Computer Science > Computer Science and Game Theory
arXiv:2606.22701 (cs)
[Submitted on 21 Jun 2026]
Abstract:A Nash equilibrium is learnable if there exists a myopic adjustment dynamic for which it is asymptotically stable. In generic symmetric two-player games, a Nash equilibrium is learnable if and only if it has index +1.
Submission history
From: Songzi Du [view email]
[v1]
Sun, 21 Jun 2026 22:36:07 UTC (9 KB)
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