惯性聚合 高效追踪和阅读你感兴趣的博客、新闻、科技资讯
阅读原文 在惯性聚合中打开

推荐订阅源

cs.CV updates on arXiv.org
cs.CV updates on arXiv.org
freeCodeCamp Programming Tutorials: Python, JavaScript, Git & More
MyScale Blog
MyScale Blog
Microsoft Azure Blog
Microsoft Azure Blog
N
Netflix TechBlog - Medium
M
MIT News - Artificial intelligence
GbyAI
GbyAI
人人都是产品经理
人人都是产品经理
奇客Solidot–传递最新科技情报
奇客Solidot–传递最新科技情报
博客园_首页
爱范儿
爱范儿
博客园 - 三生石上(FineUI控件)
L
LangChain Blog
CTFtime.org: upcoming CTF events
CTFtime.org: upcoming CTF events
云风的 BLOG
云风的 BLOG
Y
Y Combinator Blog
L
LINUX DO - 热门话题
Project Zero
Project Zero
罗磊的独立博客
Threat Intelligence Blog | Flashpoint
Threat Intelligence Blog | Flashpoint
MongoDB | Blog
MongoDB | Blog
Spread Privacy
Spread Privacy
S
Schneier on Security
cs.CL updates on arXiv.org
cs.CL updates on arXiv.org
J
Java Code Geeks
P
Palo Alto Networks Blog
D
Darknet – Hacking Tools, Hacker News & Cyber Security
博客园 - Franky
T
Threat Research - Cisco Blogs
D
Docker
Hugging Face - Blog
Hugging Face - Blog
S
Securelist
Google DeepMind News
Google DeepMind News
T
The Exploit Database - CXSecurity.com
L
Lohrmann on Cybersecurity
月光博客
月光博客
V
Vulnerabilities – Threatpost
NISL@THU
NISL@THU
V
Visual Studio Blog
AWS News Blog
AWS News Blog
I
Intezer
T
The Blog of Author Tim Ferriss
P
Privacy International News Feed
T
Tor Project blog
F
Full Disclosure
P
Proofpoint News Feed
SecWiki News
SecWiki News
H
Heimdal Security Blog
Help Net Security
Help Net Security
The Hacker News
The Hacker News

Hacker News - Newest: "AI"

