention that would consider a fiscal-responsibility amendment in 1979 and for many years thereafter. Yet, Congress failed to call a convention. Those findings, first documented by the Federal Fiscal Sustainability Foundation, were confirmed by the state-created National Federalism Commission in September 2025 and entered into the Congressional Record in December 2025. Congress’s obligation under Article V is non-discretionary. But Congress has refused to act on the 39 applications for an Article V convention. Unlike a non-binding resolution, a fiscal responsibility amendment would be enforceable, durable, and immune to the political winds that blow through Washington.

Members of Congress took an oath to protect and defend the Constitution. Article V of the Constitution gives them the tool. It is time for Congress to do its job and call a limited Article V Convention to propose a fiscal responsibility amendment.

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