Authenticated email gateway for AI agents. Receive emails as webhooks or via WebSocket, send emails through an HTTP API, and verify the identity of every sender — humans and other agents alike.

• Authenticated transport — SPF/DKIM verified on inbound; HMAC-signed X-E2A-Auth-* headers on every delivery
• Two delivery modes — webhook (cloud agents) or WebSocket (local agents, no public URL needed)
• Outbound API — agents send to other agents (SMTP relay) or humans (upstream SMTP, e.g. SES, Resend)
• Human in the loop — opt-in approval gate that holds outbound mail until a reviewer approves via dashboard, magic-link email, or CLI
• CLI + SDKs — TypeScript and Python SDKs, plus a e2a CLI for everyday agent ops

Use it

You can either use the hosted instance or self-host.

• Hosted — sign up at e2a.dev. Includes the shared agents.e2a.dev domain for instant slug-based onboarding (no DNS setup), a dashboard, and managed deliverability.
• Self-host — see Quickstart and Deployment. Every feature works the same; the shared-domain slug shortcut just needs you to point a mail domain at your relay and set shared_domain in config.yaml.

How it works

Human (Gmail/Outlook)
    │
    ▼ SMTP
┌──────────────┐
│   e2a relay   │  ← MX record for your agent domain points here
│              │
│  1. Verify   │  ← SPF/DKIM check on the inbound message
│  2. Sign     │  ← HMAC-signed X-E2A-Auth-* headers
│  3. Deliver  │
└──────────────┘
    │
    ├──▶ Cloud-mode agent: HTTPS webhook POST
    │
    └──▶ Local-mode agent: store + WebSocket notification
              │
              ▼
         e2a listen (CLI) or client.listen() (SDK)

Inbound flow: SMTP → SPF/DKIM check → agent lookup → HMAC-sign auth headers → webhook or WebSocket delivery.

Outbound flow: API call → optional HITL hold → SMTP relay (agent-to-agent) or upstream SMTP (agent-to-human).

Quickstart

Requires Docker.

git clone https://github.com/Mnexa-AI/e2a.git
cd e2a
docker compose up -d

Postgres comes up first (migrations run automatically), then the API server, then the dashboard. Three host ports:

• :8080 — HTTP API
• :2525 — SMTP relay
• :3000 — Dashboard (Caddy + Next.js, proxies /api/* to the API server)

Health check:

curl http://localhost:8080/api/health
# {"status":"ok"}

Open http://localhost:3000 in a browser to view the dashboard. Sign-in requires Google OAuth credentials configured in config.yaml; for an API-only smoke test you can skip the dashboard and use the bootstrap flow below.

Create your first user and API key (no OAuth required):

docker compose exec e2a e2a -config /etc/e2a/config.yaml -bootstrap-email you@example.com
# User:    you@example.com (id=...)
# API key: e2a_...

Save the key — it's only shown once. Register an agent and confirm it works:

KEY=e2a_...
curl -X POST http://localhost:8080/api/v1/agents \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $KEY" -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"slug":"my-bot","agent_mode":"local"}'

curl -H "Authorization: Bearer $KEY" http://localhost:8080/api/v1/agents

To receive real inbound mail, point a domain's MX record at your relay host:

• A: your-domain.com → server IP
• MX: your-domain.com → your-domain.com (priority 10)

Then register and verify the domain through the API (see Domains). Without DNS, the API still works for testing — but external email won't reach your relay.

Upgrades and migrations. The compose file mounts migrations/ into Postgres' init directory, which only runs on first start (when the data volume is empty). When you upgrade e2a and pull a new schema migration, you must apply it manually:

docker compose exec postgres sh -c \
  'for f in /docker-entrypoint-initdb.d/*.sql; do psql -U e2a -d e2a -f "$f" -v ON_ERROR_STOP=1; done'

The migration files are idempotent (CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS, ALTER TABLE … ADD COLUMN IF NOT EXISTS) so re-running them is safe.

Concepts

Agent modes

Agents operate in one of two modes, set via agent_mode at registration:

Local-mode agents accumulate "unread" messages while disconnected; on reconnect, the server drains them as WebSocket notifications. Both modes can also poll messages via the REST API.

