The US was Israel’s largest supplier of military-related imports during the war, accounting for more than 42 percent of the total declared value identified in this investigation, according to the ITA data.
India ranked second, responsible for about 26 percent.
These two countries accounted for more than two-thirds of the total value of arms imports recorded.
The next three biggest suppliers were Romania (8 percent), Taiwan (4 percent) and the Czech Republic (3 percent).
Member states of the European Union collectively accounted for nearly 19 percent of the total value of Israel’s weapons-related imports.
A further nearly 8 percent came from East and Southeast Asia, including Taiwan, China, South Korea, Vietnam and Singapore.
The data also shows shifts in supply patterns over time.
From January 2022 to September 2023, two of the three largest consignments to Israel worth a combined 80.9 million shekels ($22.3m) under the HS code for explosive munitions came from Azerbaijan. This fell to a total of 8.2 million shekels ($2.3m) during the genocidal war on Gaza.
Arms and munitions worth 40.4 million shekels ($11.1m), originating from the Netherlands under the same HS code, were sent to Israel in August 2022; by contrast, Dutch military exports to Israel during the entire war were worth 105,000 shekels ($29,000).
A spokesperson for the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs told Al Jazeera that “the export of military goods to Israel is only approved for purely defensive purposes”.
But Al Jazeera’s analysis indicates that several other countries substantially increased the scale of their military-related goods imported into Israel during the war compared with the preceding 21 months, the earliest period available due to the ITA data only dating back to 2022.
That includes the top five suppliers of military-related consignments: the US, India, Romania, Taiwan, and the Czech Republic.
It also includes smaller quantities of military supplies from nations that publicly backed the ICJ’s January 2024 ruling.
China, for instance, said it hoped the provisional measures ordered by the court would be implemented effectively. However, military-related shipments to Israel originating from China totalled 71.1 million shekels ($19.6m) during the war, with roughly 83 percent of that value logged after the court ruling.
Al Jazeera contacted the Chinese government for comment, but had received no response by the time of publication.
Singapore noted that ICJ orders are generally “binding”, and said it had supported UN resolutions calling for an “immediate humanitarian truce or ceasefire”. But Israeli customs data shows 20.2 million shekels ($5.6m) in military-related imports from Singapore during the war, 88 percent of which were recorded after the ICJ decision.
Switzerland reiterated its support for the ICJ’s role in the peaceful settlement of disputes, and "full respect for international law”. But 9 million shekels ($2.5m) worth of Israel’s military imports during the war originated in the Central European nation, with 98 percent of the total registered following the ruling. The Swiss government, in a statement, confirmed to Al Jazeera that licences for “specific military goods have been granted”.
Even countries that were among the strongest pro-Palestinian voices on the world stage had military-related goods originating from their territories enter Israel during the war - even if the quantities were much smaller - according to the ITA data.
Turkiye’s President Recep Tayyip Erdogan said he hoped Israel’s attacks on women, children and elderly people would end. Military-related goods originating from the country totalled 7.5 million shekels ($2.1m), with 79 percent recorded after the ICJ order.
The Turkish government told Al Jazeera in a statement that, from May 2, 2024, “exports, imports, free zone trade, and transit trade from Türkiye to Israel across all product groups have been completely halted” and that “trade with Israel has been at zero” since that date.
It also said “no arms export permits were granted to Israel by Turkish authorities” after October 7, 2023.
Israeli customs data reviewed by Al Jazeera does show that entries through Israel’s Ashdod port stopped after May 2024, following Turkiye’s announcement that trade had been suspended. However, military-related goods recorded as originating from Turkiye continued to enter Israel via Ben Gurion airport and Haifa port after that date, according to the ITA data.
Brazil, likewise, stressed that the ICJ’s measures were legally binding and called for full and immediate compliance. But military-related shipments originating from the country totalled 8.7 million shekels ($2.4m) during the war, almost 80 percent of that after January 2024.
Brazil’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs told Al Jazeera the country had not approved any new defence-related export requests to Israel since February 9, 2023. However, it said certain categories - including some firearm components, accessories, small-calibre ammunition, defence-related manufacturing inputs and military training equipment - are not subject to prior approval by the Foreign Ministry.
Patrick Wilken, a researcher at Amnesty International, said the scale of Israel’s military campaign made such international support indispensable.
“There is no way that Israel alone could have sustained the intensity of its massive bombardment across the Gaza Strip,” he said. “Israel has relied on a global supply chain of arms, munitions and support services, primarily supplied by the United States but supported by many other states.”
As the war continued, weapons-related imports to Israel increased. The data appears to bear that out.
