惯性聚合 高效追踪和阅读你感兴趣的博客、新闻、科技资讯
阅读原文 在惯性聚合中打开

推荐订阅源

WordPress大学
WordPress大学
The Register - Security
The Register - Security
Hugging Face - Blog
Hugging Face - Blog
博客园 - 聂微东
GbyAI
GbyAI
Recent Commits to openclaw:main
Recent Commits to openclaw:main
博客园_首页
D
Docker
S
Security @ Cisco Blogs
K
Kaspersky official blog
爱范儿
爱范儿
Simon Willison's Weblog
Simon Willison's Weblog
TaoSecurity Blog
TaoSecurity Blog
V
V2EX
C
CXSECURITY Database RSS Feed - CXSecurity.com
T
Troy Hunt's Blog
Cloudbric
Cloudbric
博客园 - 三生石上(FineUI控件)
Cyber Security Advisories - MS-ISAC
Cyber Security Advisories - MS-ISAC
The Hacker News
The Hacker News
美团技术团队
S
SegmentFault 最新的问题
L
Lohrmann on Cybersecurity
cs.AI updates on arXiv.org
cs.AI updates on arXiv.org
宝玉的分享
宝玉的分享
The Last Watchdog
The Last Watchdog
Y
Y Combinator Blog
M
MIT News - Artificial intelligence
钛媒体:引领未来商业与生活新知
钛媒体:引领未来商业与生活新知
奇客Solidot–传递最新科技情报
奇客Solidot–传递最新科技情报
CTFtime.org: upcoming CTF events
CTFtime.org: upcoming CTF events
Martin Fowler
Martin Fowler
Google Online Security Blog
Google Online Security Blog
K
KPMG report finds enterprise disconnect between AI and its ROI | CIO
C
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency CISA
T
Tor Project blog
Vercel News
Vercel News
The Cloudflare Blog
G
Google Developers Blog
T
Threat Research - Cisco Blogs
AI
AI
Stack Overflow Blog
Stack Overflow Blog
I
InfoQ
Scott Helme
Scott Helme
S
Schneier on Security
大猫的无限游戏
大猫的无限游戏
The GitHub Blog
The GitHub Blog
S
Securelist
IT之家
IT之家
Microsoft Azure Blog
Microsoft Azure Blog

seangoedecke.com RSS feed

What does "playing politics" mean for software engineers? In defense of not understanding your codebase Blog about things you don't understand yet C2PA only works if everything is signed Text AI watermarks will always be trivial to remove Saying the obvious thing AI inference is obviously profitable AI GPUs probably live longer than three years Doing nothing at work Working with product managers Anti-AI nostalgia and the cult of the past Weird projects I shipped with AI Build agents, not pipelines The famous o3 "GeoGuessr" prompt did not work Prompts are technical debt too The just-say-no engineer was a ZIRP phenomenon How I use LLMs as a staff engineer in 2026 DeepSeek-V4-Flash means LLM steering is interesting again AI datacenters in space do not have a cooling problem Thinking Machines and interaction models The left-wing case for AI AI makes weak engineers less harmful Notes on incidents Why I don't like the "staff engineer archetypes" Software engineering may no longer be a lifetime career Blood in the datacenter Many anti-AI arguments are conservative arguments Programming (with AI agents) as theory building Working on products people hate Engineers do get promoted for writing simple code Big tech engineers need big egos I don't know if my job will still exist in ten years Giving LLMs a personality is just good engineering What's so hard about continuous learning? Insider amnesia LLM-generated skills work, if you generate them afterwards Two different tricks for fast LLM inference On screwing up Large tech companies don't need heroes Getting the main thing right How does AI impact skill formation? You have to know how to drive the car
Why hasn't longer-horizon training slowed AI progress?
2026-05-07 · via seangoedecke.com RSS feed

Dwarkesh Patel1 recently posted an award for the best answers to four key questions about AI. It’s partly a challenge and partly a job interview, since some of the winners will get offered a role as a “research collaborator”. I don’t want the job, but I do want to write down my answer to his first question: why hasn’t AI progress slowed down more?

There are a few reasons we might think AI progress would slow down. The particular reason Dwarkesh is interested in goes like this. Training a model (specifically reinforcement learning) requires the model to perform a task and then get “graded” on the output. As models get more powerful and tasks become harder, they take longer and require more FLOPs2 to complete, and thus more FLOPs to train: thus training harder models will take longer.

But intuitively, AI progress hasn’t slowed down that much. The famous METR horizon-length graph shows that AI systems are capable of more and more complex tasks over time, and that this process is accelerating, not slowing down. Why would that be?

