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Recent Commits to openclaw:main

test: merge chat side-result checks · openclaw/openclaw@ddd2c2a test: merge cron history checks · openclaw/openclaw@f7eb746 test: merge responsive navigation shell checks · openclaw/openclaw@c2e4b47 docs(changelog): add codex oauth fixes · openclaw/openclaw@628e6cd test: merge navigation routing cases · openclaw/openclaw@5d8cecb Tests: mock channel registry bundled fallback · openclaw/openclaw@2b08233 Secrets: avoid broad web search discovery for single plugin config · openclaw/openclaw@a464f59 test: merge config view browser checks · openclaw/openclaw@20cf511 fix(status): align oauth health with runtime · openclaw/openclaw@eed7116 feat: add macOS screen snapshots for monitor preview (#67954) thanks … · openclaw/openclaw@f377db1 fix: report shared auth scopes in hello-ok (#67810) thanks @BunsDev · openclaw/openclaw@0b6c39b Auto-reply: avoid eager bundled route fallback · openclaw/openclaw@3ea1bf4 Tests: narrow session binding contract setup · openclaw/openclaw@54e4e16 fix(macOS): enable undo/redo in webchat composer text input (#34962) · openclaw/openclaw@00951dc Tests: speed up channel setup promotion · openclaw/openclaw@82b529a Docs: refresh agent instructions · openclaw/openclaw@5775fe2 fix(auth): serialize OAuth refresh across agents to fix #26322 (#67876) · openclaw/openclaw@8e79080 test: allow ollama public surface boundary test · openclaw/openclaw@7d4f1a6 Docs: add test performance guardrails · openclaw/openclaw@89706d3 Tests: restore context-engine usage proof · openclaw/openclaw@e4c4f95 Tests: slim context engine runtime coverage · openclaw/openclaw@74c198f ci: retry failed custom checkouts · openclaw/openclaw@0ee5baf test: trim duplicate provider auth onboarding cases · openclaw/openclaw@1ffc02e matrix: fix sessions_spawn --thread subagent session spawning (#67643) · openclaw/openclaw@1ce2596 test: reduce auth choice fixture churn · openclaw/openclaw@857b9cd test: mock health status config boundaries · openclaw/openclaw@9d5ab4a test: mock onboard config io boundary · openclaw/openclaw@299694d test: mock legacy state plugin boundaries · openclaw/openclaw@2713089 test: mock channel install boundaries · openclaw/openclaw@b945248 test: mock doctor preview channel boundaries · openclaw/openclaw@b1a3ad4
Policy: add ingress channel conformance checks (#85744) ·...
giodl73-repo · 2026-05-29 · via Recent Commits to openclaw:main

@@ -18,12 +18,13 @@ report drift through `doctor --lint`. The final conformance signal is a clean

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instead of creating a separate health gate.

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Policy currently manages configured channels, MCP servers, model providers,

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network SSRF posture, Gateway exposure posture, agent workspace posture,

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network SSRF posture, ingress/channel access posture, Gateway exposure posture, agent workspace posture,

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OpenClaw config secret provider/auth profile posture, and governed tool

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declarations. For example, IT or a workspace operator can record that Telegram

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is not an approved channel provider, restrict MCP servers and model refs to

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approved entries, require private-network fetch/browser access to remain

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disabled, require Gateway bind/auth/HTTP exposure to stay within reviewed

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disabled, require direct-message session isolation and channel ingress posture

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to stay within reviewed bounds, require Gateway bind/auth/HTTP exposure to stay within reviewed

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bounds, require agent workspace access and tool denies to stay in a reviewed

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posture, require OpenClaw config SecretRefs to use managed providers, require

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config auth profiles to carry provider/mode metadata, require governed tools to

@@ -49,9 +50,9 @@ arbitrary plugins. The plugin remains enabled if `policy.jsonc` is missing, so

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doctor can report the missing artifact.

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Policy is authored, not generated from the user's current settings. A minimal

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policy for channels, MCP servers, model providers, network posture, Gateway

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exposure, agent workspace posture, OpenClaw config secret provider/auth profile

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posture, and tool metadata looks like this:

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policy for channels, MCP servers, model providers, network posture, ingress/channel access, Gateway

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exposure, agent workspace posture, configured sandbox runtime posture, OpenClaw

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config secret provider/auth profile posture, and tool metadata looks like this:

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```jsonc

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{

@@ -81,6 +82,16 @@ posture, and tool metadata looks like this:

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"allow": false,

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},

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},

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"ingress": {

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"session": {

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"requireDmScope": "per-channel-peer",

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},

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"channels": {

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"allowDmPolicies": ["pairing", "allowlist", "disabled"],

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"denyOpenGroups": true,

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"requireMentionInGroups": true,

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},

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},

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"gateway": {

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"exposure": {

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"allowNonLoopbackBind": false,

@@ -142,8 +153,9 @@ posture, and tool metadata looks like this:

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The rules are the authority. A category block is only a namespace; checks run

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when a concrete rule is present. OpenClaw reads current `channels.*` settings

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`mcp.servers.*`, `models.providers.*`, selected agent model refs, network SSRF

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settings, Gateway bind/auth/Control UI/Tailscale/remote/HTTP posture, OpenClaw

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config agent sandbox workspace access and tool deny posture, config secret

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settings, direct-message session scope, channel DM policy, channel group policy,

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channel/group mention gates, Gateway bind/auth/Control UI/Tailscale/remote/HTTP

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posture, OpenClaw config agent sandbox workspace access and tool deny posture, config secret

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provider and SecretRef provenance, config auth profile metadata, configured

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global/per-agent tool posture, and `TOOLS.md` declarations as evidence, then

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reports observed state that does not conform. If a policy denies non-loopback

@@ -180,11 +192,12 @@ its own finding against the same observed config.