The first four months - between October 2023 and February 2024 - saw the lowest number of imports throughout the genocidal two-year war.
As the war dragged on, with tens of thousands of civilians killed, schools and universities bombed, and hospitals struck, that changed.
In March 2024, the military imports of 121.7 million shekels ($33.5m) were more than double the amount from December 2023. South Korea’s largest consignment of the period entered Israel this month, with 14.0 million shekels ($3.8m) in tank and armoured vehicle parts, according to the ITA data.
In May 2024, as Israeli forces pushed into the southern Gaza city of Rafah, the ICJ ordered Israel to halt its offensive there, citing an “immense risk” to the Palestinian population.
But Israel’s armoury was still filling up. Consignments surged again, a new record high since October 2023, reaching about 141.7 million shekels ($39m). Bulgaria’s largest shipment of the war arrived that month, 20.1 million shekels ($5.5m) in explosive munitions, while the Czech Republic recorded its biggest month overall for military-related exports to Israel, worth 10.5 million shekels ($2.9m).
As the war continued, hundreds of thousands of people across the world’s biggest cities took to the streets demanding an end to the fighting and calling on their governments to halt arms exports to Israel.
Many states announced arms embargoes - government-imposed restrictions on the sale or transfer of weapons and military equipment to a specific country. Others opted for more limited suspensions of arms sales, typically temporary or partial halts applied to certain licences or categories of equipment.
Anna Stavrianakis, a professor of international relations at the University of Sussex and expert on the global arms trade, said public pressure played a decisive role in pushing governments to reassess their export policies.
“In several cases, it has been public protest, labour organising and strategic litigation that has forced arms-exporting states to reconsider or restrict transfers,” she told Al Jazeera.
In the United Kingdom, a case brought by Al-Haq, an NGO based in the occupied West Bank, and nonprofit Global Legal Action Network (GLAN), and supported by Amnesty International and others, challenged Britain's arms exports in court.
In Spain, dockworkers refused to handle ships reportedly carrying military equipment bound for Israel, prompting authorities to block or investigate shipments.
In Canada, demonstrations and pressure from lawmakers preceded a parliamentary vote calling for a halt to transfers, after which the government paused new permits. In France, large-scale protests intensified scrutiny of arms sales.
Stavrianakis added that these debates within countries exposed tensions between governments’ strategic commitments to Israel and domestic demands to ensure compliance with international legal obligations.
Martin Drew, an expert in export controls, argued that restrictions on arms exports were not a substitute for legal measures to prohibit weapons sales.
“A government can create restrictions on export licences,” he said. “But that is policy rather than law. It means they can still authorise exports if they choose to.”
In practice, most defence contracts include a clause stating that delivery is “subject to export licence approval”. If a licence is revoked, shipments may be paused or cancelled, he said. But if a government only stops issuing new licences, existing licences may remain valid, allowing previously approved exports to continue.
Drew said the type of licence also matters.
In the UK, for example, a Standard Individual Export Licence (SIEL) covers a specific shipment of a specific item. If that licence is suspended, the export stops. However, this may also be appealed.
But other licences, such as the UK’s Open Individual Export Licences (OIELs) or Open General Export Licences (OGELs), can cover multiple shipments over a set period. These broader licences can remain in force even after political announcements about “suspensions”, depending on how the policy is implemented.
There are also wider industrial consequences. Defence companies and partner governments rely on supply chains that operate over several years, often linked to multiyear procurement contracts and long production timelines. If a country suspends export licences unpredictably, it may face reputational and commercial risks.
“Major defence contracts depend on trust,” Drew said. “If buyers think you may not fulfil your commitments, they may turn elsewhere.”
He added that large weapons systems, including jet programmes, typically run over years, and sometimes decades, relying on export orders to spread costs and sustain manufacturing. Disrupting licences via suspensions or embargoes can therefore affect not just a single shipment, but the viability of entire production lines.
The result is that governments often try to balance political pressure, legal risk and industrial interests, which can produce policies that appear restrictive in public statements but are narrower in practice.
Under Prime Minister Pedro Sanchez, Spain became one of Israel’s most vocal critics in the EU, calling for a ceasefire and backing international legal action.
In January 2024, Spain’s foreign minister said the country had not sold any weapons to Israel since the start of the war, insisting an embargo was already in effect. But a legally binding embargo was not written into law until October 2025, the month the latest "ceasefire" was announced.
Israeli customs data reviewed by Al Jazeera recorded 99 shipments of military-related goods originating from Spain worth 21.6 million shekels ($5.9m) by then. Its largest consignment, 4 million shekels ($1.1m) labelled under the HS code for explosive-type munitions, entered Israel in December 2023.
