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Recent Commits to openclaw:main

test: merge chat side-result checks · openclaw/openclaw@ddd2c2a test: merge cron history checks · openclaw/openclaw@f7eb746 test: merge responsive navigation shell checks · openclaw/openclaw@c2e4b47 docs(changelog): add codex oauth fixes · openclaw/openclaw@628e6cd test: merge navigation routing cases · openclaw/openclaw@5d8cecb Tests: mock channel registry bundled fallback · openclaw/openclaw@2b08233 Secrets: avoid broad web search discovery for single plugin config · openclaw/openclaw@a464f59 test: merge config view browser checks · openclaw/openclaw@20cf511 fix(status): align oauth health with runtime · openclaw/openclaw@eed7116 feat: add macOS screen snapshots for monitor preview (#67954) thanks … · openclaw/openclaw@f377db1 fix: report shared auth scopes in hello-ok (#67810) thanks @BunsDev · openclaw/openclaw@0b6c39b Auto-reply: avoid eager bundled route fallback · openclaw/openclaw@3ea1bf4 Tests: narrow session binding contract setup · openclaw/openclaw@54e4e16 fix(macOS): enable undo/redo in webchat composer text input (#34962) · openclaw/openclaw@00951dc Tests: speed up channel setup promotion · openclaw/openclaw@82b529a Docs: refresh agent instructions · openclaw/openclaw@5775fe2 fix(auth): serialize OAuth refresh across agents to fix #26322 (#67876) · openclaw/openclaw@8e79080 test: allow ollama public surface boundary test · openclaw/openclaw@7d4f1a6 Docs: add test performance guardrails · openclaw/openclaw@89706d3 Tests: restore context-engine usage proof · openclaw/openclaw@e4c4f95 Tests: slim context engine runtime coverage · openclaw/openclaw@74c198f ci: retry failed custom checkouts · openclaw/openclaw@0ee5baf test: trim duplicate provider auth onboarding cases · openclaw/openclaw@1ffc02e matrix: fix sessions_spawn --thread subagent session spawning (#67643) · openclaw/openclaw@1ce2596 test: reduce auth choice fixture churn · openclaw/openclaw@857b9cd test: mock health status config boundaries · openclaw/openclaw@9d5ab4a test: mock onboard config io boundary · openclaw/openclaw@299694d test: mock legacy state plugin boundaries · openclaw/openclaw@2713089 test: mock channel install boundaries · openclaw/openclaw@b945248 test: mock doctor preview channel boundaries · openclaw/openclaw@b1a3ad4
docs(tailscale): clarify Control UI pairing · openclaw/op...
steipete · 2026-04-26 · via Recent Commits to openclaw:main

@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ The dashboard settings panel keeps a token for the current browser tab session a

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## Device pairing (first connection)

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When you connect to the Control UI from a new browser or device, the Gateway requires a **one-time pairing approval** — even if you're on the same Tailnet with `gateway.auth.allowTailscale: true`. This is a security measure to prevent unauthorized access.

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When you connect to the Control UI from a new browser or device, the Gateway usually requires a **one-time pairing approval**. This is a security measure to prevent unauthorized access.

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**What you'll see:** "disconnected (1008): pairing required"

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@@ -58,7 +58,8 @@ Once approved, the device is remembered and won't require re-approval unless you

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<Note>

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- Direct local loopback browser connections (`127.0.0.1` / `localhost`) are auto-approved.

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- Tailnet and LAN browser connects still require explicit approval, even when they originate from the same machine.

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- Tailscale Serve can skip the pairing round trip for Control UI operator sessions when `gateway.auth.allowTailscale: true`, Tailscale identity verifies, and the browser presents its device identity.

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- Direct Tailnet binds, LAN browser connects, and browser profiles without device identity still require explicit approval.

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- Each browser profile generates a unique device ID, so switching browsers or clearing browser data will require re-pairing.

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</Note>

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@@ -237,7 +238,7 @@ Absolute external `http(s)` embed URLs stay blocked by default. If you intention

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- `https://<magicdns>/` (or your configured `gateway.controlUi.basePath`)

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By default, Control UI/WebSocket Serve requests can authenticate via Tailscale identity headers (`tailscale-user-login`) when `gateway.auth.allowTailscale` is `true`. OpenClaw verifies the identity by resolving the `x-forwarded-for` address with `tailscale whois` and matching it to the header, and only accepts these when the request hits loopback with Tailscale's `x-forwarded-*` headers. Set `gateway.auth.allowTailscale: false` if you want to require explicit shared-secret credentials even for Serve traffic. Then use `gateway.auth.mode: "token"` or `"password"`.

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By default, Control UI/WebSocket Serve requests can authenticate via Tailscale identity headers (`tailscale-user-login`) when `gateway.auth.allowTailscale` is `true`. OpenClaw verifies the identity by resolving the `x-forwarded-for` address with `tailscale whois` and matching it to the header, and only accepts these when the request hits loopback with Tailscale's `x-forwarded-*` headers. For Control UI operator sessions with browser device identity, this verified Serve path also skips the device-pairing round trip; device-less browsers and node-role connections still follow the normal device checks. Set `gateway.auth.allowTailscale: false` if you want to require explicit shared-secret credentials even for Serve traffic. Then use `gateway.auth.mode: "token"` or `"password"`.

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For that async Serve identity path, failed auth attempts for the same client IP and auth scope are serialized before rate-limit writes. Concurrent bad retries from the same browser can therefore show `retry later` on the second request instead of two plain mismatches racing in parallel.

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