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One thing that keeps bothering me:
Most privacy/security products still require organizations to trust vendors with readable sensitive data.
Even many “privacy vault” systems persist:
* plaintext * token mappings * or both
So the trust boundary never really disappears.
I’ve been exploring whether there’s a viable model where:
* sensitive data inside documents is tokenized before sharing * vendors never persist readable plaintext * customer-controlled keys handle reveal flows * and the vendor literally cannot leak what it does not hold
The architecture itself seems feasible using:
* tokenization/FF1 * customer-held KMS keys * ephemeral processing * audit-only metadata retention
What I’m trying to understand is whether this materially changes:
* security reviews * compliance approvals * BAA/vendor trust conversations * operational workflows
Curious whether anyone here has:
* encountered this problem directly * seen vendors rejected over plaintext exposure concerns * worked on privacy-vault/tokenization systems * or believes “vendor cannot access plaintext” meaningfully changes the trust model
Still very early and mostly doing discovery conversations.
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