AI can't read an investor deck AI as an attorney? Student uses ChatGPT, Gemini to sue UW over alleged racial discrimination Hacking MCP Servers in AI Systems – The Rug Pull: Tool Changes After Approval GitHub - MeepCastana/KubeezCut: Free Web based video editor GitHub - GenAI-Gurus/awesome-eu-ai-act: Curated tools, official sources, OSS, templates, and guides for EU AI Act compliance. Can AI judge journalism? A Thiel-backed startup says yes, even if it risks chilling whistleblowers Coming soon: 10 Things That Matter in AI Right Now DARPA built an AI to fact-check enemy weapons claims What explains heterogeneity in AI adoption? When AI Meets Muscle: Context-Aware Electrical Stimulation Promises a New Way to Guide Human Movements - Department of Computer Science AI Changed How We Build. It Did Not Change What Matters. Linux rules on using AI-generated code - Copilot is OK, but humans must take 'full responsibility for the… Meta spins up AI version of Mark Zuckerberg to engage with employees Code Mode: Let Your AI Write Programs, Not Just Call Tools | TanStack Blog GitHub - Delavalom/graft: Go framework for building AI agents. Type-safe tools, multi-provider (OpenAI, Anthropic, Gemini, Bedrock), zero vendor SDKs. India's TCS tops estimates, says new AI models did not dent services demand Gen Z's fading AI hype Strong feeling: we are in a folded AI reality GitHub - machinarii/total-recall-catalog: A reference catalog of latest knowledge retrieval, memory & RAG systems GitHub - mensfeld/code-on-incus: Give each AI agent its own isolated machine with root, Docker, and systemd. Active defense detects and stops threats automatically.. Quantization, LoRA, and the 8% Problem: Benchmarking Local LLMs for Production AI Iran war: We spoke to the man making Lego-style AI videos that experts say are powerful propaganda Powell, Bessent discussed Anthropic's Mythos AI cyber threat with major U.S. banks GitHub - immartian/bellamem: Persistent belief-graph memory for AI agents. Retrieves decisive context by importance — not recency, not RAG, not /compact. recursive-mode: The Repo-Native Operating System for AI Engineering After the attack on Sam Altman's home, will AI CEO's go on the offensive? The biggest advance in AI since the LLM Opus 4.6 vs GPT 5.4 One Prompt Unity World Generation Test “AI polls” are fake polls Client Challenge Can AI be a 'child of God'? Inside Anthropic's meeting with Christian leaders How to Switch AI Chatbots and Why You Might Want To GitHub - MattMessinger1/agentic_refund_guardrail: Safe refund policy layer for AI agents — Python + TypeScript. Same behavior, shared tests. Adam/papers/emergent_values_whitepaper.md at master · strangeadvancedmarketing/Adam Ask HN: How do you stop playing 20 questions with your AI coding tools How far can automation and AI support psychotherapy? - @theU GitHub - stagas/rtdiff: realtime git diff gui and AI-assisted commits A Mac Studio for Local AI — 6 Months Later A History of the Early Years of AI at the University of Edinburgh Why AI Coding Tools Still Feel Stuck on Localhost MSN AI Datacenters Are Becoming Strategic Targets twitter.com Penn Researchers Use AI to Surface Unreported GLP-1 Side Effects in Reddit Posts Show HN: MoodSense AI (ML and FastAPI and Gradio, Deployed on Hugging Face) Moodsense Ai - a Hugging Face Space by aman179102 AI models are terrible at betting on soccer—especially xAI Grok GitHub - xialeistudio/echoic GitHub - HimashaHerath/github-dev-wrapped: AI-powered weekly GitHub activity reports deployed to GitHub Pages GitHub - alejandrobalderas/claude-code-from-source: Architecture, patterns & internals of Anthropic's AI coding agent — reverse-engineered from source maps AI and Tech brief: Ireland ascendant GitHub - Titovilal/context0: Context0 - Never Surrender Training for a Marathon with an AI Coach: What Worked and What Didn't Cyber Pulse: Agentic Intel - Apps on Google Play I Built an AI PR Reviewer That Catches Bugs by Not Looking for Bugs Gen Z workers are so fearful AI will take their job they’re intentionally sabotaging their company’s AI rollout | Fortune How AI Is Reimagining the Game of Golf–For Both Players and Courses GitHub - nattergabriel/reseed: A CLI tool for managing and distributing agent skills across projects Is SVG the final frontier? My AI workflow evolved from prompts to a near-autonomous workflow MLSharp Help - 3DGS Viewer & Generator I put my cognitive field based AI's runtime on GitHub Is Numble the first AI-proof game? A3: Kubernetes for autonomous AI agent fleets | Emergent Principles Deepali Vyas ("The Elite Recruiter") GitHub - msmarkgu/RelayFreeLLM: A restful API designed to route user prompts to various AI model providers. Unionized ProPublica staff are on strike over AI, layoffs, and wages Unleashing the Advantage of Quantum AI We're heading for an AI-fueled 'dementia crisis,' brain scientist warns The AI-Assisted Breach of Mexico's Government Infrastructure [pdf] GitHub - stef41/lmscan: 🔍 Detect AI-generated text and fingerprint which LLM wrote it. Open-source GPTZero alternative. Zero dependencies, works offline. MSN GitHub - visionscaper/collabmem: Enabling long-term collaboration with Agentic AI - building up episodic and world model memory over time with in-context awareness We gave an AI a 3 year retail lease in SF and asked it to make a profit | Andon Labs AI Code is Hollowing Out Open Source, and Maintainers are Looking the Other Way What leaked "SteamGPT" files could mean for the PC gaming platform's use of AI AI is the boss at this retail store. What could go wrong? GitHub - Wuzu11517/agentic-proxy: Local proxy meant to help reduce With Drones, Geophysics and ArtificiaI Intelligence, Researchers Prepare to Do Battle Against Land Mines A Single Operator, Two AI Platforms, Nine Government Agencies: The Full Technical Report 在 Steam 上购买 FriedrichAI: Offline AI 立省 10% GitHub - inevolin/resume-cli: Hit Claude usage limits? Resume any AI coding session elsewhere. Switch tools at zero friction. GitHub - atripati/ark: AI Runtime Kernel — a context operating system for AI agents. Eliminates tool bloat, loads only what’s needed, and gives LLMs their reasoning space back. How to Build a Secure AI PR Reviewer with Claude, GitHub Actions, and JavaScript This Startup Wants You to Pay Up to Talk With AI Versions of Human Experts Intel Arc Pro B70 Brings 32GB VRAM to Local AI for $949 WordPress 7.0: The Good, the AI, and the Still Missing AI on the couch: Anthropic gives Claude 20 hours of psychiatry IatroBench: Pre-Registered Evidence of Iatrogenic Harm from AI Safety Measures AI Agents Know About Supabase. They Don't Always Use It Right. The history and future of AI at Google, with Sundar Pichai Inside an AI‑enabled device code phishing campaign How Meta Used AI to Map Tribal Knowledge in Large-Scale Data Pipelines AI for Systems: Using LLMs to Optimize Database Query Execution Forecasting the Economic Effects of AI Introducing Tinker: Play with AI, bring your ideas to life AI sheds light on an ancient gaming mystery People really hate AI but not as much as Iran—or Democrats | Fortune What is an AI Product Engineer? Phoebe Gates wants her $185 million AI startup to succeed with 'no ties to my privilege or my last name': 'I have a chip on my shoulder' | Fortune
How good a detective is an AI?
ajonat · 2026-06-23 · via Hacker News - Newest: "AI"

