A series of coordinated attacks carried out by ⁠⁠armed groups across Mali has exposed security vulnerabilities in the military-ruled country, analysts say.

Since gaining independence from French rule in 1960, the West African nation has navigated cycles of political instability, punctuated by persistent attacks from armed groups, military coups and financial crises.

As French and international security operations leave the region, the rising influence of Russian mercenary groups over the past two years has signalled further security risks and rising violence.

On Saturday, an al-Qaeda-linked group, Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) claimed responsibility for attacks on military sites across the country, including in the capital, Bamako. JNIM said it had “captured” the city of Kidal in the north in a coordinated operation with the Azawad Liberation Front (FLA), a Tuareg-dominated rebel group.

On Sunday, a military source told Al Jazeera that Mali’s Defence Minister Sadio Camara had been killed during the attacks.

Speaking to Al Jazeera, Mathias Hounkpe, the International Foundation for Electoral Systems’ country director for Mali said “If they [armed groups] were able to cover almost the whole country in one day, it means there are security vulnerabilities in the system.”

“They have also been able to reach the city of Kati, where the president and other important ministers live. That is the centre of power and them having reached this point through attacks means the government’s ability to secure the country is weak,” he added.

Who are the main armed groups in Mali?

Since 2012, the security situation in Mali has been murky, with several separatist groups fighting against the government, instigating coups and killing dozens of people in north and central Mali.

JNIM is one of the most active armed groups in the region, according to conflict monitor Armed Conflict Location & Event Data (ACLED).

The group was formed in 2017 as a coalition between the Saharan branch of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and Malian armed groups – Ansar Dine, Al-Murabitun and Katiba Macina.

With its base in Mali, the group has about 10,000 fighters and is led by Iyad Ag Ghali, who founded Ansar Dine in 2012. The group primarily follows the ideology of al-Qaeda, fighting Western influence in predominantly Muslim countries and to ensure local governments in these countries comply with strict rules.

According to the United States Department of National Intelligence (DNI), Ghali has stated that JNIM also aims to expand its presence across West Africa and to eliminate government forces and rival armed groups, such as the ISIL affiliate in Sahel Province (ISSP).

In 2022, JNIM attacked the Malian army base in Kati, close to the capital, Bamako.

In September 2024, the group attacked the capital’s airport and an elite police training academy, killing dozens.

Last year, JNIM fighters launched attacks on fuel tankers, bringing Bamako to a standstill in October. It also imposed an economic and fuel blockade by sealing off crucial highways used by tankers transporting fuel from neighbouring Senegal and the Ivory Coast to the landlocked Sahel country.

Meanwhile, in the north, the Azawad Liberation Front (FLA), a Tuareg-dominated rebel group formed in 2024 from a coalition of separatist forces in the north and led by Alghabass Ag Intalla.

FLA has been fighting Mali’s military government and Russian forces in the north, seeking their own independent and autonomous region of Azawad, the northern region of Mali, which covers the Saharan and Sahelian regions.

These two main alliances have also been at odds with each other over the years. Between 2019 and 2020, in particular, clashes were reported between the two groups over control of northern regions.

Are these groups united now?

These two coalitions of armed groups have different goals – one says it aims to impose its strict interpretation of Islamic law across Mali and the other is fighting for an independent region. So their relationship is fluid, with FLA and JNIM regularly opposing each other’s ideologies and fighting for territorial control.

But they have also previously partnered to fight common enemies, namely Mali’s government and its allies.

In 2012, for example, Tuareg rebels who organised under the banner of the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) allied with al-Qaeda-linked groups to launch a rebellion against the Malian government, rapidly seizing control of northern Mali. The alliance, however, fell apart due to differences in their ideologies.

In July 2024, FLA coordinated with JNIM once again to launch an ambush on an army convoy in Tinzaouaten, in the northeast of the country, which resulted in Malian and Russian casualties.

Then on Saturday, the two armed groups coordinated the latest series of attacks across the country.

Bulama Bukarti, an analyst who focuses on armed groups in sub-Saharan Africa, told Al Jazeera that the groups appear, for now, to have set their differences aside.

“These are two groups fighting for different objectives,” he said. “But they came together last year and said they would work together going forward, and what we have seen over the last few days is the actual implementation of this agreement.”

