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Abstract:Input Diversity (DI), which applies random resizing and padding at each attack iteration, is a near-default ingredient of transfer-based adversarial attacks, widely assumed to improve transferability. We show this assumption is regime-dependent and, for robustly trained surrogates, often reversed. Varying only the surrogate, increasing the DI probability raises transfer success for standard surrogates but lowers it for robust ones: the two response curves separate like a pair of scissors, a pattern we call the Scissors Effect. The effect is strong and consistent on ImageNet, where blind DI costs the robust source 10.3% attack success on average across CNN, ViT, Swin, and ConvNeXt targets and across ten attacks spanning 2018-2024; it is smaller on CIFAR-10 unless DI is made aggressive. A controlled robustness-strength sweep that varies only the training budget shows the harm is graded rather than binary, crossing from beneficial to harmful already in the little-robustness regime. We trace it to gradient geometry: a resize/translation decomposition attributes roughly 67% of the harm to resize, and a direct source-target gradient-alignment measurement confirms the same resize operation improves alignment for standard surrogates but degrades it for robust ones. We summarize the regime with Local Gradient Consistency (LGC), a single input-space probe that separates the two surrogate types, and prove a bias-variance crossover theorem isolating where DI helps from where its resize bias dominates. A training-free rule (CG-DI) that disables diversity when LGC is high avoids the loss on robust surrogates while keeping DI's benefit on standard ones, positioning the Scissors Effect as a DI-specific manifestation of the broader robustness-transferability trade-off.

Submission history

From: Yuhang Jiang [view email]
[v1] Sun, 21 Jun 2026 14:10:07 UTC (2,009 KB)