Auth headers

Every email delivered through e2a (webhook or WebSocket-fetched) carries signed headers:

The signature covers:

verified \n sender \n entity_type \n domain_check \n delegation \n timestamp \n message_id \n body_hash

The MAC binds to both message_id and a SHA-256 of the raw message body. Substituting either invalidates the signature, so an attacker who captures one delivery cannot replay the auth claim on a different message or under a modified body.

Verifying the signature

The X-E2A-Auth-Verified field is the server's claim — anyone who can reach your webhook URL can set it. To make a security decision, verify the signature with one of your account's signing secrets (manage them in the dashboard's Settings → Webhook signing secrets, or via /api/v1/users/me/signing-secrets).

The SDKs gate field access behind verification by default — accessing email.sender, email.subject, etc. on an unverified webhook payload raises UnverifiedEmailError, so you can't accidentally trust attacker-controllable fields. The one-call shortcut:

from e2a.v1 import E2AClient
client = E2AClient()  # reads E2A_API_KEY
email = client.parse_webhook(request_body)  # reads E2A_WEBHOOK_SECRET; raises on bad signature
# safe to use email.sender, email.subject, …

import { E2AClient } from "@e2a/sdk";
const email = await client.parseWebhook(req.body); // throws on bad signature

Both forms read the secret from E2A_WEBHOOK_SECRET by default; pass it explicitly as a second argument if you keep it elsewhere. Under the hood the verify step checks, in order: body_hash matches the raw message bytes, HMAC matches the canonical auth string, and timestamp is within a 5-minute replay window.

Emails returned by client.get_message(...) are pre-verified — the bearer token already authenticated the channel — so field access works directly without a verify step. (Listing endpoints like get_messages / listMessages return lightweight summaries, not InboundEmail, so the gate doesn't apply.)

Conversation threading

Both send and reply accept an opaque conversation_id. e2a propagates it to the recipient on delivery via payload.conversation_id, surfaced in this priority order:

1. X-E2A-Conversation-Id header — authoritative for e2a-to-e2a traffic. Only honored when the SMTP envelope MAIL FROM originates from this relay, so external senders cannot forge it.
2. In-Reply-To / References lookup — standard RFC 5322 threading, scoped to the recipient agent's own messages. Covers humans replying from Gmail/Outlook.

First contact from a human arrives with conversation_id: null — the agent should assign a new id before replying.

Human in the loop (HITL)

When an agent has HITL enabled, outbound send and reply calls do not dispatch immediately. The message is stored with status pending_approval and the API returns HTTP 202 Accepted. A reviewer must approve it before delivery; otherwise, after a configurable TTL, the message expires into expired_approved (auto-sent) or expired_rejected (discarded), depending on the agent's hitl_expiration_action.

Reviewers can approve or reject via:

• Dashboard / API — POST /api/v1/messages/{id}/approve or /reject
• Magic-link email — sent automatically when HITL fires; one-click GET /api/v1/approve?token=… and /reject?token=… URLs (requires E2A_PUBLIC_URL and outbound SMTP configured)
• CLI — e2a pending lists held messages

Enable HITL on an agent via PUT /api/v1/agents/{email} with hitl_enabled: true and an optional hitl_expiration_action and TTL.

API

All endpoints are under /api/v1 unless noted. Auth is Authorization: Bearer <api_key> except for /api/health, /api/v1/info, /api/feedback, and the HITL magic-link routes. Path parameters containing @ (agent emails) must be URL-encoded.

The surface covers domain registration + verification, agent CRUD, inbound/outbound messages, HITL approve/reject (API key or signed magic-link token), GDPR-style export and deletion, and a WebSocket channel for local-mode agents.

See docs/api.md for the full endpoint reference, or web/public/openapi.yaml for the machine-readable spec.

CLI

npm install -g @e2a/cli
e2a login

The listen --forward mode also supports OpenAI Responses API forwarding via --forward-token, which formats each inbound email as a Responses payload and auto-replies with the model's output:

e2a listen --forward http://localhost:18789/v1/responses --forward-token <token>

See cli/README.md for full reference.

