- Reports that only show differences in heuristic detection/parity (for example obfuscation-pattern detection on one exec path but not another, such as `node.invoke -> system.run` parity gaps) without demonstrating bypass of auth, approvals, allowlist enforcement, sandboxing, or other documented trust boundaries.

- Reports that only show an ACP tool can indirectly execute, mutate, orchestrate sessions, or reach another tool/runtime without demonstrating bypass of ACP prompt/approval, allowlist enforcement, sandboxing, or another documented trust boundary. ACP silent approval is intentionally limited to narrow readonly classes; parity-only indirect-command findings are hardening, not vulnerabilities.

- Reports that only show untrusted media bytes reaching a maintained native decoder dependency (for example Sharp/libvips/libheif) without proving the shipped dependency version is vulnerable and demonstrating crash, memory corruption, data exposure, or a boundary bypass through OpenClaw. JavaScript header sniffing and image dimension fast-paths are preflight/UX checks, not the security boundary for native decoder correctness.

- Reports whose only impact is transient extra memory, CPU, or allocation work from decoding, base64 expansion, media transcoding, serialization, or other format conversion after the input was already accepted under OpenClaw's configured size/trust limits, including base64 decode-before-size-estimate findings. These are performance issues, not vulnerabilities, unless the report demonstrates unauthenticated amplification, bypass of configured limits, crash/process termination, persistent resource exhaustion, data exposure, or another documented boundary bypass.

- ReDoS/DoS claims that require trusted operator configuration input (for example catastrophic regex in `sessionFilter` or `logging.redactPatterns`) without a trust-boundary bypass.

- Archive/install extraction claims that require pre-existing local filesystem priming in trusted state (for example planting symlink/hardlink aliases under destination directories such as skills/tools paths) without showing an untrusted path that can create/control that primitive.

- Reports that depend on replacing or rewriting an already-approved executable path on a trusted host (same-path inode/content swap) without showing an untrusted path to perform that write.

- Reports whose only claim is that an ACP-exposed tool can indirectly execute commands, mutate host state, or reach another privileged tool/runtime without demonstrating a bypass of ACP prompt/approval, allowlist enforcement, sandboxing, or another documented trust boundary. These are hardening-only findings, not vulnerabilities.

- Reports whose only claim is that exec approvals do not semantically model every interpreter/runtime loader form, subcommand, flag combination, package script, or transitive module/config import. Exec approvals bind exact request context and best-effort direct local file operands; they are not a complete semantic model of everything a runtime may load.

- Reports whose only claim is parser reachability in an up-to-date maintained dependency without showing that the exact shipped dependency build is vulnerable. We keep native media dependencies current; dependency exposure alone is not a vulnerability.

- Reports whose only claim is resource overhead from decode/encode, base64 expansion, media transcoding, serialization, or format-conversion order after input has already passed the applicable configured acceptance limits, including base64 decode-before-size-estimate findings. These are performance-only and should be ignored for GHSA triage unless the report demonstrates unauthenticated amplification, limit bypass, crash/process termination, persistent exhaustion, data exposure, or another documented boundary bypass.

- Exposed secrets that are third-party/user-controlled credentials (not OpenClaw-owned and not granting access to OpenClaw-operated infrastructure/services) without demonstrated OpenClaw impact

- Reports whose only claim is host-side exec when sandbox runtime is disabled/unavailable (documented default behavior in the trusted-operator model), without a boundary bypass.

- Reports whose only claim is that a platform-provided upload destination URL is untrusted (for example Microsoft Teams `fileConsent/invoke` `uploadInfo.uploadUrl`) without proving attacker control in an authenticated production flow.