Viktor Orbán’s crushing defeat in last month’s Hungarian election has led to an outbreak of democratic optimism. Across the globe, democrats are drawing lessons from the results and speculating about the decline of the far right. There is simultaneously a consensus that Donald Trump has gone from inspiration to “liability” for the global far right.

While the fall of Orbán has great symbolic significance and important consequences for EU politics (see the EU-Ukraine deal), we should be very careful not to read too much into it for three reasons.

First, as far as lessons for how to defeat so-called illiberal democrats are concerned, we must bear in mind that Orbán was in power for an exceptionally rare 16 years. This allowed him to oversee not only a political transformation of Hungary, but an economic and societal one. His defeat was not a rejection of his far-right policies, certainly not his anti-immigration policies (which are largely supported by the incoming prime minister, Petér Magyar), but of the country’s dire economic situation and the allegations of massive corruption under the Orbán regime.

Victory for Magyar, who will be sworn in on 9 May, was not so much an endorsement of his policies, but a consequence of his tireless campaigning outside the traditional opposition strongholds in the most strategic constituencies in an extremely disproportional electoral system. While this strategy could pay off in similar ways in majoritarian systems such as France, the UK and the US, it would be much less impactful in proportional systems such as the Netherlands. Still, as Zohran Mamdani has shown in New York City, grassroots mobilisation and old-school knocking on doors still matter.

Second, while the European far right has lost its unofficial leader, it is not in decline. Sure, some other far-right parties have also recently lost elections (in Bulgaria, for example) or power (the Netherlands). But far-right parties remain in government in a variety of EU member states (Czechia, Italy), and lead the polls in several others (Austria, France). The thing is, the far right is here to stay, and many of its parties are as established as the (former) “mainstream” parties. And, like other parties, their electoral support fluctuates and is affected by internal and external factors, such as corruption, infighting and crises in government.

More importantly, the mainstreaming and normalisation of far-right actors and ideas continue unabated. Giorgia Meloni’s Italy has become a mandatory pilgrimage site for politicians who try to present themselves as tough on immigration – from the European Commission president, Ursula von der Leyen, to Keir Starmer. The European People’s party (EPP), the EU-wide political alliance of centre-right parties, is now openly collaborating with far-right parties to pass legislation in the European parliament, while still openly flirting with Meloni.

And this collaboration is not limited to immigration. As long ago as the 2024 EU elections, the EPP was adopting far-right scepticism towards the climate crisis and environmental protection, in an effort to keep dissatisfied farmers from jumping ship to the far right.

Third, it is true that Trump is at the moment “toxic” for the far right, although this had no significant effect on the Hungarian election. But this toxicity issue is not static. Simply stated, when the US president is threatening to occupy Greenland and leave Nato, or introducing trade tariffs on the EU, he is a liability for European far-right parties. But when he is mainly linked to anti-establishment and immigration policies, or his alleged fight against “the swamp” and “wokeness”, his star rises again within the far right – although European far-right voters are overall rather sceptical of Trump. Hence, the much-celebrated “break-up” between Meloni and Trump is strategic rather than ideological and, consequently, will be temporary rather than permanent.

But Trump helps the European far right simply by being the US president. Because whenever the president of the most powerful country in the world says something, it is by definition not politically marginal. Moreover, much of what he says, however extreme, is normalised and rationalised in the discourse of mainstream media and politicians – just look at the obsequiousness of the Nato secretary general, Mark Rutte. That means that similar arguments become more difficult to marginalise in the European context.

Even worse, because Trump’s behaviour is so extreme and often seems unhinged, it is very easy for European far-right leaders to seem “moderate” in comparison – after all, he or she is “not as bad as Trump”. This endless comparison, and the inability to accept that there can be various shades of far right, helps savvy politicians such as Meloni. By not acting aggressively, erratically and loudly like Trump (or, in her own country, Matteo Salvini), she is mistaken for a mere “conservative” rather than a radical-right politician. She is thereby also helped by the implicit sexism of many observers, who assume that women are less extreme and ideological than men.

All of this is not to take anything away from Magyar or from the wonderful Hungarian people who opposed and ousted Orbán – and particularly the many leftwing Hungarians who voted for a rightwing politician to save democracy. It is also not to deny the symbolic significance of Orbán’s defeat. We should very much celebrate this important victory. But we should do so without generalising and simplifying, so we can ensure that similar election victories can be achieved in Europe and the US.

• Cas Mudde is the Stanley Wade Shelton UGAF professor of international affairs at the University of Georgia, and author of The Far Right Today