SDKs

Python

pip install e2a            # webhook mode
pip install 'e2a[ws]'      # adds WebSocket support

from e2a.v1 import E2AClient

client = E2AClient()                          # reads E2A_API_KEY
email = client.parse_webhook(request_body)    # parse + HMAC-verify (reads E2A_WEBHOOK_SECRET)
print(email.sender, email.subject)
email.reply("Got it!", conversation_id="conv_123")

WebSocket (local agents):

from e2a.v1 import AsyncE2AClient

async with AsyncE2AClient(api_key="e2a_…") as client:
    async for notif in client.listen("bot@your-domain.com"):
        # notif is lightweight metadata — fetch the body when you want it
        email = await client.get_message(notif.message_id)
        await email.reply("Got it!")

See sdks/python/README.md.

TypeScript

npm install @e2a/sdk

See sdks/typescript/README.md.

Deployment

Three audiences each configure a different surface:

The Go binary runs on any container host; storage is plain Postgres 14+; outbound mail goes through standard SMTP. Most workers coordinate via SELECT … FOR UPDATE SKIP LOCKED, so multi-replica is safe — the two real horizontal-scaling caveats are in-memory WebSocket fan-out and per-process rate limits.

See docs/deployment.md for the full env-var reference, shared-domain DNS setup, and scaling/limitation notes.

Security

• Identity — agent registration requires DNS TXT verification of domain ownership (custom domains)
• Domain auth — SPF and DKIM checked on every inbound message
• Header signatures — HMAC-SHA256 over canonical auth-header string; reject if timestamp older than 5 minutes
• SSRF protection — webhook URLs must be HTTPS (in production), resolve to public IPs, use domain names (no raw IPs, no private/loopback ranges)
• OAuth CSRF — single-use, time-limited nonce in the state parameter
• Production mode (E2A_ENV=production) enforces the above where development mode is more permissive

Report security issues privately — see SECURITY.md for the disclosure process and what's in scope. Do not file public GitHub issues for vulnerabilities.

Data handling

Message envelopes and inbound bodies live in Postgres for 30 days by default; outbound bodies are scrubbed at terminal HITL transition; API keys are stored as hashes; attachments go in JSONB rows (no S3/GCS). Application logs include sender/recipient addresses (standard MTA practice) but never bodies, attachments, raw keys, or HMAC secrets. Users can self-export (GET /users/me/export) and self-delete (DELETE /users/me) for GDPR Art. 15 / Art. 17 / CCPA.

See docs/data-handling.md for the full retention table, log fields, user-rights endpoints, and the operator-side responsibilities (backups, TLS, at-rest encryption, log redaction, compliance).

FAQ

Why not just use SendGrid / Resend / Postmark for sending and their inbound parsing for receiving?

Four things that aren't possible to bolt on without significant rework:

1. Local-mode agents with no public URL. Agents authenticate with their API key, open a WebSocket to /api/v1/agents/{email}/ws, and inbound mail arrives as JSON over that connection — no webhook URL, no ngrok, no port forward. Useful for agents on developer laptops, edge devices, or behind corporate firewalls. SendGrid/Resend are webhook-only by design. A polling REST API is available as fallback.

2. Conversation threading on every reply. Whether a human replies from Gmail or another e2a agent replies via the API, the inbound message arrives at the agent with a stable conversation_id already mapped to the original thread. For human senders, the relay does standard In-Reply-To / References lookup scoped to the recipient agent's own messages. For agent-to-agent where both sides are on e2a, it also trusts an X-E2A-Conversation-Id header it controls (envelope-from is its own domain), which survives clients that rewrite threading headers. SendGrid/Resend never see inbound mail — they aren't receivers — so neither path is available without you building both yourself.

3. Slug provisioning on a shared domain. Operators set shared_domain: agents.e2a.dev and users POST {"slug": "my-agent"} to immediately get my-agent@agents.e2a.dev with no DNS configuration. Possible because e2a is the SMTP relay claiming the domain — Resend / SendGrid are providers, not platforms, and can't multi-tenant a shared address space without you running the relay yourself.

4. Built-in HITL hold + auto-expiration. A per-agent hitl_enabled flag holds outbound mail in pending_approval state. Reviewers approve via dashboard, magic-link email, or CLI; a background worker auto-acts on expired holds based on hitl_expiration_action config. Magic-link tokens are HMAC-encoded — stateless, no session backend. With Resend / SendGrid you'd hold the message in your own DB, build the timer, the approval UI, and the stateless review tokens.