Al Jazeera contacted the Spanish government for comment, but had received no response at the time of publication.
Ottawa followed Spain’s example, saying in January 2024 that it would stop approving new arms exports to Israel. The policy was formalised in March 2024, following a parliamentary vote referencing the ICJ’s provisional measures.
However, the final wording of that motion fell short of demanding a complete halt to all military trade. Instead, it asked the government to stop approving new authorisations and transfers.
Critics say this “watered-down” language has allowed military-related imports to continue entering Israel.
Between October 2023 and October 2025, Canada recorded 23 shipments of military-related goods to Israel worth approximately 1.7 million shekels ($458,000). Nineteen of these shipments were logged in the ITA data as occurring after the parliamentary vote calling for an end to arms exports to Israel.
The Canadian government told Al Jazeera that it does not comment on the specifics of individual export permit applications or transactions due to “commercial confidentiality”.
The Global Affairs Canada said it had not approved any new permits for items that could be used in the genocidal Gaza war since January 8, 2024, but acknowledged that “not all exports from Canada require an export permit”.
It also said all permits suspended in 2024 remain so and cannot be used to export to Israel.
Canadian officials did not say whether military-related shipments recorded in Israeli customs data were imported into Israel under permits approved before January 2024.
Experts say France chose political signalling over a binding ban. On October 5, 2024, President Emmanuel Macron called for a halt to arms deliveries to Israel, saying the priority was to return to a political solution and stop supplying weapons used in Gaza. The statement marked one of France’s strongest public interventions of the war.
But it did not amount to a legal embargo.
The month before Macron’s announcement, 19 million shekels ($5.2m) of military-related goods originating from France entered Israel, one of 29 consignments to Israel between October 2023 and September 2024.
France's exports to Israel did not stop even afterwards.
The ITA data shows 25 shipments entered Israel after France announced a halt in deliveries. In total, 49.9 million shekels ($13.7m) in military-related goods arrived in Israel, with 92 percent of that value recorded after the ICJ ruling.
Al Jazeera contacted the French government for comment but received no response at the time of publication.
Days after Macron’s announcement, Rome also said it had suspended shipments of military equipment linked to the genocidal war on Gaza, framing the move as temporary rather than permanent.
However, after the arms suspension was announced, 33 additional consignments were recorded, continuing until the month before the "ceasefire", according to the ITA data. These post-announcement imports by Israel were worth 5.1 million shekels ($1.4m). During the war, Italy’s total of military-related goods to Israel was worth 24 million shekels ($6.6m) across 98 consignments.
The Italian government told Al Jazeera it had adopted a “particularly restrictive” approach to exports to Israel, “especially when compared with the stance adopted by other partner countries, including within the European Union”.
Italian officials also said Italy was “among the few countries worldwide” to “operate a dual-layer preventive control system: not only on export licences, but - even prior to that - on the conclusion of contracts”.
The government said, following reviews of licences approved before the war, “one licence concerning the export of naval ammunition materials for demonstration and testing purposes only was first suspended and subsequently revoked as a precautionary measure”.
However, it added that “the remaining previously authorised licences were not suspended, as the materials concerned do not present characteristics enabling their use against the civilian population in Gaza, the West Bank or Lebanon”.
Arguably Israel’s strongest ally in Europe, Germany tightened its arms policy only near the end.
Between October 2023 and October 2025, it exported 100 consignments to Israel worth approximately 43.5 million shekels ($12m).
In August 2025, Chancellor Friedrich Merz said Germany would no longer authorise exports that could be used in Gaza “until further notice”.
By then, most exports had already taken place, and Gaza was in ruins. A month after Merz’s statement, the third-largest recorded single consignment, worth 2.9 million shekels ($794,000), arrived at Ben Gurion airport.
The German government told Al Jazeera in a statement: “The Federal Government decides on the granting of licences for arms exports on a case-by-case basis and in the light of the specific circumstances, following a thorough assessment that takes into account foreign and security policy considerations in accordance with legal and political guidelines. This also applies to Israel.
“In doing so, the Federal Government takes into account compliance with international humanitarian law. Particular consideration is also given to the recipient country, the type of military equipment and its intended use.”
In early 2024, the UK - traditionally one of Israel’s strongest allies - started shifting its position, after it formally voted for a UN Security Council resolution calling for a temporary ceasefire.
A few months later, Keir Starmer was elected prime minister on a platform that called for an “urgent” and “immediate ceasefire”, while MPs from within the new governing party called for an arms embargo.
