expect(fs.readFileSync(targetPath, "utf8")).toBe('{"sentinel":true}\n');

});

it("refuses to traverse a symlinked parent component in the approvals path", () => {

it("accepts a symlinked OPENCLAW_HOME as the trusted approvals root", () => {

const realHome = makeTempDir();

const linkedHome = `${realHome}-link`;

tempDirs.push(realHome);

fs.symlinkSync(realHome, linkedHome);

tempDirs.push(realHome, linkedHome);

fs.symlinkSync(realHome, linkedHome, "dir");

process.env.OPENCLAW_HOME = linkedHome;

saveExecApprovals({ version: 1, defaults: { security: "full" }, agents: {} });

expect(

fs.readFileSync(path.join(realHome, ".openclaw", "exec-approvals.json"), "utf8"),

).toContain('"security": "full"');

});

it("refuses to traverse symlinked approvals components below a symlinked home", () => {

const realHome = makeTempDir();

const linkedHome = `${realHome}-link`;

const linkedStateTarget = path.join(realHome, "state-target");

tempDirs.push(realHome, linkedHome);

fs.mkdirSync(linkedStateTarget, { recursive: true });

fs.symlinkSync(realHome, linkedHome, "dir");

fs.symlinkSync(linkedStateTarget, path.join(realHome, ".openclaw"), "dir");

process.env.OPENCLAW_HOME = linkedHome;

expect(() =>

saveExecApprovals({ version: 1, defaults: { security: "full" }, agents: {} }),

).toThrow(/Refusing to traverse symlink in exec approvals path/);

expect(fs.existsSync(path.join(realHome, ".openclaw"))).toBe(false);

expect(fs.existsSync(path.join(linkedStateTarget, "exec-approvals.json"))).toBe(false);

});

it("adds trimmed allowlist entries once and persists generated ids", () => {