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#### Scoped overlays

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Use `scopes.<scopeName>` when one set of agents needs stricter policy than the

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top-level baseline. Scopes require the `agentIds` selector, which supports

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`tools.*`, `agents.workspace.*`, and `sandbox.*`. Unsupported sections are

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rejected instead of being ignored. If an `agentIds` entry is not present in

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`agents.list[]`, OpenClaw evaluates the scoped rule against inherited

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Use `scopes.<scopeName>` when one set of agents or channels needs stricter

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policy than the top-level baseline. Agent-scoped sections use `agentIds`, which

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supports `tools.*`, `agents.workspace.*`, and `sandbox.*`. Channel-scoped

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ingress uses `channelIds`, which supports `ingress.channels.*`. Unsupported

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sections are rejected instead of being ignored. If an `agentIds` entry is not

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present in `agents.list[]`, OpenClaw evaluates the scoped rule against inherited

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global/default posture for that runtime agent id.

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```jsonc

@@ -230,6 +243,16 @@ global/default posture for that runtime agent id.

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},

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},

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},

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"telegram-ingress": {

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"channelIds": ["telegram"],

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"ingress": {

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"channels": {

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"allowDmPolicies": ["pairing"],

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"denyOpenGroups": true,

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"requireMentionInGroups": true,

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},

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},

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},

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},

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}

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```

@@ -248,9 +271,13 @@ passing. Use separate `agentIds` scopes for agent groups that use different

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sandbox backends, and leave unsupported container rules unset or false for the

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groups where those fields cannot be observed.

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| Selector | Supported sections | Use when |

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| ---------- | ------------------------------------------ | ----------------------------------------------- |

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| `agentIds` | `tools`, `agents.workspace`, and `sandbox` | One or more runtime agents need stricter rules. |

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Top-level `ingress.session.requireDmScope` remains global because

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`session.dmScope` is not channel-attributable evidence.

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| Selector | Supported sections | Use when |

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| ------------ | ------------------------------------------ | ------------------------------------------------- |

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| `agentIds` | `tools`, `agents.workspace`, and `sandbox` | One or more runtime agents need stricter rules. |

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| `channelIds` | `ingress.channels` | One or more channels need stricter ingress rules. |

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Every scope present in `policy.jsonc` must be valid and enforceable.

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@@ -281,6 +308,15 @@ Every scope present in `policy.jsonc` must be valid and enforceable.

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| ------------------------------ | ----------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------ |

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| `network.privateNetwork.allow` | Private-network SSRF escape hatches | Set to `false` to require private-network access to stay disabled. |

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#### Ingress and channel access

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| Policy field | Observed state | Use when |

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| ----------------------------------------- | -------------------------------------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------ |

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| `ingress.session.requireDmScope` | `session.dmScope` | Require a reviewed direct-message isolation scope. |

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| `ingress.channels.allowDmPolicies` | `channels.*.dmPolicy` and legacy channel DM policy fields | Allow only reviewed direct-message channel policies. |

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| `ingress.channels.denyOpenGroups` | Channel, account, and group ingress policy | Deny open group ingress for configured channels and accounts. |

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| `ingress.channels.requireMentionInGroups` | Channel, account, group, guild, and nested mention gate config | Require mention gates when group ingress is open or mention-gated. |

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#### Gateway

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| Policy field | Observed state | Use when |

@@ -617,6 +653,10 @@ Policy currently verifies:

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| `policy/models-denied-provider` | A configured model provider or model ref uses a denied provider. |

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| `policy/models-unapproved-provider` | A configured model provider or model ref is outside the allowlist. |

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| `policy/network-private-access-enabled` | A private-network SSRF escape hatch is enabled when policy denies it. |

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| `policy/ingress-dm-policy-unapproved` | A channel DM policy is outside the policy allowlist. |

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| `policy/ingress-dm-scope-unapproved` | `session.dmScope` does not match the policy-required DM isolation scope. |

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| `policy/ingress-open-groups-denied` | A channel group policy is `open` while policy denies open group ingress. |

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| `policy/ingress-group-mention-required` | A channel or group entry disables mention gates while policy requires them. |

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| `policy/gateway-non-loopback-bind` | Gateway bind posture permits non-loopback exposure when policy denies it. |

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| `policy/gateway-auth-disabled` | Gateway authentication is disabled when policy requires auth. |

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| `policy/gateway-rate-limit-missing` | Gateway auth rate-limit posture is not explicit when policy requires it. |