Abstract:Peer-evaluation and selection systems are used when sets of agents evaluate each other in order to select the best $k$ among them. These are commonly used in real-world settings, including academic conferences where those reviewing papers are often the set of submitters. Conferences have attempted to better allocate their reviewing resources by moving to a two-stage mechanism, in which some papers are eliminated after a first stage of review and remaining papers receive additional reviewers. We investigate how two major strategyproof peer selection mechanisms, Partition and ExactDollarPartition, perform when adapted to a two-stage system, in order to try and understand the effect of the two-stage mechanism on which agents get selected. We also examine how the various parameters of the two-stage mechanism influence the outcome. We provide a theoretical basis by showing how a particular setting is influenced by the two stages. However, solving for the general case seems implausible at the moment, and we use extensive simulations of different scenarios and settings to observe which agents benefit and which are harmed by adopting two-stage mechanisms (and we vary this mechanisms parameters as well). We show that the two-stage mechanism's advantage depends the noisiness of reviewer beliefs. Borderline agents benefit most in a low noise environment, while high rank agents benefit more in noisy environments. We show that the effectiveness of these mechanisms is highly dependent on the number of chosen agents, the number of reviews requested from agents, and reviewers' correlation, indicating that organizers need to exercise caution when selecting these parameters for a reviewing process.
| Subjects: | Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT) |
| MSC classes: | 91A80, 91B10, 91B12, 91B14 |
| ACM classes: | J.4; I.2 |
| Cite as: | arXiv:2605.24222 [cs.GT] |
| (or arXiv:2605.24222v1 [cs.GT] for this version) | |
| https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2605.24222 arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite (pending registration) |
From: Harper Lyon [view email]
[v1]
Fri, 22 May 2026 21:09:10 UTC (908 KB)
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