Abstract:Side-channel attacks are a major threat to the security of cryptosystems. Masking is a widely used countermeasure against such attacks, but proving the security of masked algorithms is error-prone without formal verification. In this work, we propose a novel approach to formal verification of noninterference properties of masked algorithms based on probabilistic separation logic. By establishing a connection between noninterference and conditional independence, we show how noninterference can be verified using Lilac, a separation logic for conditional independence. We also provide several proof rules that facilitate the verification of probing security and demonstrate their application to example algorithms.
| Subjects: | Logic in Computer Science (cs.LO); Cryptography and Security (cs.CR) |
| Cite as: | arXiv:2605.23316 [cs.LO] |
| (or arXiv:2605.23316v1 [cs.LO] for this version) | |
| https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2605.23316 arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite (pending registration) |
From: Satoshi Kura [view email]
[v1]
Fri, 22 May 2026 07:34:38 UTC (118 KB)
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