Abstract:Memory-backed agents need provenance that can survive leaked or migrated snapshots, where logs, visible outputs, and trusted metadata may be absent. We propose MemMark, a state-evolution attribution watermark that embeds an owner-controlled signal into latent memory-write decisions. At each internal LLM call, MemMark samples among admissible candidates using keyed, distribution-preserving selection, and records cryptographic commitments with signed session anchors and reveal evidence. This makes attribution depend on reproducible backend behavior rather than mutable provenance fields. Across A-Mem and Graphiti on LoCoMo, with three LLM backbones, MemMark preserves memory utility: Overall F1 retains 99.6% of the unwatermarked baseline, while BLEU-1 changes by +0.2%. It also provides usable carrier capacity, with 1.16, 1.14, and 1.26 bits of mean entropy for update-target, link-target, and semantic-realization decisions. In the snapshot-only R3 setting, MemMark recovers the full 40-bit payload from final snapshots, while wrong-key verification remains near chance. Under nine memory-lifecycle attacks, verification distinguishes tampering, evidence deletion, and partial payload recovery. These results show that robust snapshot-only attribution is feasible for long-term agent memory without surviving traces, trusted metadata, or utility-degrading.
| Subjects: | Cryptography and Security (cs.CR) |
| Cite as: | arXiv:2605.25002 [cs.CR] |
| (or arXiv:2605.25002v1 [cs.CR] for this version) | |
| https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2605.25002 arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite (pending registration) |
From: Zhang HaoBo [view email]
[v1]
Sun, 24 May 2026 11:04:35 UTC (1,993 KB)
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