Paper 2026/776

SCOUT-CT: Sound Constant-Time Outcome with Uncertainty Tracking using multi-taint analysis

, University of Applied Sciences and Arts Western Switzerland, École Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne

Jean-François Pasche, University of Applied Sciences and Arts Western Switzerland

Maxim Golay, University of Applied Sciences and Arts Western Switzerland, École Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne

Alexandre Duc, University of Applied Sciences and Arts Western Switzerland

Abstract

Side-channel attacks are an important class of security exploits, in which an attacker gains access to confidential data by observing information inadvertently leaked by a system. Writing constant-time code is a common defense against time-based and microarchitectural side-channel attacks. Many approaches have been proposed to automatically verify that a program is constant-time. Sound methods can detect all information leaks but, to efficiently analyze large programs, most of them rely on overapproximation which can yield false alarms (i.e., reports of non-existent information leaks). Each finding produced by such analyses therefore requires manual inspection. Additionally, most existing approaches do not perform binary-level analysis and thus miss vulnerabilities introduced by compilation. In this paper, we present a novel sound analysis for detecting information leaks under the constant-time threat model. Compared with existing work, our technique improves taint analysis by systematically tracking precision loss to determine whether a detected information leak could be caused by overapproximation. Findings for which no precision loss is detected are reported as confirmed; as long as they do not arise from dead code, confirmed findings are guaranteed to be true and thus do not require significant manual inspection. Only findings with detected precision loss need classical human verification. Our analysis operates directly on binary executables. We instantiate our technique within the abstract interpretation framework and provide a proof of correctness. We implemented our approach in a prototype tool, SCOUT-CT, and evaluated it on a benchmark of constant-time and non-constant-time programs, including real-world cryptographic implementations. Our results show that SCOUT-CT is effective: our tool detected all 98 timing leaks in the benchmark and automatically classified 97 as confirmed findings that do not require significant manual inspection.

@misc{cryptoeprint:2026/776,
      author = {Damien Maier and Jean-François Pasche and Maxim Golay and Alexandre Duc},
      title = {{SCOUT}-{CT}: Sound Constant-Time Outcome with Uncertainty Tracking using multi-taint analysis},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2026/776},
      year = {2026},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/776}
}