It has been 100 days since the United States and Israel attacked Iran in a coordinated campaign aimed at regime change. Since April, a tenuous ceasefire has been in place – one that has been regularly violated by exchanges of fire. The Strait of Hormuz remains closed while fighting in Lebanon continues.

At this point, peace remains elusive as both sides’ objectives remain unfulfilled. Washington and Tel Aviv’s goal has been not just to eliminate the Iranian nuclear programme but also to degrade the Iranian security and military apparatus and thereby create space for internal political change.

For Tehran, the main objective has been to preserve the governing system and ensure its continuity, regardless of the cost. In this sense, it sees itself as having the upper hand.

Losses on both sides

The war has taken the lives of more than 3,400 Iranian citizens, including dozens of senior leaders in the political and military spheres. It has made it clear that Iran is unable to protect its leadership, arsenal, or nuclear programme.

Within the first two weeks of the conflict, Iranian missile and drone attacks decreased by 90 percent, as US and Israeli operations destroyed launchers faster than they could be replaced, revealing the limitations of a deterrent developed over two decades.

The nuclear programme, already damaged in the 12-day war in 2025, was targeted with more strikes. Civilian infrastructure and energy facilities were also damaged and destroyed. The economy, which was already suffering before the start of the war, has taken another dip.

Meanwhile, the network of allied forces cultivated by Tehran across the region continues to weaken. By targeting sites in Gulf states hosting US forces, Iran has further alienated neighbours it had attempted to engage in the past.

But the war has also brought significant losses for Iran’s adversaries. Iranian missiles and drones hit several US bases in the region, revealing the limits of US protection.

Gulf states were drawn into a conflict they had not sought and were attacked on their own territory. The security guarantees underpinning their alignment with Washington appear less reliable than before.

Thus, the most enduring effect of the war may be less the damage to Iran’s capabilities than the uncertainty introduced into the regional security architecture.

From military weakness to economic leverage

Within days of the US-Israeli attacks, Iran started restricting maritime traffic through the Strait of Hormuz, which handles approximately one-fifth of the world’s seaborne oil and liquefied natural gas.

The US responded with an air campaign in March to reopen the waterway and, in April, imposed a naval blockade on Iranian ports. Despite these efforts, the strait remains closed. Only a few vessels vetted by Iran have been allowed to pass.

Diplomatic challenges have compounded the military situation. When Washington requested assistance from NATO and its European and Asian partners to secure the route, they declined. European governments characterised the conflict as outside their purview.

For Tehran, this outcome demonstrated that the power which struck at the core of the Iranian state was unable to mobilise its allies to reopen a single shipping lane. The closure of the Strait of Hormuz is thus interpreted in Iran not only as a point of economic leverage but also as a political and strategic setback for the US and Israel, serving as evidence that the strategy of imposing costs on its adversaries is effective.

Feeling emboldened, Iran has rejected US demands for unconditional surrender and continued negotiations rather than capitulating. Ongoing support from Russia and China, including at the United Nations, has enabled Tehran to frame the war as part of a broader contest over the international order rather than as an isolated conflict.

On the domestic front, the Islamic Republic has managed to retain stability by demonstrating continuity. After the assassination of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, his son, Mojtaba, was appointed as his successor within days. Even as the new leader’s prolonged absence from public view raises additional questions, the Islamic Republic has been able to maintain the perception of stability and cohesion.

What comes next

By its own standards, Tehran sees itself as having the upper hand. The inability of its adversaries to topple the governing system is what matters in the view of its leadership; all other losses are considered recoverable as long as the Islamic Republic endures.

Iran now appears to seek to translate survival into a partial restoration of regional standing, most notably by linking any settlement of the conflict to an end to the war in Lebanon. It wants to position itself as a participant in regional de-escalation.

The objective is to halt the erosion of influence over the past few years, particularly the loss of its position in Syria, and to convert remaining leverage into continued relevance.

However, the failure of its conventional military deterrent has reinforced within the Iranian leadership the argument that only a nuclear capability could have prevented the US-Israeli attacks.

This perspective makes the nuclear issue more difficult to resolve and could therefore complicate negotiations with the US.

Domestically, the war has, for the time being, displaced the economic and governance grievances that fuelled protests over the winter, replacing them with rhetoric focused on external threats and national resistance.

The political leadership and the security establishment see the domestic situation differently: the former is aware of the governance failures exposed by the protests, while the latter tends to view dissent and external pressure as a unified existential threat. This divergence, as much as the war itself, will shape the direction domestic politics takes: towards more repression or towards reconciliation and recovery.

A few outstanding questions remain: Can a leadership that equates regime survival with victory achieve a lasting peace? Or will it come to the conclusion that only a more assertive posture and potentially a nuclear weapon can guarantee its future? The next 100 days may give us the answers.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera’s editorial stance.