- Discord/voice: lengthen the default voice join Ready wait, add configurable `voice.connectTimeoutMs`/`voice.reconnectGraceMs`, and warn before destroying unrecovered disconnected sessions so slow Discord voice handshakes and reconnects no longer fail silently. Fixes #63098; refs #39825 and #65039. Thanks @darealgege, @kzicherman, and @ayochim.

- Gateway/health: refresh cached health RPC snapshots when channel runtime state diverges, so Discord and other channel status reads no longer report stale running or connected values until the cache TTL expires. (#75423) Thanks @clawsweeper.

- Gateway/sessions: keep session-store reads from running stale prune and entry-count cap maintenance during startup, so oversized stores no longer block chat history readiness after updates while writes and `sessions cleanup --enforce` still preserve the cleanup safeguards. Fixes #70050. Thanks @tangda18.

- Security/audit: keep plain `security audit` on the cold config/filesystem path and reserve plugin runtime security collectors for `--deep`, so large plugin installs cannot execute every plugin runtime during routine audits. Thanks @vincentkoc.

- Discord/voice: merge configured media-understanding providers such as Deepgram into partial active provider registries, so follow-up voice turns keep transcribing after another media plugin is already active. Fixes #65687. Thanks @OneMintJulep.

- WhatsApp: stage `qrcode` through root mirrored runtime dependencies so packaged QR pairing can render from staged plugin-runtime-deps installs. Fixes #75394. Thanks @FelipeX2001.

- Discord/voice: apply per-channel Discord `systemPrompt` overrides to voice transcript turns by forwarding the trusted channel prompt through the voice agent run. Fixes #47095. Thanks @qearlyao.

openclaw security audit --json

```

Plain `security audit` stays on the cold config/filesystem/read-only path. It does not discover plugin runtime security collectors by default, so routine audits do not load every installed plugin runtime. Use `--deep` to include best-effort live Gateway probes and plugin-owned security audit collectors; explicit internal callers may also opt into those plugin-owned collectors when they already have an appropriate runtime scope.

The audit warns when multiple DM senders share the main session and recommends **secure DM mode**: `session.dmScope="per-channel-peer"` (or `per-account-channel-peer` for multi-account channels) for shared inboxes.

This is for cooperative/shared inbox hardening. A single Gateway shared by mutually untrusted/adversarial operators is not a recommended setup; split trust boundaries with separate gateways (or separate OS users/hosts).

It also emits `security.trust_model.multi_user_heuristic` when config suggests likely shared-user ingress (for example open DM/group policy, configured group targets, or wildcard sender rules), and reminds you that OpenClaw is a personal-assistant trust model by default.

() =>

`\n${theme.heading("Examples:")}\n${formatHelpExamples([

["openclaw security audit", "Run a local security audit."],

["openclaw security audit --deep", "Include best-effort live Gateway probe checks."],

[

"openclaw security audit --deep",

"Include best-effort live Gateway probes and plugin-owned security audit collectors.",

],

["openclaw security audit --deep --token <token>", "Use explicit token for deep probe."],

[

"openclaw security audit --deep --password <password>",

security

.command("audit")

.description("Audit config + local state for common security foot-guns")

.option("--deep", "Attempt live Gateway probe (best-effort)", false)

.option("--deep", "Attempt live Gateway probes and plugin-owned collector checks", false)

.option("--token <token>", "Use explicit gateway token for deep probe auth")

.option("--password <password>", "Use explicit gateway password for deep probe auth")

.option("--fix", "Apply safe fixes (tighten defaults + chmod state/config)", false)

loadPluginMetadataRegistrySnapshotMock(...args),

}));

const { collectPluginSecurityAuditFindings } = await import("./audit.js");

const { collectPluginSecurityAuditFindings, runSecurityAudit } = await import("./audit.js");

function createAuditContext(params: {

sourceConfig: Parameters<typeof collectPluginSecurityAuditFindings>[0]["sourceConfig"];

expect(applyPluginAutoEnableMock).not.toHaveBeenCalled();

expect(loadPluginMetadataRegistrySnapshotMock).not.toHaveBeenCalled();

});

it("keeps plain security audit off plugin collector runtime discovery by default", async () => {

const sourceConfig = {

plugins: {

allow: ["audit-plugin"],

},

};

await runSecurityAudit({

config: sourceConfig,

sourceConfig,

env: {},

includeFilesystem: false,

includeChannelSecurity: false,

stateDir: "/tmp/openclaw-test-state",

configPath: "/tmp/openclaw-test-config.json",

});

expect(getActivePluginRegistryMock).not.toHaveBeenCalled();

expect(applyPluginAutoEnableMock).not.toHaveBeenCalled();

expect(loadPluginMetadataRegistrySnapshotMock).not.toHaveBeenCalled();

});

});

execDockerRawFn: opts.execDockerRawFn,

probeGatewayFn: opts.probeGatewayFn,

plugins: opts.plugins,

loadPluginSecurityCollectors: opts.loadPluginSecurityCollectors !== false,

loadPluginSecurityCollectors: opts.loadPluginSecurityCollectors ?? deep,

workspaceDir,

configSnapshot,

codeSafetySummaryCache: opts.codeSafetySummaryCache ?? new Map<string, Promise<unknown>>(),