// noVNC auth tests cover observer URL construction, one-time tokens, and

// password generation for sandbox browser viewing.

import { describe, expect, it } from "vitest";

import {

buildNoVncDirectUrl,

});

it("issues one-time short-lived observer tokens", () => {

// Observer tokens are bearer access to a browser session, so consumption is

// one-shot and bounded by a short TTL.

resetNoVncObserverTokensForTests();

const token = issueNoVncObserverToken({

noVncPort: 50123,

// Sandbox management tests cover browser runtime listing/removal metadata and

// backend manager wiring.

import { beforeAll, beforeEach, describe, expect, it, vi } from "vitest";

let listSandboxBrowsers: typeof import("./manage.js").listSandboxBrowsers;

});

it("compares browser runtimes against sandbox.browser.image", async () => {

// Browser containers have a different configured image than shell sandboxes;

// management views must compare against the browser label kind.

const results = await listSandboxBrowsers();

const describeInput = firstDescribeRuntimeInput();

// Sandbox env sanitizer tests cover credential filtering for inherited and

// explicitly configured sandbox environment variables.

import { describe, expect, it } from "vitest";

import { sanitizeEnvVars, sanitizeExplicitSandboxEnvVars } from "./sanitize-env-vars.js";

});

it("allows explicit configured sandbox env names that look like credentials", () => {

// Explicit sandbox env config is operator intent; value validation still

// runs, but name-based credential blocking does not.

const result = sanitizeExplicitSandboxEnvVars({

GEMINI_API_KEY: "dummy-gemini-api-key",

GOOGLE_CLIENT_SECRET: "dummy-google-client-secret",

// Sandbox tool policy tests cover effective allow/deny merging and blocked-tool

// guidance for sandboxed agent sessions.

import { describe, expect, it } from "vitest";

import type { OpenClawConfig } from "../../config/config.js";

import { resolveSandboxConfigForAgent } from "./config.js";

});

it("preserves allow-all semantics for allow: [] plus alsoAllow", () => {

// An empty allowlist means allow all except denies; alsoAllow should only

// remove matching default denies, not turn allow-all into allow-some.

const cfg: OpenClawConfig = {

agents: {

defaults: {

});

it("keeps blocked-tool guidance glob-aware and shell-safe", () => {

// The guidance embeds a copy-paste command; quote the real session key while

// keeping the displayed session line compact and terminal-safe.

const sessionKey = "agent:main:weird session;rm -rf /";

const cfg: OpenClawConfig = {

agents: {

// Sandbox workspace tests cover bootstrap file seeding into isolated workspaces

// without following unsafe host links.

import fs from "node:fs/promises";

import os from "node:os";

import path from "node:path";

});

it.runIf(process.platform !== "win32")("skips symlinked bootstrap seed files", async () => {

// Bootstrap files can influence agent behavior; symlinks must not pull in

// arbitrary host files from outside the source workspace.

const root = await makeTempRoot();

const seed = path.join(root, "seed");

const sandbox = path.join(root, "sandbox");