Abstract:The escalating digitalization of distribution networks has exposed interconnected Microgrid (MG) clusters to Stealthy False Data Injection Attacks that bypass Bad Data Detectors and propagate through tie-line couplings and shared learning channels. This paper proposes BR-FedMAPPO, a Byzantine-Resilient Federated Multi-Agent Proximal Policy Optimization framework that learns a triple-surface Moving Target Defense and an adaptive isolation strategy for cyber-secure operation. Each MG hosts a local Actor-Critic Agent whose policy is partitioned into a globally federated shared encoder and a privately retained action head, so no MG exposes the configurations, cardinality, or locations of its D-FACTS lines, Battery Energy Storage (BES) units, or tie-line capacities. The action vector perturbs D-FACTS reactances, redirects BES injections, reshapes inter-MG exchanges, and includes a continuous islanding signal. A two-stage Byzantine-resilient aggregation rule combines trimmed-mean filtering with reward-weighted updates. This scheme incorporates a detection-quality score based on the F1-score and False Positive Rate to penalize clients causing false alarms. Simulation results on four interconnected MGs based on the IEEE 30- and 118-bus test systems demonstrate effective mitigation of coordinated S-FDI attacks, containment of cascading disruptions through adaptive isolation, and protection of distributed learning channels against malicious model manipulations while maintaining cost-aware dispatch performance.
From: Seyyed Mostafa Nosratabadi [view email]
[v1]
Wed, 17 Jun 2026 13:52:22 UTC (6,456 KB)
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