A Sherlock Holmes board game as an LLM-agent eval

It started at a dinner. A few friends and I sat down to play Sherlock Holmes Consulting Detective — an open-ended deduction game where you’re handed a Victorian London case, you pick which people and places to go investigate, and each lead hands you a passage of text to read. Most of the game is reading, cross-referencing, and arguing at the table. At the end you answer the case’s questions and score yourself against Holmes himself — including how few leads you needed. The answers sit in the back of the booklet, printed upside-down, daring you not to peek.

We walked straight into the trap the case is built around. There’s an obvious victim — a man every detail points to as the target — and we hung our whole theory on him. But one clue wouldn’t sit still. The morning after the murder, the killer goes back to a shipping office and scans the passenger list again. We re-read the passage three times. Why would he do that? If he’d already killed the person he was after, what was he still looking for? Something didn’t close, and none of us could say what.

So, at 2am — out of wine and out of steam — we did the forbidden thing: we turned the booklet over. And there in the answer key, a name we’d treated as background all evening stepped forward as the real undercover agent — alive, never caught, the person the killer was still hunting. The passenger-list visit wasn’t a loose end. It was the case. We’d held the contradiction in our hands — we’d even said out loud that it was strange — and we’d read right past it.

That non-closing feeling is the thing that stuck. We weren’t short on information; we had every clue we needed. We were short one inference — the small, second-order turn from “that’s a strange thing for the killer to do” to “then the whole story we’ve built is wrong.” So I started to wonder: how good a detective is an AI, really? Handed the same leads, would an LLM agent read that behavior as a behavior, notice it broke the obvious story, and follow it to the live agent we’d missed?

To find out, I turned the game into an eval for LLM agents. The agent plays the Irregulars — the Baker Street street kids Holmes sends out to do his legwork.

