In recent years, the Brics grouping has attracted attention as it adds members and positions itself as the voice of the Global South. At a Brics forum held in Beijing last month, officials discussed expanding trade within the grouping. Such initiatives reflect both an impulse to reduce exposure to external shocks linked to the US dollar and a long-term ambition to reshape global finance.

These gatherings are as much about signalling intent as delivering substance. Brics wants to be seen as a platform through which emerging economies can reshape global engagement rules.

In Chinese, this grouping is called jinzhuan, or “gold brick”, a term that speaks volumes about its early aspirations. It is sometimes described as a bloc. Yet the more one looks at it, the less it resembles a coherent coalition. What binds its members is not a shared strategy or ideology, but something looser: a common unease with the global order and a desire for greater autonomy within it.

However, there is no unity. The war involving the United States, Israel and Iran has made that clear. Faced with one of the most consequential geopolitical crises in recent years, Brics has struggled to articulate a unified response. This is hardly surprising. The group now includes countries with sharply differing interests and alignments. Iran itself is a member, as is United Arab Emirates.

This lack of cohesion is, indeed, a defining feature of Brics. The more it expands, the harder it becomes to align.

And yet Brics matters, not because it offers a ready-made alternative to the existing order, but because it signals widespread dissatisfaction with it. For many of its members, the post-war international architecture in finance, politics and institutions no longer feels adequately representative.