Paper 2026/833

Scale, Round, Break: Simple Leakage Attacks on Secret Sharing Schemes

Mark Simkin, Flashbots, Aarhus University

Abstract

We study the local leakage resilience of $t$-out-of-$n$ threshold secret sharing schemes. We present a remarkably simple, perfectly correct attack that fully breaks any scheme with linear reconstruction over a finite field using $\lg t + \mathcal{O}(1)$ bits of leakage per share. In particular, this yields concretely efficient attacks on additive secret sharing and on Shamir’s scheme for arbitrarily large thresholds over arbitrarily large finite fields. Our key technical idea is an approximately linear scale-and-round function that maps shares from an arbitrarily large field into a much smaller ring, while preserving the distance of well-separated secrets. Our results provides two surprising insights: Bigger finite fields do not necessarily improve leakage resilience and increasing the reconstruction threshold in Shamir’s scheme does not help too much either.