Paper 2026/991

DDYF: Differential Dolev-Yao Fuzzing of Cryptographic Protocols

Lucca Hirschi, Inria Nancy Grand-Est, Université de Lorraine, LORIA

Steve Kremer

Abstract

Symbolic formal verification of cryptographic protocols based on the Dolev-Yao (DY) attacker model---an active attacker with full network control and perfect cryptography---is well-established for finding design-level logical flaws in cryptographic protocols. Building on this, DY fuzzing enriches fuzzing with this attacker model to uncover logical bugs at the implementation level. In contrast to bit-level fuzzers (e.g., AFL), DY fuzzing leverages a formal model of messages and cryptography to generate structured, adversarial executions, such as replaying and re-signing a modified payload. However, a significant limitation of DY fuzzing is the requirement to precisely model properties to check at runtime (e.g., session parameter agreement). Defining these properties is labor-intensive and inherently non-exhaustive, often necessitating complex instrumentation of the Programs Under Test (PUTs). Consequently, typically only a subset of logical attacks is detected. We address this limitation by introducing Differential DY Fuzzing (DDYF), which uses a differential oracle to compare executions across different protocol implementations. By interpreting discrepancies through the DY model, it identifies semantic differences indicative of bugs or vulnerabilities, effectively minimizing false positives. We propose a generic design for DDYF, implement it within the puffin DY fuzzer, and evaluate it on two major TLS implementations. Our results demonstrate that DDYF can detect vulnerabilities that evade state-of-the-art fuzzers, specifically those requiring DY attacker capabilities (missed by bit-level differential fuzzers) or complex objective oracles (missed by DY fuzzing). DDYF also uncovered 8 new RFC violations in Openssl and Wolfssl, which are by-design hardly detectable with non-differential oracle. Furthermore, we show that DDYF exposes fine-grained behavioral discrepancies, enabling more precise fingerprinting of protocol implementations.

@misc{cryptoeprint:2026/991,
      author = {Tom Gouville and Lucca Hirschi and Steve Kremer},
      title = {{DDYF}: Differential Dolev-Yao Fuzzing of Cryptographic Protocols},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2026/991},
      year = {2026},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/991}
}