






















This work studies an independent natural policy gradient (NPG) algorithm for the multi-agent reinforcement learning problem in Markov potential games. It is shown that, under mild technical assumptions and the introduction of the \textit{suboptimality gap}, the independent NPG method with an oracle providing exact policy evaluation asymptotically reaches an $ε$-Nash Equilibrium (NE) within $\mathcal{O}(1/ε)$ iterations. This improves upon the previous best result of $\mathcal{O}(1/ε^2)$ iterations and is of the same order, $\mathcal{O}(1/ε)$, that is achievable for the single-agent case. Empirical results for a synthetic potential game and a congestion game are presented to verify the theoretical bounds.
此内容由惯性聚合(RSS阅读器)自动聚合整理,仅供阅读参考。 原文来自 — 版权归原作者所有。