Hounkpe said it is unlikely that either group has relaxed its ultimate goals, however.

“It is more of a kind of pragmatic way of dealing with the challenges they are facing. Right now, their common enemy is the government, and losing regions to the government is a big loss to them,” he said.

He warned that the alliance is, therefore, unlikely to last.

“For a very short period of time, JNIM and FLA may stick together until they secure their control over regions like Kidai in the north. But the groups have different goals. FLA want to be seen as a kind of ‘Republican forces’. They don’t want to be seen as political forces that use violence. They want to be seen as Malians who are fighting for the independence of their area,” he said.

“Meanwhile, JNIM use violence to achieve their goals,” he said. “So their alliance cannot last long.”

How will Mali’s government respond to the latest attacks?

The current military government ruler, Assimi Goita, has been in power since a military coup in 2020 and has been responding to security tensions, especially in the north, with help from Russian mercenaries.

Ulf Laessing, head of the Sahel Programme at Germany-based Konrad Adenauer Foundation, said, “The situation in the North remains difficult. The government has lost Kidal, which is a Tuareg stronghold and I don’t think the government can control it again any time soon.” 

Hounkpe said the government will need to focus on maintaining citizens’ trust. “Governments in the Sahel region survive primarily if they are supported by their citizens. Currently, Mali’s military government has been relatively quiet about why or how Saturday’s attacks took place. If they decide to speak to the people of the country soon, they need to display unity and assure citizens that their security will be guaranteed,” he said.

Hounkpe highlighted that the government will also need to review its position in the African Union, its alliances with other African countries and also its strategy with foreign forces like Russia, which support the government.

Meanwhile, the African Union, the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation and the United States Bureau of African Affairs have all condemned the attacks. Last year, Mali, along with Niger and Burkina Faso, formally split from the West African regional bloc ECOWAS to form the Alliance of Sahel States (AES).

However, last week, Malian Foreign Minister Abdoulaye Diop attended a security forum in Senegal where he said the withdrawal was “final”, but added that the AES could maintain a constructive dialogue with ECOWAS on freedom of movement and preserving a common market.

Laessing said AES countries are all in weak positions.

“They are all fighting extremist armed groups and none of them has troops to spare. So I’m sceptical that they can offer much support,” he said.

He noted that foreign powers are likely to want to stay out of the conflict rather than aid the government as they have done in the past.

Why are Russian mercenaries operating in Mali?

Troops from European nations, primarily France, had been helping Mali fight unrest for more than a decade. But in 2023, they withdrew following a breakdown in relations with Mali’s military government and the country’s growing alliance with Russia.

In December 2021, Goita had invited Russian mercenaries to support the military administration in its fight against armed groups after asking French troops to leave the country.

In June last year, Russia’s Wagner group said it would withdraw from Mali after more than three and a half years on the ground. The paramilitary force said it had completed its mission against armed groups in the country.

But Wagner’s withdrawal from Mali did not mean the departure of Russian fighters. Russian mercenaries have remained under the banner of the Africa Corps, a separate Kremlin-backed paramilitary group created after Wagner founder Yevgeny Prigozhin led a failed mutiny against the Russian military in June 2023.

As in other former French colonies in West Africa, such as Burkina Faso, people in Mali, fed up with the French colonial legacy, have been relatively welcoming of Russian influence instead.

“The Malians certainly want the Russians to stay. But the Russians are a bit reluctant to get too involved in the war because now Africa Corps belongs to the Defence Ministry, so it’s an official military operation and the Russian mercenaries are no longer private companies. They also want to avoid another defeat,” Laessing said.

What is the solution for Mali?

“Mali has been in talks with countries like the United States to provide counterterrorism assistance, but certainly not boots on the ground and European troops have already withdrawn. So Mali is pretty much on its own. I don’t think there’s anyone who wants to pick up the pieces of what might be left of the country if the security situation worsens,” Laessing added.

Laessing highlighted that the people of Mali, however, do not want armed groups to take control, so they will support the government even if they are unhappy with the worsening security situation. “So I feel the government might eventually resort to signing a deal with the armed groups so they can remain in power,” he said.