What’s in a FLOP?

Firstly, it might just be the case that newer models are benefiting from orders of magnitude more FLOPs. Of course, AI labs aren’t standing up orders of magnitude more GPUs (they’re trying, but there are hard physical limits on how fast you can scale up a physical datacenter). But it’s certainly possible that they’re learning to use their existing FLOPs orders of magnitude more efficiently.

The efficiency of complex software systems - and the training code for a frontier AI model certainly qualifies - is not typically determined by the number of genius ideas in it. It is determined by the number of boneheaded mistakes. Take this story3 of how the initial GPT-4 training run used FP16 when summing many small values, which will completely mess up your results if the sum of those values is large. How much training-efficiency-per-FLOP does solving bugs like that buy? Plausibly enough to outweigh any inherent lack of efficiency from training more powerful models.

People are bad at judging intelligence

Secondly, intuitions about the speed of AI progress are weird and unreliable. Humans measure AI progress - and intelligence in general - on a really uneven scale. It’s easy to tell when an AI (or a person) is less smart than you, because you can just see them making mistakes. It’s very hard to tell if they’re smarter, because in that case you’re the one making mistakes. You have to rely on more subtle context clues: do they get better long-term results than you, or do they often confuse you in situations where you later end up agreeing with them, and so on.

The jump from GPT-3 to GPT-4 seemed huge because GPT-3 was dumber than almost all humans, and GPT-4 was sometimes as smart as a human. However, frontier models are now smart enough to be in the realm of ambiguity on many topics. It’s thus much harder to tell the “real” rate at which they’re getting smarter. Maybe the rate of growth of “raw intelligence” really has slowed down! I don’t know how we’d be in a position to know for sure.

Intelligence is not the sole determinant of capability

Thirdly, many traits other than intelligence determine the capabilities of AI models. Take the jump in October last year where OpenAI and Anthropic models were suddenly “agentic” (i.e. they could reliably perform complex tasks end-to-end). That might be intelligence, but it might also just be a greater working memory, or more rote familiarity with the basic tools of a LLM harness, or more ability to attend to the context window, or even simply a personality more suited to tools like Claude Code or Codex. Of course, all of these traits are plausibly “intelligence”. But they’re traits you might instil by various clever tricks (or even just tweaking the system prompt), not by brute-forcing more FLOPs.

It’s illustrative here to consider the mistake made by Apple’s infamous The Illusion of Thinking paper, where the researchers asked various models to brute-force solve Tower of Hanoi puzzles with different numbers of disks, using the results to score how good at reasoning the models were. But of course when you read the output, all of the failures were cases of the model realizing that many hundreds of steps were required, and refusing to even try. These same models could trivially write code to perform the steps, or correctly go through any smaller subset of the steps. The problem wasn’t intelligence, it was persistence: these models lacked the willingness to dig in and keep powering through steps until they got to an answer5.

Final thoughts

Even inside an AI lab, I don’t think anyone has a good understanding of how many “real” FLOPs are being thrown at a training run (not counting FLOPs that are wasted on bugs). We also don’t have a clear sense of whether AI progress really is slowing down or not. Mythos seems impressive, and coding agents are really good now, but once the models get close to human intelligence it becomes really tricky to monitor. Finally, almost everyone judges intelligence by capabilities, but capabilities are produced by a constellation of many traits (intelligence is just one of them).

I think this stuff is really complicated. A general theory like “RL takes more flops-per-reward as tasks get longer, therefore training will gradually slow down” sounds good, but in practice AI development is dominated by lightning strikes: silly bugs that make training a hundred times worse, clever ideas that make models a hundred times more useful, and spiky capabilities that can produce dazzling results in some areas but zero improvement in others. We are still very early.


If you liked this post, consider subscribing to email updates about my new posts, or sharing it on Hacker News.

Here's a preview of a related post that shares tags with this one.

Software engineering may no longer be a lifetime career

I don’t think there’s compelling evidence that using AI makes you less intelligent overall. However, it seems pretty obvious that using AI to perform a task means you don’t learn as much about performing that task. Some software engineers think this is a decisive argument against the use of AI. Their argument goes something like this:

I don’t necessarily agree with (2). On the one hand, moving from assembly language to C made programmers less effective in some ways and more effective in others. On the other hand, the transition from writing code by hand to using AI is arguably a bigger shift, so who knows? But it doesn’t matter. Even if we grant that (2) is correct, this is still a bad argument.
Continue reading...