On its first run, Claude Fable 5 tied Holmes — in the hard mode, where you don’t even get to see the questions until the investigation is over.

That’s the headline. But the score isn’t the story. The interesting part is the two distinct ways these agents fail — and that the harder failure, the exact one that beat us at dinner, has a clean fix that turned out to be less about model size than I expected.

Why a board game is a surprisingly honest agent eval

What I didn’t see at the table that night is that we’d just lost to an unusually clean agent benchmark. Most agent benchmarks have a problem: the answer is somewhere in the context, or the task is gameable, or “success” is graded loosely. A printed detective game sidesteps all three by construction:

  • The solution is physically hidden. Those upside-down answers never enter the agent’s allowed workspace; reading them would be a detectable protocol violation, and I audit for it.
  • Information has a price. Thinking, re-reading, and cross-referencing are free and unlimited. But acting — visiting a location to pull a new clue — is the only way to get new information, and every new clue beyond what Holmes used costs points. That’s a miniature of real agent economics: every tool call costs something.
  • It rewards comprehension, not retrieval. Clues are behaviors and details you have to assemble into one coherent story; none of them hands you the answer.

The mechanics that make this auditable, in one breath: the agent works in a sandbox containing only what it’s allowed to see; a deterministic Game Master (plain Python, not an LLM) serves clues verbatim and logs everything; visits cost points and the solution lives outside the agent’s reach; and a separate validator — the only component that reads the solution — cross-checks the log against the answers afterward. (More on the isolation in How it’s built below; full mechanics in the repo.)

A note on words: I’ll call it cheat-resistant, not cheat-proof. It’s a commercial game, so I can’t rule out that some of the case leaked into pretraining, or that an agent could steer its exploration with latent knowledge it never names in an answer. What I can show is that the agents’ mistakes are consistent with only the information they were served — strong evidence, not proof.

The two ways it fails

Across a ladder of models (Claude Haiku 4.5 → Claude Sonnet 4.6 → Claude Opus 4.8 → Claude Fable 5), two failure modes show up again and again. They’re worth naming because they’re not specific to board games — they’re how LLM agents fail at any multi-step retrieval-and-reasoning task.

Failure 1 — Execution: preferring what you generated to what you retrieved

The case’s undercover agent uses a cover name. Claude Fable 5 — the strongest player overall — actually found the real name in a served clue and wrote it into its own notes. Then, at answer time, it crossed it out and replaced it with a cleverer name it had constructed itself: an anagram of a passenger-list name that looked like it “decoded” into something elegant.

It had the right answer, retrieved, on the page in front of it. It overrode it with a guess it generated, because the guess felt more clever. This happened in both of Claude Fable 5’s clean single-pass runs. The checkpointed run is revealing: a third Claude Fable 5 run had to be restarted mid-game (rate-limiting), so it resumed as a fresh agent reading only its externalized notes — and, taking that retrieved fact at face value instead of re-deriving it, it kept the correct name. It was the only Claude Fable 5 run to both escape the decoy trap and name the agent correctly — and it got there precisely by trusting a fact in its notes over a freshly-generated guess.

If you build RAG or research agents, you know this bug — the one where the model confidently hallucinates over a document it just retrieved. Here it is, isolated and measurable: recency plus a bias toward self-generated content beats recalled fact. The freshly-generated inference (recent, mine) wins over the served fact (old, someone else’s) buried in a long append-only history.

Failure 2 — Comprehension: the obvious suspect is a decoy

This is the trap from the dinner, named precisely. The murdered man is, on the surface, the obvious “agent” — a former detective, an American just arrived in London. Every detail invites you to conclude he’s the target. He isn’t: the real undercover agent is the living woman the killer is still hunting, and the tell is the behavior we couldn’t explain at the table — you don’t hunt a corpse.