However, in September 2024, the government announced only a partial suspension of arms supply. It suspended 29 arms export licences after concluding the equipment might be used in serious violations of international humanitarian law, with some 350 licences remaining active.
The UK government has previously said it did not implement a full arms embargo due to the sale of F-35 jet parts, which would disrupt international supply chains. This was upheld by the High Court.
However, Al Jazeera’s analysis shows shipments recorded under military-related customs codes that are unrelated to aircraft parts also continued to enter Israel.
Between October 2023 and October 2025, 28 consignments worth 6.7 million shekels ($1.8m) entered Israel. The most valuable came well after repeated UK calls for a ceasefire. In June 2025, a consignment worth 1.9 million shekels ($535,000) entered Israel - the largest single shipment recorded in the ITA data analysed since 2022.
The UK government told Al Jazeera: “As announced to Parliament in September 2024, we suspended licences for all items that we assess could be used in military operations in Gaza, with the exception of the special measures with regard to the global F-35 programme.
“Exports of such equipment remain suspended, and since then over 50 licence applications have been refused or rejected on the same basis. Customs data does not accurately reflect export licence data and is therefore unreliable in this case.”
Al Jazeera’s investigation does not attempt to match individual customs shipments to specific UK export licences.
Data obtained by Al Jazeera through Freedom of Information (FOI) requests also reveals additional routes through which UK-origin combat aircraft parts could have reached Israel via third countries.
The documents show that the UK approved exports under what are known as “third-party” or incorporation licences. These licences allow British defence companies to ship components to manufacturers in other countries, where they are integrated into completed weapons systems that are then exported to Israel.
Between October 1 and December 31, 2024, the UK authorised licences worth 69,000 pounds ($92,000) for components for military training equipment routed via the US, 5,000 pounds ($7,000) in periscope components and related technology routed through Germany and two consignments for combat aircraft components worth 196,000 pounds ($263,000) shipped via Italy for onward transfer to Israel. These licences, for shipping via Germany and Italy, were labelled nonextant as of June 6, 2025.
A separate FOI response shows that the UK continued approving incorporation licences involving the US in 2025, with Israel listed as a potential end destination.
Between January 1 and September 30, 2025, the government authorised multiple licences covering components for combat aircraft, aero engines, targeting systems and navigation equipment, with a combined value running into the hundreds of millions of pounds. Several of the largest licences - including approvals worth 269.2 million pounds ($360m), 63.8 million pounds ($85m) and 39 million pounds ($52m) for combat aircraft components - listed Israel among a wide range of possible ultimate end users alongside the US and European allies.
Separately, two licences worth a combined 530,000 pounds ($710,000) explicitly named Israel as the sole ultimate end user, covering components for targeting equipment and military guidance and navigation systems.
The UK government also confirmed to Al Jazeera that it “does not carry out end-use verification checks overseas once the licence is issued”, relying instead on pre-export risk assessments.
The exports for incorporation licences to Israel via third countries do not appear in the UK government’s publicly reported figures for arms sales to Israel.
Campaigners say incorporation licences can obscure the ultimate destination of UK-made components and have criticised what they describe as a lack of transparency in how such exports are recorded.
Between January 19 and March 18, 2025, a temporary ceasefire and exchange of Israeli captives and Palestinian prisoners took effect. It was the second pause in the war.
According to the data analysed by Al Jazeera, some of the largest single weapons consignments recorded during the war arrived during this period, suggesting that the pause in fighting may also have created space for resupply and replenishment.
In February 2025, customs records show a shipment valued at 605 million shekels ($16.6m) entered Israel through the port of Haifa. Classified under codes for tank and armoured vehicle parts, it was the single largest weapons-related import identified in this investigation.
The data suggests the shipment arrived while the first 2025 ceasefire was still in effect. In total, 233 million shekels ($64.1m) of tank or armoured vehicle parts arrived in Israel during the genocidal war, accounting for 7.24 percent of all exports, according to the ITA data.
Sam Perlo-Freeman, a military and arms trade specialist, said the data indicated Israel may have been seeking to replenish supplies during the ceasefire. “A surge like this may indicate they needed emergency or diversified supplies,” he said.
Patrick Wilken, a researcher at Amnesty International, said large deliveries during pauses in fighting can reflect the need to replace weapons that have already been used.
“Given the sustained nature of the operations, there may have been supply pressures at different points,” he said.
Analysts say such replenishment cycles reflect logistical realities on the ground: it is harder to move large quantities of weapons during active bombardment, so lulls allow forces to resupply more efficiently.
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