For a node connecting to a non-loopback `ws://` Gateway on a trusted private

network, set `OPENCLAW_ALLOW_INSECURE_PRIVATE_WS=1`. Without it, node startup

fails closed and asks you to use `wss://`, an SSH tunnel, or Tailscale.

`openclaw node install` persists this opt-in into the supervised node service.

This is a process-environment opt-in, not an `openclaw.json` config key.

`openclaw node install` persists it into the supervised node service when it is

present in the install command environment.

## Service (background)

For plaintext private-network `ws://` targets (trusted networks only), set

`OPENCLAW_ALLOW_INSECURE_PRIVATE_WS=1` in the onboarding process environment.

There is no `openclaw.json` equivalent for this client-side transport

break-glass.

Non-interactive custom provider:

- `controlUi.allowedOrigins`: explicit browser-origin allowlist for Gateway WebSocket connects. Required when browser clients are expected from non-loopback origins.

- `controlUi.dangerouslyAllowHostHeaderOriginFallback`: dangerous mode that enables Host-header origin fallback for deployments that intentionally rely on Host-header origin policy.

- `remote.transport`: `ssh` (default) or `direct` (ws/wss). For `direct`, `remote.url` must be `ws://` or `wss://`.

- `OPENCLAW_ALLOW_INSECURE_PRIVATE_WS=1`: client-side break-glass override that allows plaintext `ws://` to trusted private-network IPs; default remains loopback-only for plaintext.

- `OPENCLAW_ALLOW_INSECURE_PRIVATE_WS=1`: client-side process-environment

break-glass override that allows plaintext `ws://` to trusted private-network

IPs; default remains loopback-only for plaintext. There is no `openclaw.json`

equivalent, and browser private-network config such as

`browser.ssrfPolicy.dangerouslyAllowPrivateNetwork` does not affect Gateway

WebSocket clients.

- `gateway.remote.token` / `.password` are remote-client credential fields. They do not configure gateway auth by themselves.

- `gateway.push.apns.relay.baseUrl`: base HTTPS URL for the external APNs relay used by official/TestFlight iOS builds after they publish relay-backed registrations to the gateway. This URL must match the relay URL compiled into the iOS build.

- `gateway.push.apns.relay.timeoutMs`: gateway-to-relay send timeout in milliseconds. Defaults to `10000`.

- **Loopback + SSH/Tailscale Serve** is the safest default (no public exposure).

- Plaintext `ws://` is loopback-only by default. For trusted private networks,

set `OPENCLAW_ALLOW_INSECURE_PRIVATE_WS=1` on the client process as break-glass.

set `OPENCLAW_ALLOW_INSECURE_PRIVATE_WS=1` on the client process as

break-glass. There is no `openclaw.json` equivalent; this must be process

environment for the client making the WebSocket connection.

- **Non-loopback binds** (`lan`/`tailnet`/`custom`, or `auto` when loopback is unavailable) must use gateway auth: token, password, or an identity-aware reverse proxy with `gateway.auth.mode: "trusted-proxy"`.

- `gateway.remote.token` / `.password` are client credential sources. They do **not** configure server auth by themselves.

- Local call paths can use `gateway.remote.*` as fallback only when `gateway.auth.*` is unset.

SecretRef and unresolved, resolution fails closed (no remote fallback masking).

Optional: pin remote TLS with `gateway.remote.tlsFingerprint` when using `wss://`.

Plaintext `ws://` is loopback-only by default. For trusted private-network

paths, set `OPENCLAW_ALLOW_INSECURE_PRIVATE_WS=1` on the client process as break-glass.

paths, set `OPENCLAW_ALLOW_INSECURE_PRIVATE_WS=1` on the client process as

break-glass. This is intentionally process environment only, not an

`openclaw.json` config key.

Local device pairing:

openclaw node restart

```

`OPENCLAW_ALLOW_INSECURE_PRIVATE_WS=1` is process environment, not an

`openclaw.json` setting. `openclaw node install` stores it in the LaunchAgent

environment when it is present on the install command.

Approve the node from the Gateway host:

```bash