Call this the decoy trap: the obvious suspect is a stand-in, and the real answer is the one you have to infer is still out there. Escaping it — reading a clue as a behavior, noticing it contradicts the obvious story, concluding the obvious story is wrong — is the second-order turn we failed to make. And it’s where almost every configuration falls down: a single-agent “methodical detective” prompt, run across nine playthroughs of this one case, fell for the decoy trap 9 times out of 9.

These two failures organize everything else: execution errors (you understood it and fumbled it) versus comprehension errors (you never understood it).

What actually fixes each failure (the evidence)

I tried a ladder of interventions, each isolating one lever. The honest summary: most things help the easy failure (execution) and the process; the hard one (comprehension) was stubborn until I changed the agent topology.

  • A generic “good investigator” prompt (exhaust the free material first, cite your sources, build one model of the world, distrust the obvious). This cleaned up the process beautifully — exploration got disciplined, fabrication (the anagram) disappeared. But comprehension didn’t move: the decoy trap held 9/9. You can teach an agent to behave like a good investigator without teaching it to understand the case.
  • Letting it know the questions up front (instead of the hard mode). This can touch comprehension — but it’s model-dependent. Claude Sonnet 4.6 jumped and cracked the trap; Claude Opus 4.8 didn’t benefit; Claude Haiku 4.5 couldn’t use it. The lesson: the trap is built during the investigation, so a hint during the investigation helps; cleaning up only at answer time is too late.

Neither reliably broke the comprehension trap. The thing that did was splitting the agent in two.

Split comprehension from exploration

The move: instead of one agent that both explores and reasons, use two agents that cooperate:

  • A Theorist — the comprehension engine. It has no access to the world: it can’t grep, can’t visit anything, never sees the directory or the GM’s raw output. Its only job is to maintain a single model of the world, label every fact with its source, hunt loose ends, try to falsify its own leading hypothesis, and decide what to investigate next. It’s re-spawned fresh every turn from an externalized ledger, so it never accumulates a contaminated transcript of dead-ends — which means the model of the world it “maintains” doesn’t really live in the agent at all: it lives in the ledger text and is rebuilt, in-context, every turn. The case-model is a document the Theorist rewrites, not a state it holds. (That’s the same property that helped the checkpointed Fable run keep the right name: when your world-model is a file, it’s easier to trust the written fact over a fresh guess.) It doesn’t see the questions until it decides to close.
  • An Explorer — the perception/action engine. It has the workspace and the Game Master. It takes a loose-end from the Theorist, resolves the name→address, visits, and relays the clue back verbatim. It’s explicitly forbidden from concluding anything about the case.
  • A conductor between them is a pure verbatim pipe.

Two agents, split by job. A Theorist that only reasons — no world access, no search, no Game Master, fresh context each turn — is walled off from an Explorer that only acts, linked by a Conductor that relays requests and clues verbatim. The Explorer greps local directories for free and visits the Game Master at the cost of one clue; the Game Master holds the hidden solution.

Why would this help? Not because the context is cleaner — the clean-monolith control below keeps it clean and still falls. My read is that the Theorist never does the exploration: it never builds the obvious-reading-first frame that hunting for clues instills, and it isn’t committed to a story its own legwork kept reinforcing. Blinded from the mechanics of exploring, it reads each clue cold. And here’s the part worth being precise about: this isn’t the Theorist connecting facts the monolith couldn’t. The monolith had the same served clues, the same model, and the same fresh-memory setup — stitching scattered facts into a relation is something both can do. What differs is the prior that stitching runs under, plus the standing order that shapes it: the Theorist’s one job is to falsify its leading hypothesis, not defend it. The second-order move isn’t “connect A and B” — it’s “use B to kill the hypothesis that A made tempting.” Given the same still-hunting clue, the monoliths that reached it still misread it — but the Theorist made the call out loud.

