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Abstract:The CPU-side large language model (LLM) tokenizer is a critical security gap in LLM serving through a confidential computing stack with CPU and GPU trusted execution environments (TEEs). Tokenizers converts the prompts through table-driven lookups, and the resulting memory access patterns are a powerful source of side-channel leakage. Recent work demonstrates end-to-end recovery of user prompts from tokenizer access pattern on production Intel TDX. However, a drop-in use of the popular tree-based Oblivious RAMs (e.g., PathORAM) to prevent access-pattern leakage introduces $\sim$13$\times$ tokenizer slowdown, resulting in 10-58% higher time-to-first-token (TTFT).
In this paper, we present OTRO, an efficient, oblivious tokenization path tailored to latency-critical LLM serving. OTRO relies on square-root ORAM for fast single-access lookups, but avoids its prohibitive $O(N\log^2N$) rebuild cost every $\sqrt{N}$ accesses through three key innovations. First, OTRO provides a pool of replicated square-root ORAM instances that utilize the read-only nature of tokenizer table. Second, an epoch-based rotation policy decouples accesses from rebuilds and pads each epoch with dummy accesses to its boundaries, minimizing observable information. Lastly, chunked KV-cache-aware tokenization further overlaps rebuilds with GPU prefill and minimizes the instance count. Implemented as modules in HuggingFace Tokenizers and nano-vLLM, running within a TDX-enabled CVM with an NVIDIA H100 GPU, OTRO limits TTFT overhead to at most 4.5%, keeps tokenizer-induced latency under 10\% of total TTFT, and adds less than 0.5 GB of memory overhead while reducing the tokenizer's observable leakage across various model families and sizes.

Submission history

From: Jonghyun Lee [view email]
[v1] Mon, 15 Jun 2026 23:21:32 UTC (1,166 KB)