The visit of Iran’s Foreign Minister, Abbas Araghchi, to Russia once again raises questions about Moscow’s position on the conflict between Iran on one side and the United States and Israel on the other.

This visit should not come as a surprise. Russia is a great power and a permanent member of the UN Security Council. Iran and Russia are also friendly states, as stipulated in the 2025 treaty signed between them. Therefore, the most viable strategy is to promote peace, even if military escalation offers short-term benefits.

Such benefits do exist for Moscow, including rising oil prices and the diversion of attention away from the conflict in Ukraine.

However, Russia is fully aware that a temporary improvement in the oil market does not remove the need to restructure its economy in the face of Western sanctions.

It is also clear that external conditions alone are insufficient for achieving its objectives in Ukraine.

On this basis, Moscow does not focus on short-term gains but instead places greater emphasis on resolving the conflict and mitigating its negative consequences. These include a potential humanitarian crisis in Iran, a global economic slowdown caused by excessively high energy prices and the resulting drop in demand, the risk of a financial crisis due to disruptions in regional financial centres, and threats to Russian companies that have significantly expanded their presence in the region in recent years.

Tehran appears to view Moscow’s position as aligned with its interests. Iran has managed to withstand a powerful military attack by the US and Israel, which is often seen as a major tactical victory.

Iran has also succeeded in achieving a favourable diplomatic position, as the US and Israel have found themselves with little meaningful support from other major powers.

European NATO allies have shown reluctance to participate in demining operations in the Strait of Hormuz and other activities. They see little benefit in becoming involved in the conflict, especially since the attack on Iran was not coordinated with them.

US allies in the region have also suffered significantly as a result of the conflict, as military action has weakened rather than strengthened their security.

China strongly opposes any military action. As is often the case, Beijing avoids escalation, but its position is clear and significant, particularly given its close economic ties with Iran.

As for India, it has shown little enthusiasm for the war, especially given the large number of its citizens working in the region.

Iran entered the conflict diplomatically isolated, without its military allies being obligated to provide immediate assistance. Yet the US and Israel also find themselves diplomatically isolated. Washington has many allies, but their effective support remains unclear.

Russia’s position helps to break this current diplomatic isolation, reinforced by Araghchi’s visit to Russia. Nevertheless, the situation remains highly fragile and dangerous, particularly for Iran.

Despite the weakness of the anti-Iran coalition, the US still retains broad scope to carry out military strikes at its discretion.

It is true that the US may face temporary resource constraints. The war has revealed certain shortcomings in the organisation of its armed forces when confronting a major regional power, most notably the need to strengthen its naval fleet. However, Washington remains largely insulated from any Iranian retaliation.

The Americans may need time to correct their mistakes, but they have ample time to do so. Nor can the US be considered hostage to a blockade of the Strait of Hormuz; it has already become the world’s largest oil producer and, along with Canada and Mexico, is strengthening its leading position.

Although Russia is unlikely to exert a direct influence on the outcome of the conflict, its political stance and practical measures nonetheless constitute an important factor in the equation shaping the coming Middle East crisis.

Russia expresses its view of the conflict in clear and unequivocal terms: the United States and Israel have committed aggression against Iran, and the consequences extend beyond Iran and the Middle East.

The conflict carries serious risks, including an increased likelihood of a humanitarian catastrophe and nuclear contamination if nuclear facilities are damaged. There is no military solution to the conflict; it requires sustained and continuous diplomatic efforts.

Naturally, Russia does not support any economic restrictions against Tehran, as clearly reflected in the 2025 Russian-Iranian agreement. This is consistent with Moscow’s firm position that any sanctions imposed outside the UN Security Council are unacceptable.

The same applies to any other hostile actions against Iran, including a naval blockade. At the same time, Russia’s position clearly emphasises the importance of reaching a political settlement.

Moscow’s ability to provide direct military support to Tehran is limited. This was evident long before the outbreak of the conflict and is reflected in the 2025 agreement, which, while outlining friendly relations, does not constitute a military alliance.

Moreover, Russia maintains and supports its relations with other Gulf states, and it is in Russia’s interest to avoid fuelling conflict between Iran and its neighbours. The region is so complex that the consequences of wars there are impossible to predict. A potential change in the US administration is also unlikely to resolve the issue. Since 1979, the United States has remained a persistent adversary of the Islamic Republic, despite fluctuations in its policies.

Washington may agree to a deal with Tehran today, but it could easily withdraw from it if it deems it necessary or if an opportunity arises to eliminate Iran.

At the same time, military strikes against Iran have demonstrated their limitations. For the first time in a long while, a large-scale US military operation of this kind has failed to achieve rapid and decisive political results. Instead, it has produced new dynamics in the balance of power for Washington. Before the war, its position was decisive: mere threats of force were sufficient.

That threat still carries weight, but its effectiveness is now in question. The limitations of military tools are likely to encourage Iran’s adversaries to make more effective use of “hybrid warfare”, while simultaneously seeking new ways to enhance the effectiveness of their military capabilities.

For Iran, establishing a sustainable economic and development model remains a major challenge. The state has proven its ability to withstand intense military pressure, but it is unlikely to build a long-term development model based solely on crisis-management measures.

Tehran will seek a much-needed period of respite to restore its economic capabilities. The limitations of Iran’s economic model were evident long before the conflict and may play a negative role in the future.