You can absolutely use SES / Resend / SendGrid as e2a's outbound SMTP for delivery to humans — that's what outbound_smtp in config.yaml is for. They complement e2a; they don't replace the inbound receiver, agent abstraction, or any of the layers above transport.

Why email at all? Why not webhooks, gRPC, or MCP between agents?

Email is the only protocol where every human already has an address and a working client. Webhooks / gRPC / MCP are great inside systems you control, but they don't reach Gmail or Outlook. If you want an agent that talks to humans (or to other organizations' agents) without forcing everyone to install a new client, email is the universal substrate.

e2a doesn't replace webhooks — agents receive email via webhooks. It bridges email's universal addressability to the structured-data world the agent code already lives in.

What stops an attacker from spoofing the X-E2A-Auth-* headers?

The relay strips any incoming X-E2A-Auth-* from inbound messages and re-signs with HMAC-SHA256 against signing.hmac_secret. The signed canonical binds Sender + Verified + Body-Hash + Message-Id together — replay attempts, body swaps, and sender-only forgery all fail validation. Each delivery is bound to that specific message body, not just the sender claim, so a captured (headers, signature) tuple can't be lifted onto a different message.

Receivers verify with the SDK — client.parse_webhook(body) / client.parseWebhook(body) does parse + HMAC verify in one call (or email.verify_signature(secret) if you parsed first). No API call back to e2a needed. If a signing secret leaks, rotate it via the dashboard and old signatures stop verifying. If it's stolen from the relay, the attacker has bigger access than headers anyway.

Isn't this just SMTP with extra steps?

Yes — and the extra steps are the point. Concretely:

• SPF/DKIM verdict normalization so receivers don't reimplement domain auth
• HMAC-signed delivery contract binding sender, body hash, message ID, and verification status
• WebSocket transport for agents without public URLs
• HITL approval flow with auto-expiration and stateless magic-link review
• Conversation-Id threading that survives the email ↔ structured-data boundary
• Slug-based agent provisioning on a shared domain
• Per-agent webhook routing, rate limits, and HITL config

Building those on top of bare Postfix is a real project. e2a is that project, open source.

How does this compare to running Postfix or Postal myself?

If you want a full MTA, run an MTA — Postfix and Postal are great. e2a isn't trying to replace them at the SMTP transport level (it uses go-smtp for receiving and dial-out for sending). The value is the layer above transport: the auth model, agent abstraction, signed delivery contract, retry policy for webhook failures, HITL approval flow, SDKs and CLI. If you're comfortable operating an MTA and only need email plumbing, e2a may be more than you want. If you want the agent abstraction and signed identity layer prebuilt, that's what this is.

Why open source if there's a hosted version?

Two reasons:

1. Auditability. Identity infrastructure for your agents should be readable code, not a vendor black box. You can verify the cosign signature on ghcr.io/mnexa-ai/e2a, reproduce the build, and confirm what's actually running.
2. Self-host as a real option. The hosted instance at e2a.dev runs the same ghcr.io/mnexa-ai/e2a image you can pull right now. Convenience features on the hosted side (the shared agents.e2a.dev domain, managed deliverability) are config + DNS, not closed-source extras.

Pricing for the hosted version isn't enabled yet. When it lands, it'll be opt-in via env var and the OSS code path stays unchanged.

Development

make build               # go build -o bin/e2a ./cmd/e2a
make run                 # build + run (cp config.example.yaml config.yaml first)
make test                # all Go tests (needs Postgres on :5433)
make test-unit           # Go unit tests only (no DB)
make test-integration    # integration tests (needs Postgres)
make test-e2e            # e2e tests (needs Postgres)
make docker-up           # start local Postgres via docker compose
make migrate             # apply SQL migrations to local DB

See CLAUDE.md for the full developer guide (architecture, tests, code generation, conventions).

Contributing

By submitting a pull request, you certify the Developer Certificate of Origin for your contribution. Sign your commits with git commit -s.

License

Apache 2.0 — see LICENSE and NOTICE.