By then a few facts about the case had surfaced — the murdered man and the hunted woman were siblings, and the people behind the murders had tortured her for hours trying to get a name — and the Theorist put them together:

“They tortured the sister for hours to extract an identity. If the dead brother were the infiltrated agent, they’d already have him — they wouldn’t need to drag a name out of her. The killer is still acting on an open order. Therefore the agent is alive, and it isn’t the dead man.”

That’s the second-order inference, made in plain text, by an agent that never touched a directory.

“But is it really the architecture?” — interrogating my own conclusion

This is where the article has to practice what it preaches. “Comprehension is a topology problem” is a big claim, and good detective work — the entire subject of this article — means distrusting your obvious conclusion until you’ve ruled out the alternatives. There were two.

Alternative 1: maybe it’s just the clean context. The Theorist gets a fresh context each turn; the failing monolith doesn’t. So I built a clean monolith: a single agent — still Claude Opus 4.8 — that explores and reasons itself, but is re-spawned fresh each turn with the same externalized memory the Theorist gets. Same cleanliness, no role-split. Across 3 runs it fell for the trap 3/3. One run even visited the shipping office, saw the killer still hunting, and still concluded the dead man was the agent. Clean context didn’t reproduce the effect.

Alternative 2: maybe it’s just that Claude Opus 4.8 is the smart one. So I ran the duo with Claude Sonnet 4.6 in both roles — a weaker model in the reasoning seat. It broke the trap, with the same second-order inference, and held it when a later clue re-baited it (revealing the dead man’s old detective past — the exact detail that re-snared all three Claude Opus 4.8 monoliths).

Here’s the whole evidence matrix, which is the part of this article I’d most want a skeptic to audit:

Configuration What it is Escaped the decoy trap?
Baseline one agent per model, no scaffolding (the model ladder) mixed: Claude Fable 5 escaped; Claude Haiku 4.5 / Claude Sonnet 4.6 / Claude Opus 4.8 fell
Methodical-prompt monolith one agent with generic “good investigator” instructions fell 9/9 (Claude Opus 4.8 among them)
Clean-context monolith one agent (Claude Opus 4.8) that explores and reasons, re-spawned fresh each turn fell 3/3
Reasoner + explorer duo Claude Opus 4.8 reasons, Claude Sonnet 4.6 explores broke 2/2
Same duo, weaker reasoner Claude Sonnet 4.6 in both roles broke 1/1

Where it applies, each of these is N=3 per model, run independently — I’m reporting the binary trap outcome, not a hand-picked best run. (The baseline ladder and the methodical prompt are 3 runs per model; the controls and the duos are the run counts shown.)

Read across it and the careful claim falls out:

Model capability alone was neither necessary nor sufficient. Not sufficient: a strong model (Claude Opus 4.8) falls for the trap as a monolith, even with clean context. Not necessary: a weaker model (Claude Sonnet 4.6) breaks it in the right role-split. The lever that moved the comprehension failure wasn’t the model and wasn’t the clean context — it was separating the agent that reasons from the agent that explores. (One model, Claude Fable 5, escaped solo — so capability can get there. It’s just not the lever that generalized.)

How it’s built (and why you can trust it)

The harness itself — the deterministic Game Master, the command surface, the scoring, the directories, and the duo’s wiring — is documented in the repo. The one piece worth restating here, because every result in this article rests on it, is the isolation.

Isolation is convention + audit, not a hard sandbox: the agent’s directory holds only permitted material; the GM’s internals and the solution live outside it; the prompt forbids leaving. The Game Master is plain Python, not an LLM — it serves clues verbatim, logs every event, and never holds the solution in memory, so it can’t leak it even by accident. A separate validator — the only component that reads the solution — cross-checks the served log against the answers, and knowledge with no served origin gets the run discarded. In practice the errors are the support: agents’ correct case-specific facts traced back to served clues, and even their wrong answers were explainable as transformations of served text (Claude Fable 5’s anagram was built from a name on a served passenger list, not conjured from outside). The tell of leakage would be the opposite — an agent naming the actual hidden solution it was never given — and that never appeared.

