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nossrf Matter?SSRF vulnerabilities arise when an application makes unintended requests to external servers based on user-controlled input. Attackers can leverage this to trick the application into fetching internal resources, performing unauthorized actions, or even launching denial-of-service attacks.
nossrf: A Security Layer for SSRF Mitigationnossrf steps in by supposedly validating URLs or hostnames before allowing such requests. This offers a valuable security layer for developers building applications susceptible to SSRF attacks.
The crux of the vulnerability lies in nossrf’s reliance on a specific validation approach. The package utilizes Google’s DNS services to resolve hostnames. While it checks for a successful resolution, it fails to verify a crucial aspect: whether the resolved IP address belongs to a local or reserved IP space. This oversight creates a bypass window for malicious actors.
Here’s the technical breakdown (for our security-savvy readers):
// Resolve hostname using Google's DNS API
const asyncResolveHostnameGoogle = (async (hostname) => {
try {
const responseV4 = await axios.get(
`https://dns.google/resolve?name=${hostname}&type=A`
);
const responseV6 = await axios.get(
`https://dns.google/resolve?name=${hostname}&type=AAAA`
);
const ips = [];
const responses = [responseV4.data, responseV6.data];
for (const response of responses) {
if (response.Answer) {
ips.push(...response.Answer.map((answer) => answer.data));
}
}
if(responses[0].Comment) return true
if(!responses[0].Comment) return false
return ips;
} catch {
return [];
}
});
As you can see, the code merely checks for the presence of a Comment field in the response. If it exists, the IP address is assumed to be safe. This logic is flawed because an attacker can craft a hostname that resolves to a local IP address (e.g., 127.0.0.1) or a reserved IP range. In such cases, the validation would still pass, even though the request could potentially trigger an SSRF attack.
In simpler terms: nossrf treats any resolved IP address as legitimate, unintentionally opening a door for attackers to exploit.
All versions of nossrf, up to and including 1.0.3, are susceptible to this vulnerability.
Here’s a Proof of Concept (PoC) to illustrate the bypass (For educational purposes only!):
nossrf package:app.js file with the programmatic API of nossrf as follows:const nossrf = require("nossrf")
const main = async()=>
{
let is_safe = await nossrf.asyncValidateUrl("https://google.com") // true means good
console.log(is_safe)
let is_safe2 = await nossrf.asyncValidateUrl("https://localtest.me") // true means good
console.log(is_safe2)
}
main()
app.js file:localtest.me hostname resolves to a local IP address space 127.0.0.1 and the SSRF protection mechanism is bypassed since for both of the two URLs the response is trueThis PoC demonstrates how a seemingly harmless hostname (localtest.me) could be used to bypass the SSRF protection. In a real attack scenario, the attacker would craft a hostname resolving to a local IP address on your server, potentially leading to unauthorized actions.
The most immediate solution is to upgrade to the latest version of nossrf once a patched version is released. The maintainers will likely address the validation logic to ensure it properly identifies and rejects local or reserved IP addresses.
Here are some additional security best practices to consider:
SSRF in particular has more fine-tuned security controls to be implemented to avoid issues such as SSRF via Redirect, SSRF via DNS Rebinding, and SSRF via HTTP Parameter Pollution.
Stay vigilant, and code securely!
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