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Abstract:Multi-agent large language model (LLM) systems often fail to reliably outperform a single strong model equipped with best-of-N sampling. We argue that a core source of this instability is ill-posed equilibrium selection: current systems specify what information agents share, but not which coordination convention should be selected. We formalize a broad class of such systems as discounted incomplete-information Markov games and show that two common pathologies, oscillation between competing conventions and drift across them, can both induce unstable learning and linear Bayesian regret. To obtain a well-posed target, we introduce the Heterogeneous Quantal Response Equilibrium (HQRE), an entropy-regularized equilibrium concept with agent- and state-dependent temperatures. Under a monotonicity condition, HQRE is unique, admits linearly convergent mirror updates, and yields bounded Bayesian regret; the same condition yields rollout-measurable stability diagnostics. We instantiate this objective in two algorithms: DICE-PC, which coordinates frozen models through prompt-control actions, and DICE-FT, which performs parameter-efficient mirror fine-tuning. Across eleven benchmarks in four domains, DICE improves accuracy-cost trade-offs over strong within-class baselines; on reasoning and planning tasks, DICE-PC improves by 4.3 percentage points on average and DICE-FT by 8.5 points.

Submission history

From: Zhanke Zhou [view email]
[v1] Sat, 6 Jun 2026 09:33:32 UTC (4,180 KB)