Wittgenstein's duck-rabbit poses a question for vision-language models: when a model captions an ambiguous image, where in the model is the commitment to one aspect made? We address this with a 3,320-generation behavioral baseline over 83 bistable stimuli that surfaces three regimes (default-dominant, force-dominant, force-balanced) under neutral vs forced-choice prompting, then probe the underlying representations using a TopK sparse autoencoder we train on the CLIP layer that LLaVA-1.6-7B actually consumes (validation EV 0.93). Across 69 bistable stimuli with both per-aspect feature pools available, 72% (50/69) show simultaneous activation of both pools at the vision tower, including 12/12 default-dominant duck/rabbit and 7/8 force-balanced young/old. Causal steering at CLIP layer 22 flips captions on default-dominant stimuli (33% rabbit-flip rate under a fluency guard) but cannot flip captions on force-balanced young/old at any tested coefficient, despite their vision-side superposition. The dominance bottleneck lives downstream of the vision tower; the gap between vision-side representation and language-side commitment is an empirical handle on the seeing/seeing-as distinction. We also flag a methodological note: rank-based statistics on TopK SAE outputs require tie-corrected ranking to avoid silent row-order bias.