惯性聚合 高效追踪和阅读你感兴趣的博客、新闻、科技资讯
阅读原文 在惯性聚合中打开

推荐订阅源

IT之家
IT之家
Last Week in AI
Last Week in AI
博客园_首页
酷 壳 – CoolShell
酷 壳 – CoolShell
博客园 - 叶小钗
大猫的无限游戏
大猫的无限游戏
人人都是产品经理
人人都是产品经理
V
Visual Studio Blog
宝玉的分享
宝玉的分享
博客园 - Franky
奇客Solidot–传递最新科技情报
奇客Solidot–传递最新科技情报
月光博客
月光博客
T
Tailwind CSS Blog
让小产品的独立变现更简单 - ezindie.com
让小产品的独立变现更简单 - ezindie.com
量子位
博客园 - 聂微东
S
SegmentFault 最新的问题
博客园 - 司徒正美
罗磊的独立博客
V
V2EX
freeCodeCamp Programming Tutorials: Python, JavaScript, Git & More
美团技术团队
小众软件
小众软件
Jina AI
Jina AI

Hacker News: Front Page

SPICE simulation → oscilloscope → verification with Claude Code — Lucas Gerads Introducing Claude Opus 4.7 Qwen Studio The Future of Everything is Lies, I Guess: Where Do We Go From Here? GitHub - SeanFDZ/macmind: Single-layer transformer in HyperTalk for the classic Macintosh Virginia Bans Sale of Geolocation Data Show HN: Agent-cache – Multi-tier LLM/tool/session caching for Valkey and Redis Ancient DNA reveals pervasive directional selection across West Eurasia [pdf] AI cybersecurity is not proof of work Moving a large-scale metrics pipeline from StatsD to OpenTelemetry / Prometheus GitHub - Nightmare-Eclipse/RedSun: The Red Sun vulnerability repository GitHub - SethPyle376/hiraeth: Local AWS emulator focused on fast integration testing, with SQS support, SQLite-backed state, and a debug-friendly web UI. A Better Ludum Dare; Or, How to Ruin a Legacy GitHub - macOS26/Agent: Any AI, replaces Claude Code, Cursor, OpenClaw. Over 18 LLM providers (Claude, OpenAI, Gemini, Ollama, Zai, HF, Qwen) wired into a native Mac app that writes code, builds Xcode projects, bumps versions, manages git, automates Safari, use AppleScript, JS or Accessibility, extend Agent! w/ MCP Servers, run tasks from your iPhone via Messages. YouTube now lets you turn off Shorts I Made a Terminal Pager Burgers | マクドナルド公式 Commands — HackerNews CLI documentation ChatGPT for Excel PiCore - Raspberry Pi Port of Tiny Core Linux Live Nation illegally monopolized ticketing market, jury finds Google Broke Its Promise to Me. Now ICE Has My Data. Founding Engineer at Adaptional | Y Combinator CRISPR takes important step toward silencing Down syndrome’s extra chromosome GitHub - saffron-health/libretto: The AI toolkit for building reliable browser automations US v. Heppner (S.D.N.Y. 2026) no attorney-client privilege for AI chats [pdf] Unexpected €54k billing spike in 13 hours: Firebase browser key without API restrictions used for Gemini requests Fragments: April 14 Cal.com Goes Closed Source: Why AI Security Is Forcing Our Decision | Cal.com - Scheduling Software for Online Bookings Laravel raised money and now injects ads directly into your agent
Our response to the Axios developer tool compromise
2026-04-10 · via Hacker News: Front Page

We recently identified a security issue involving a third-party developer tool, Axios, that was part of a widely reported, broader industry incident(opens in a new window). Out of an abundance of caution we are taking steps to protect the process that certifies our macOS applications are legitimate OpenAI apps. We found no evidence that OpenAI user data was accessed, that our systems or intellectual property was compromised, or that our software was altered.

What happened and what we are doing

On March 31, 2026 (UTC), Axios, a widely used third-party developer library, was compromised as part of a broader software supply chain attack.(opens in a new window) At that time, a GitHub Actions workflow we use in the macOS app-signing process downloaded and executed a malicious version of Axios (version 1.14.1). This workflow had access to a certificate and notarization material used for signing macOS applications, including ChatGPT Desktop, Codex, Codex-cli, and Atlas. This certificate helps customers know that software comes from the legitimate developer, OpenAI. 