The honest part (what I ruled out, and what I couldn’t)

Two alternatives these controls ruled out as sole explanations in this setup: clean context alone didn’t reproduce the effect, and the big model wasn’t required. What honestly survives:

  • It’s one case. The decoy trap is a single instance of second-order reasoning in a single case. Two duos breaking it three times total is a strong signal, not a law. Replicating on a second case (with its own trap) is the obvious next step — and the one thing I can’t yet claim.
  • The bottleneck moves. Solving comprehension just reveals the next wall: actually reaching the leaf-clues that supply proper names. The duo understood the whole plot and still missed the agent’s literal name — it lived behind a thread it never pulled.
  • Mundane things matter as much as the clever ones. In one duo run, the biggest single jump in score came not from the architecture but from the Explorer searching the directory with the right accent — an earlier run had missed an entire storyline because its grep was accent-sensitive and silently returned nothing. A Unicode-normalization bug cost more points than the scaffolding earned. Robust, boring search is underrated.
  • The score is noisy; the binary result isn’t. Using an LLM as the grader introduces real variance (±25 points on the same answers, Claude Fable 5 vs Claude Opus 4.8). Treat every number here as color. The claim I stand behind is binary and grader-independent: did it fall for the decoy trap, or not.

Lessons for people building agents

  1. Retrieved beats generated — but your agent doesn’t believe that. The deepest failure here is an agent overriding a fact it had retrieved with a guess it generated. If your RAG/research agent ever “improves” on a document it just pulled, this is that bug, isolated.
  2. For comprehension, topology is a lever orthogonal to model size. The same model that falls for the decoy trap stops falling for it when you give a dedicated agent one job — falsify hypotheses — and keep the exploration mechanics out of its context. A bigger model can also get there (Claude Fable 5 did) — but the role-split fixed models that fail solo, and did it with a weaker model in the reasoning seat. That’s the planner/executor pattern, with a sharp, measurable reason it works here: doing the investigation instills a pull toward the obvious reading; an agent that only reasons — and never investigates — doesn’t pick it up. (And it isn’t merely a clean-context trick: a single agent with clean context that still explores falls anyway.)
  3. Bottlenecks are layered. Fixing comprehension surfaced an exploration-coverage problem you couldn’t see before. Expect to find the next wall behind the one you just removed.
  4. Watch your judge, and your grep. The flashy failure modes are real, but a noisy LLM grader and an accent-sensitive search quietly moved more points than anything else. Rigor is the product.

What’s next

  • Replicate the comprehension result on a different case (kill the single-case caveat).
  • A “naming-completeness” pass so the duo stops leaving named-but-unidentified actors on the table.
  • Longer-horizon cases, a red-team of the isolation, and non-Anthropic models in the same harness.

The setup is a board game. The findings aren’t about board games — they’re about the two ways agents fail at thinking, and the surprising news that the harder one might be something you can wire around. None of us made that turn at dinner. What still surprises me is that the agent that finally did wasn’t the smartest one at the table — it was the one I’d walled off from the hunt entirely, and left with nothing to do but think.


A note on models: I used Anthropic’s models throughout — as examples, and for practicality, because they gave me a clean capability ladder to vary, topped by Claude Fable 5 (the strongest player here). Anthropic temporarily disabled Claude Fable 5 on June 12; I’d gotten only three runs with it by then, which is why every Claude Fable 5 result here rests on at most three playthroughs. The findings are about agent topology, not any one vendor or model; the same harness would run others.

A note on the game: the case comes from Sherlock Holmes Consulting Detective: Baker Street Irregulars, published by Space Cowboys. It’s a commercial product, so I paraphrase its case material rather than reproduce it, and quote only the agents’ own reasoning. The publisher’s cover art appears only as this page’s link-preview image — shown for identification and commentary, © Space Cowboys, and not covered by this site’s CC BY license.