Abstract:This paper presents an investigation of a novel class of stealthy and selective reactive jamming attacks targeting the Physical Uplink Shared Channel (PUSCH) in 5G New Radio (NR) networks. We design and implement STORM-RJ (Stealthy Timing Obstruction and Radio Manipulation -- Reactive Jamming), a Software-Defined Radio (SDR)-based adversarial framework that enables highly precise, time-frequency aligned interference by dynamically adapting the bandwidth and center frequency of injected noise bursts in real time. STORM-RJ leverages decoded Downlink Control Information (DCI) to identify Uplink-Grants (UL-Grants) and synchronizes interference exactly with the resource blocks allocated to a target User Equipment (UE). We further characterize and mitigate the dominant latency sources -- both at the software processing and hardware Radio Frequency (RF) frontend levels -- to achieve a rapid jamming response upon grant detection. We conduct a comparative analysis of high-level versus low-level radio control strategies, demonstrating that only low-level tuning provides the microsecond-scale responsiveness necessary to meet 5G-NR timing constraints for effective reactive jamming. We analyze the practical feasibility of such selective jamming under realistic hardware and timing constraints, highlighting key trade-offs between SDR flexibility, processing latency, and synchronization accuracy. Finally, we discuss potential mitigation strategies, including Hybrid Automatic Repeat reQuest (HARQ) anomaly detection.
From: Rosolino Alaimo [view email]
[v1]
Fri, 12 Jun 2026 13:57:00 UTC (5,594 KB)
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