Our analysis of the incident concluded that the signing certificate present in this workflow was likely not successfully exfiltrated by the malicious payload due to the timing of the payload execution, certificate injection into the job, sequencing of the job itself, and other mitigating factors. Nevertheless, out of an abundance of caution we are treating the certificate as compromised, and are revoking and rotating it. 

Effective May 8, 2026, older versions of our macOS desktop apps will no longer receive updates or support, and may not be functional. These versions represent the earliest releases signed with our updated certificate:

  • ChatGPT Desktop: 1.2026.051
  • Codex App: 26.406.40811
  • Codex CLI: 0.119.0
  • Atlas: 1.2026.84.2

As part of our investigation and response, we engaged a third-party digital forensics and incident response firm, rotated our macOS code signing certificate,  published new builds of all relevant macOS products with the new certificate, and are working with Apple to ensure software signed with the previous certificate cannot be newly notarized. We have also reviewed all notarization of software using our previous certificate to confirm no unexpected software notarization occurred with these keys, and validated that our published software did not have unauthorized modifications. At this time, we have found no evidence of compromise or risk to existing software installations.

In the event that the certificate was successfully compromised by a malicious actor, they could use it to sign their own code, making it appear as legitimate OpenAI software. We have stopped new software notarizations using the old certificate, so new software signed with the old certificate by an unauthorized third party would be blocked by default by macOS security protections unless a user explicitly bypasses them. Once we fully revoke our certificate on May 8th, 2026, new downloads and launches of apps signed with the previous certificate will be blocked by macOS security protections.

The root cause of this incident was a misconfiguration in the GitHub Actions workflow, which we have addressed. Specifically, the action in question used a floating tag, as opposed to a specific commit hash, and did not have a configured minimumReleaseAge for new packages.

FAQ

Were OpenAI products or user data compromised?

No. We have found no evidence that OpenAI products or user data were compromised or exposed.

Have you seen malware signed as OpenAI?

No. We have found no evidence that the potentially exposed notarization and code signing material have been misused, and we have confirmed all notarization events with the impacted material were expected. 

Do I need to change my password?

No. Passwords and OpenAI API keys were not affected.

Does this affect iOS, Android, Linux, or Windows?

No. This only affects OpenAI macOS apps. This does not affect the web versions of our software. 

Why are you asking me to update my Mac apps?

OpenAI identified exposure in a GitHub Actions workflow involved in the macOS app-signing process. Because the exposed workflow was related to macOS app signing, we are proactively rotating the notarization and code signing material used for OpenAI macOS applications. Updating ensures you are running versions signed with our latest certificate. This certificate helps customers know that software comes from the legitimate developer, OpenAI.

Where do I download the updated macOS apps? 

Only download OpenAI apps from in-app updates or the official webpages below:

Do not install apps from links in emails, messages, ads, or third-party download sites. Be cautious of unexpected “OpenAI,” “ChatGPT,” or “Codex” installers sent through email, text, chat messages, ads, file-sharing links, or third-party download sites.

What happens after May 8, 2026? 

Effective May 8, 2026, older versions of our macOS desktop apps will no longer receive updates or support, and may not be functional. These versions represent the earliest releases signed with our updated certificate:

  • ChatGPT Desktop: 1.2026.051
  • Codex App: 26.406.40811
  • Codex CLI: 0.119.0
  • Atlas: 1.2026.84.2

Why are you not revoking the certificate immediately?

We have worked to block any further notarization of macOS apps with the impacted notarization material. This means that any fraudulent app posing as an OpenAI app using the impacted certificate will lack notarization, and therefore will be blocked by default by macOS security protections unless a user explicitly bypasses those protections. 

Because new notarization with the previous certificate is blocked, and because the revocation may cause macOS to block new downloads and first-time launches of apps signed with the previous certificate, we are giving our users a 30-day window to update to minimize disruption. This window will help minimize user risk and allow impacted clients to update through built-in update mechanisms, ensuring they are appropriately remediated. 

We are working with our partners to monitor for any indicators of misuse of the signing certificate, and will accelerate the revocation timeline if we identify malicious activity during this window.